APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Kyle Dwight Shaddon, pleaded guilty to four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor for possessing over 379 images of child sexual abuse material (“CSAM”). After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to partially consecutive sentencing for a total effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his guilty plea is not valid because it was not written and signed, as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e). He further contends that the trial court erred when it ordered partial consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Moore County jury found the defendant, Fred Wayne Putt, Jr., guilty of being a convicted violent felon in possession of a firearm, simple possession of methamphetamine, possession of a legend drug without a prescription, a muffler violation, and a financial responsibility violation, for which he received a total effective sentence of thirteen years in confinement and a $325 fine. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of a firearm as a convicted violent felon and that the trial court erred in failing to issue a requested jury instruction. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.

In this divorce action, the trial court declared the parties divorced on stipulated grounds.
Following a bench trial on the remaining contested matters, the trial court entered a
memorandum opinion and final decree for divorce (1) naming the wife as the primary
residential parent of the parties’ minor child; (2) setting forth a “two weeks for wife/one
week for husband” rotating residential co-parenting schedule; (3) directing the husband to
pay child support; (4) finding that the husband owed $12,500.00 in child support arrearage;
(5) distributing the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence; and (6) declining to
award attorney’s fees to either party. The court subsequently entered a final order and
permanent parenting plan wherein the court made slight adjustments to the residential coparenting
schedule according to proposed parenting plans submitted by the parties. The
final permanent parenting plan granted to the wife 243 days per year of co-parenting time
and to the husband 122 days. The court set the husband’s monthly child support obligation
at $272.00. The wife has appealed, asserting issues related to the trial court’s credibility
determinations, the permanent parenting plan and best interest of the Child, the amount of
child support and arrearage awarded, and the equitable division of marital property. Upon
careful review, we vacate the trial court’s determination of the husband’s child support
obligation and the award of child support arrearage in the amount of $12,500.00. In all
other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The wife’s request for attorney’s
fees on appeal is denied.

A Knox County grand jury charged the Defendant, Javari Jackson-Allen, via presentment
with two counts of first degree felony murder and one count each of especially aggravated
robbery, first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder, and
employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. At trial, the jury
convicted the Defendant of both counts of first degree felony murder as well as especially
aggravated robbery, the lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide, and the
firearm charge but acquitted the Defendant of attempted first degree murder. Thereafter,
the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that a felony murder
must be the “natural and probable consequence” of the target crime of fraud. After review,
we conclude that the Defendant waived all issues regarding the trial court’s failure to
instruct the jury on the “natural and probable consequences” portion of the criminal
responsibility instruction, and we decline to conduct plain error review. Therefore, we
affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lamarcus Terrell Carpenter, was convicted in the Tipton County Circuit Court of being a felon in possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of violence, a Class B felony; being a felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, and received an effective sentence of sixteen years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of resisting arrest and that the prosecutor’s inappropriate statements during the State’s cross-examination of the Defendant and during the State’s closing argument warrants a new trial. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In two separate indictments, the Defendant, Chase Lyndal Harrison, pleaded guilty to mitigated statutory rape and to possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver a Schedule VI drug (marijuana) over half an ounce. The trial court placed the Defendant on judicial diversion for a total of four years for the two convictions. The Defendant’s probation officers filed multiple probation violation reports, and the trial court issued multiple warrants for the Defendant. After a hearing, the court found the Defendant violated the terms of his probation, and it revoked judicial diversion. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of four years, one of which was to be served in confinement followed by three years of probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it revoked his judicial diversion. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A mother brought a post-divorce contempt petition alleging multiple instances where father had violated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. At the hearing on the contempt petition, the trial court found that mother was in possession of notes from her attorney during her redirect examination. Father moved for a mistrial, and the court granted the motion. Father subsequently objected to a new hearing on the ground that retrial would violate the double jeopardy protections of the state and federal constitutions. We have determined that retrial of the father, who requested the mistrial, would not violate double jeopardy protections.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act. Because of the deficiencies in the appellant’s brief, we deem the appellant’s issues waived. We grant the appellee’s request for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal but decline to vacate the trial court’s order on a post-hearing motion to compel.

The Defendant, Allan Partin, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence for aggravated burglary, domestic assault, and attempted kidnapping and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly apply the two-step process required for revocation of his community corrections sentence. Specifically, the Defendant contends that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings regarding its consequence determination, leaving the record inadequately developed for meaningful appellate review. The State responds that the trial court made the requisite findings before exercising its discretion to order the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. We agree with the Defendant that the trial court failed to articulate its findings concerning the consequence imposed for the revocation. However, upon our de novo review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and conclude that full revocation of his community corrections sentence was proper.

In 2021, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for one count of aggravated assault by strangulation or attempted strangulation. At his 2024 trial, the trial court instructed the jury on the charged aggravated assault offense as well as the lesser included offenses of attempted aggravated assault, reckless aggravated assault, domestic assault, attempted domestic assault, and domestic assault by offensive contact. After deliberating, the jury acquitted the Defendant of aggravated assault by strangulation as well as the lesser-included offenses of attempted aggravated assault and reckless aggravated assault. However, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the domestic assault charge, and the trial court declared a mistrial. At the Defendant’s 2025 retrial, the jury convicted the Defendant of domestic assault. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) his conviction for domestic assault should be vacated and his indictment dismissed with prejudice because the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that domestic assault was a lesser-included offense of the indicted aggravated assault offense; (2) the trial court violated his due process and confrontation rights when it denied him access to the transcript from his first trial, when it restricted his cross-examination of the victim, and when it failed to declare a mistrial in response to the victim’s testimony that the Defendant had “a history of selling [drugs]”; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting unauthenticated photographs of the victim’s alleged injuries; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an excessive sentence and in setting a restrictive appeal bond and bond conditions following the appellate court’s intervention; and (5) the cumulative effect of these errors requires relief. After review, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction for domestic assault, vacate the judgment, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

The Petitioner, Alexander Carino, appeals the coram nobis court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis based upon newly discovered evidence as being time-barred. On appeal, we affirm the coram nobiscourt’s summary dismissal of the petition as being time-barred.

On the first day of a scheduled divorce trial, the parties announced an agreement in open court as to the remaining property issues in dispute. The parties thereafter submitted competing orders to the trial court; the trial court adopted the wife’s proposed language in the final decree. The husband appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment and award the wife her reasonable appellate attorney’s fees and expenses.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. We affirm the trial court’s findings as
to the grounds for termination. Because the trial court declined to consider eight of the
twenty statutory best interest factors, we vacate the trial court’s best interest determination
and remand for reconsideration.

Mother filed a petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan seeking additional parenting time with the child. Father filed a counter-petition alleging that Mother had repeatedly interfered with Father’s parenting time and communication with the child, and he requested that he be designated primary residential parent. The trial court modified the parenting plan by designating Father as the primary residential parent, reducing Mother’s parenting time from 265 days to 120 days, and increasing Father’s parenting time from 100 days to 245 days. Mother appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its application of the best interest factors. We affirm.

A property owner relocated several monuments from a historic family burial ground located on his property and later filed a petition seeking to terminate the land’s use as a burial ground. The defendants, who are other descendants of those identified on the monuments, denied that the burial ground should be closed and filed a counterclaim seeking injunctive relief. After a bench trial, the court found that the statutory requirements for closure were not met and dismissed the petition. The trial court entered an injunction ordering the return of the monuments and the honoring of a defendant’s wish to be buried there. We reverse the portion of the order regarding the defendant’s burial rights. Finding no other reversible error, we affirm in all other respects.

This appeal arises from the termination of parental rights of Dustin S. ("Father"), and Katlyn H. ("Mother"). The trial court found that two grounds had been proven: (1) both parents had committed severe child abuse under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1 113(g)(4) against their children, and (2) each had received a felony sentence of two years for severe child abuse under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(5). The trial court also found that termination of their rights was in the best interest of the children. Both parents appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.

On December 11, 2002, Michael Eugene St. Clair (“the petitioner”) entered a guilty plea to one count of rape in Davidson County, Tennessee. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the petitioner received an eight-year sentence to be served on probation. The special conditions section of the judgment included “sex offender treatment” and “sex offender registry,” but the judgment did not include the condition of community supervision for life mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-524.

The petitioner ultimately violated his probation and was ordered to serve his sentence in confinement. On June 4, 2010, the petitioner was released from Tennessee Department of Correction custody. The petitioner completed the required sex offender registry, which specified that the petitioner had “no supervised release.” On August 16, 2010, however, the Davidson County Criminal Court entered a “Corrected Judgment,” which included community supervision for life as a special condition.

On September 20, 2024, the petitioner, a resident of Sumner County, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Williamson County, asserting that his liberty has been unlawfully restrained under a void judgment, citing the “Corrected Judgment. ”The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Williamson County was not the proper venue and that the petitioner had failed to include a copy of the guilty plea transcript. The habeas court granted the State’s motion to dismiss on those two procedural grounds.

The petitioner appealed, contending that the habeas court erred in dismissing the petition on the two procedural grounds. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the habeas court’s dismissal of the petition on those two grounds. The court then concluded, sua sponte, that the petitioner would not be entitled to relief on the merits of his claim.

The petitioner has filed an application for permission to appeal to this Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure. In the application, the petitioner maintains that the habeas court erred in dismissing his petition. The petitioner also argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in addressing the merits of his petition despite affirming dismissal of the petition on the two procedural grounds addressed by the habeas court.

Upon consideration of the application for permission to appeal and the record before us, the application is granted in part and denied in part.

As to the portion of the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals that affirmed the habeas court’s dismissal of the petition on the two procedural grounds, we deny the application for permission to appeal. Accordingly, we leave that portion of the opinion and judgment—and, therefore, the habeas court’s dismissal of the petition—undisturbed. The denial of review as to the dismissal on the two procedural grounds is, to the extent authorized by law, without prejudice to refiling a compliant petition in a proper venue.

The State of Tennessee has filed an application for extraordinary appeal pursuant
to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10, seeking review of the trial court’s
November 19, 2025 bench ruling granting the Defendant’s request for a jury trial on the
issue of his competency to stand trial. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-7-301(b)(2). The State
asserts that immediate review is warranted because the ruling departs from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings and because, absent review, the State may lose
a right or interest that cannot later be recaptured. See Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a); Gilbert v.
Wessels, 458 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Tenn. 2014).

This appeal arises from claims of negligence and negligence per se stemming from a dog bite. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff after the defendant failed to respond to the lawsuit. Nine months after the entry of the final order, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. The defendant claimed that he had not been served, had not been aware of the lawsuit, and the facts upon which summary judgment had been granted were false. The trial court denied the motion to set aside. The defendant appeals. We affirm.

The pro se Defendant, Julius Gionni Godbolt-Roserie, has filed an application for
extraordinary review of the trial court’s May 27, 2026 order dismissing a probation
violation warrant. Upon review of the Defendant’s application and applicable law, we have
determined that a response from the State is not necessary. Upon full consideration, the
Defendant’s application is DENIED.

The pro se Petitioner has filed an application for extraordinary appeal, see Tenn. R.
App. P. 10, seeking review of two trial court orders: (1) the April 10, 2026 order
adjudicating the Petitioner’s motion seeking return of seized property pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) and (2) the May 27, 2026 order denying the
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The Petitioner asserts that “the lower court has so
far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings so as to require
immediate review,” Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a) because the April 10, 2026 order incorporated
an inventory document, with which the Petitioner disagrees, and the trial court denied
reconsideration of that order.

This is an action for access to records from a homicide investigation assigned to the “cold case” section of the Metropolitan Police Department of Nashville and Davidson County (“MNPD”). The petitioner sought, among other things, all reports in the case file, all E-911 recordings in the file, and the personnel records of any employee who authored a report or memo in the file. MNPD denied the request in full because the investigation was still open. Petitioner then commenced this action against MNPD and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) to compel them to comply with the records request. Petitioner argued that the records she requested were not related to a “pending or contemplated” criminal action because MNPD had no active leads and had transferred the investigation to the Cold Case Section. After conducting an evidentiary hearing based on declarations, the trial court ordered Metro to disclose the E-911 records, but it held that MNPD had no duty to produce the personnel records because the request was not sufficiently detailed. Relying on the decision in Tennessean v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, 485 S.W.3d 857 (Tenn. 2016), the trial court concluded that the remaining records were exempt from disclosure under the state law exception to the Tennessee Public Records Act and under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. The court also denied the petitioner’s request for an award of attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Wiley Vanover, pled guilty to multiple offenses in two cases. The trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence and placed the Defendant on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant violated the conditions of his probation, and the trial court revoked the suspended sentence in part and ordered him to serve five of the six years in custody. On appeal, the Defendant admits that he violated his probation conditions but asserts that the trial court should have imposed a lesser sanction, such as reinstatement to probation or split confinement. Upon our review, we conclude that the record does not contain the findings necessary for this court to conduct meaningful appellate review of the consequence determination as required by State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. 2022). Accordingly, we respectfully vacate the revocation orders and remand the case to the trial court for further findings regarding the appropriate consequence for the violations.

While serving a probated sentence, the Defendant, Susan Escobar, was arrested and
charged with one count of evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, creating a risk
of death or serious bodily injury. The Defendant entered a best interest guilty plea and,
following a combined probation revocation and sentencing hearing, the trial court revoked
her probation in full and imposed a sentence of seven years’ incarceration. On appeal, the
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing her sentence because it failed to
place sufficient findings on the record regarding the applicable enhancement factors.
Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Kenneth Earl Murphy, appeals his Hardin County Circuit Court
convictions of rape of a child and incest, for which he received an effective sentence of
thirty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
convicting evidence and argues that the trial court committed plain error by 1) failing to
issue a curative instruction following his testimony regarding a polygraph test; 2)
permitting the introduction of the indictment while simultaneously instructing the jury not
to consider it as evidence; 3) instructing the jury that an admission against interest had been
raised by the proof; and 4) permitting the introduction of irrelevant and prejudicial
character evidence. The Defendant also asserts that the cumulative effect of the errors in
this case entitles him to a new trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.