

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs June 2, 2026

IN RE BRANTLEY S. ET AL.¹Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Grainger County
No. 2024-JV-10 Steven Lane Wolfenbarger, Judge

No. E2025-01999-COA-R3-PT

This appeal arises from the termination of parental rights of Dustin S. (“Father”), and Katlyn H. (“Mother”). The trial court found that two grounds had been proven: (1) both parents had committed severe child abuse under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(4) against their children, and (2) each had received a felony sentence of two years for severe child abuse under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(5). The trial court also found that termination of their rights was in the best interest of the children. Both parents appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, and CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JJ., joined.

Pepper Bowser, Rutledge, Tennessee, for the appellant, Dustin S.

Agnes Trujillo, Strawberry Plains, Tennessee for the appellant, Katlyn H.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; and Alison E. Potterfield, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

¹ This Court has a policy of protecting the identities of children by initializing the last names of the parties.

OPINION

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mother and Father (collectively “Parents”), a married couple, are the parents of two children (the “Children”), Brantley S. (hereafter “Brantley”), born in June 2020, and Charleigh S. (“Charleigh”), born in July 2022.

Brantley, the older child, was placed in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) in May of 2022 after testing positive for methamphetamine on a hair follicle screen. Charleigh was removed from Father’s custody a week after she was born in July 2022. Mother regained custody of Brantley in July 2023 while Father was only permitted supervised visitation.

On February 28, 2024, the Children were found to be living in a motel room with Mother; however, she had left Brantley unsupervised in Father’s care knowing it was a violation of the court’s order restricting Father to supervised visitation only. Because a search of the motel room revealed drug paraphernalia, the Children were tested for drug exposure. Both children tested positive for methamphetamine. As a result, they were removed from Mother’s custody.

On March 1, 2024, a dependency and neglect petition was filed by DCS in the Grainger County Juvenile Court.² On the same day, the Children were placed in the temporary legal custody of DCS pursuant to a protective custody order. DCS then placed the Children with a foster family.

The Parents were arrested on July 4 and July 5, 2024, respectively. Each subsequently pled guilty in the Criminal Court for Hamblen County to child abuse and neglect under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-15-401(a), a Class D felony, with the offense date identified as February 28, 2024. Each parent received a two-year and one day sentence.³

At an adjudicatory hearing on November 19, 2024, the Juvenile Court for Grainger County found that Mother and Father had committed severe child abuse against the

² An amended petition was filed May 24, 2024.

³ The criminal court judgments are in the record as Exhibit 11 and Exhibit 12 respectively. Father’s case number is 24CR413 and Mother’s case number is 24CR414. Father served nine months in jail before his release to a treatment facility while Mother served ninety days in jail. Upon her release, Mother resided in a halfway house from May 2025 until August 2025. Following Father’s release, Parents lived together in a halfway house in Knoxville.

Children, stating in an order “Mother and Father agree that they exposed the children to methamphetamine to such a degree that the children tested positive for methamphetamine on their hair follicle drug tests[.]”

On May 23, 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. In June 2025, the Children were placed with a new foster family, Michelle N., Colin N. and their six adopted children.⁴ The family had previously provided respite care for the Children.

The case was tried on October 14, 2025. Parents, represented by counsel, participated in the trial. Also present were counsel for DCS, guardian ad litem Jordan Long, DCS Case Manager Emileah Buffalo, Omni Case Manager Josh Weitzel, and Michelle N., the Children’s foster mother. Parents stipulated to a finding of severe child abuse, as well as to the fact that they were both sentenced to more than two years imprisonment for an incident of severe child abuse of a child under the age of eight. The criminal court judgments evidencing their convictions and sentences were also admitted into evidence as respective Exhibits 11 and 12.

When counsel for DCS asked the court to admit into evidence the entire record from the dependency and neglect action, referred to as “Collective Exhibit 1,” counsel for Mother objected on the grounds of hearsay and relevance. After hearing arguments, the court admitted into evidence all prior orders in Collective Exhibit 1, but struck all other documents.

Mother testified stating that she understood that the Children were removed from her care due to her use of methamphetamines and she acknowledged that they tested positive for methamphetamines at the time of removal. Mother described her residence as a halfway house in Knoxville and said she was looking for an apartment. She testified that she works at McDonald’s and sees the Children twice a month. Mother described the visits as “wonderful,” stating that the Children run up to her calling her “Mommy” and giving her hugs and kisses. She stated that she brings diapers, drinks, and snacks to visits. She testified that the Children ask about Father and recognize his picture on a cell phone screen. Mother testified that she pays child support. She also asserted that she has been sober since July 2024 and discontinued suboxone April 2025.

Father then testified, acknowledging that he lost custody of the Children previously and that they were most recently removed from his care in February of 2024 “because I was a meth addict.” He admitted that his visits with the Children were supposed to be supervised but thought that Mother could supervise the visits. Father testified that he had used methamphetamines off and on for 15 years and that the Children’s positive test for methamphetamines was “probably being around me . . . it does come out of your pores.”

⁴ The previous foster family relocated out of state, which necessitated a change of custody.

Father stated that he has been sober since July 2024 and is committed to sobriety, which he currently maintains by going to meetings three times a week. Father is employed at McDonald's. He testified that child support was scheduled to begin coming out of his employment checks from McDonald's soon and that he is looking for an apartment and trying to get a driver's license.

The next witness was Emileah Buffalo, a foster care case manager with DCS. Regarding the Children's removal, she testified that Child Protective Services had responded to allegations of environmental neglect in February 2024 and their investigation revealed drug paraphernalia. Then, she stated, hair follicle tests of both Children resulted in positive results for methamphetamine which led to the second removal of the Children.

The court then heard from Josh Weitzel, resource coordinator at Omni Family Services. He testified that the Children are settled and thriving in their new foster home. He stated that the foster family appropriately advocates for services for the Children and that "they are on top of things" like obtaining regular assessments for the Children.

Michelle N., the current foster mother, testified, stating that she works as a nurse practitioner for East Tennessee Children's Hospital and her husband works at an accounting firm. They have six adopted children, ranging in age from ten to seventeen. Her children have a good relationship with Brantley and Charleigh. Michelle N. then testified that Charleigh has a language deficit and sensory processing concerns while Brantley has bilateral strabismus and PTSD. The Children see a therapist, are in daycare and are "making progress." Michelle N. further testified that she and her husband are willing to adopt the Children.

Following the conclusion of the trial, the court found that two grounds for termination of Mother and Father's parental rights had been proven. The court also found that termination of both parents' parental rights was in the Children's best interests, noting that fourteen of the best interest factors favored terminating Father's parental rights and ten factors favored terminating Mother's parental rights. Based on these and other findings, the court terminated the parental rights of both Mother and Father.

This appeal followed.

ISSUES

The following issues have been restated slightly for clarity.

Father presents the following issue for review on appeal: "Whether the trial court erred by finding clear and convincing evidence that the termination of Father's parental rights was in the best interest of the Children."

Mother presents the following issues for review on appeal:

1. Does the record on appeal properly include all or part of Collective Exhibit 1, tendered by DCS at the outset of trial, where the trial court reserved ruling on its admission but indicated that it would take judicial notice of its own orders entered in the related foster care case?
2. Did the trial court properly weigh certain best interest factors in favor of termination because of an inability to determine whether Mother would remain sober in the future?
3. Did the trial court properly place significant weight on the quality of the Children's foster home where they had been placed for a few months prior to trial?

DCS presents the following issues for review on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court properly determined that grounds existed to terminate the Parents' parental rights.
2. Whether the trial court properly determined that termination of the Parents' parental rights was in the Children's best interest.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The right of biological parents to the custody and care of their children "is among the oldest of the judicially recognized liberty interests protected by the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions." *In re M.L.P.*, 228 S.W.3d 139, 142 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citing *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000); *Hawk v. Hawk*, 855 S.W.2d 573, 578–79 (Tenn. 1993); *Ray v. Ray*, 83 S.W.3d 726, 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). Although fundamental, "this right is not without limitation and may be terminated if clear and convincing evidence supports termination under pertinent statutory authority." *State v. C.H.K.*, 154 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing *Santosky v. Kramer*, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)).

"A party seeking to terminate parental rights must prove both the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination and that termination is in the child's best interest." *In re Scarlet W.*, No. W2020-00999-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 144232, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2021) (citing *In re Jacobe M.J.*, 434 S.W.3d 565, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013); see also *In re Carrington H.*, 483 S.W.3d 507, 522–23 (Tenn. 2016); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)).

We review a trial court’s findings of fact de novo upon the record, giving the trial court a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. *In re Elizabeth Y.*, No. E2023-01448-COA-R3-PT, 2024 WL 3738701, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2024) (See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); see also *In re Carrington H.*, 483 S.W.3d at 523–24; *In re F.R.R., III*, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tenn. 2006)). The trial court’s conclusion that there is sufficient evidence to support a termination of parental rights is a conclusion of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. *In re Jordan P.*, No. E2022-00499-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 2770680, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2023) (citing *In re Carrington H.*, 483 S.W.3d at 524).

ANALYSIS

I. COLLECTIVE EXHIBIT 1

Mother contends that Collective Exhibit 1 contains material that was not admitted into evidence based on her objection due to hearsay, relevance and lack of foundation. When the issue was raised at trial, the court struck all non-orders from the exhibit and only considered the orders contained in Collective Exhibit 1 as evidence.

As Mother correctly notes, the stricken material has been erroneously included in the record before us. Nevertheless, Mother acknowledges that the matter is “harmless clerical error and raises the issue for purposes of clarity only,” requesting that we exclude the non-order material from our review of the record.

We agree with Mother that the inclusion of the stricken documents is harmless error. *See A.M. by Amanda M. v. Masek*, No. W2024-01412-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 2701750, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2025) (citing *Smith v. Smith*, No. W2013-02095-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 3971836, at *4 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Momon v. State*, 18 S.W.3d 152, 165 (Tenn. 1999)) (instructing appellate courts to “focus[] on the underlying fairness of the proceeding rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.”).

Accordingly, as Mother requests, we will not consider the stricken materials.

II. GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

Parents do not challenge the trial court’s statutory determination that grounds exist to terminate their rights to Brantley and Charleigh. Nonetheless, we are tasked with reviewing the trial court’s findings as to each ground for termination, regardless of whether these findings are challenged on appeal. *In re Carrington H.*, 483 S.W.3d at 525–26.

In this case, the trial court relied upon final non-appealable court orders to find that two grounds for termination had been proven. One ground being that a child has been found

to be a victim of severe child abuse, as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-102, and the parent has been found to have knowingly or with gross negligence either committed severe child abuse or failed to protect the child from severe child abuse. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4). The other ground being that the parent has been sentenced to more than two years' imprisonment for conduct against a child that has been found under any prior order of a court or that is found by the court hearing the petition to be severe child abuse, as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-102.⁵ *See* Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(5).

Here, the trial court relied upon the November 19, 2024, Adjudicatory Order wherein the juvenile court found that Mother and Father committed severe abuse of the Children by exposing them to methamphetamine to such a degree that the Children tested positive for methamphetamine on hair follicle drug tests. Significantly, no appeal was taken from the dependency and neglect judgment. Thus, it constitutes a final, non-appealable judgment which implicates the doctrine of *res judicata*. This doctrine prevents a parent from re-litigating whether he or she committed severe child abuse in a later termination of parental rights proceeding when such a finding had been made in a previous dependency and neglect action. *See In re I.E.A.*, 511 S.W.3d 507, 517 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (citing *In re Dakota C.R.*, 404 S.W.3d 484, 497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012)).

The trial court also relied upon the judgments from the Criminal Court for Hamblen County to find that both Parents had been convicted of severe child abuse under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-15-401(a), a class D felony, and that each parent had been sentenced to serve more than two years for the felony of severe child abuse. Because no appeal was taken from these judgments, they too are final, non-appealable judgments.

When a ground for termination is based on a criminal conviction, “[w]e need not look beyond the judgments of conviction in considering this ground for termination.” *In re Allainah B.*, No. M2020-01381-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 4453465, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2021) (citing *In re Audrey S.*, 182 S.W.3d 838, 876 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)) (footnote omitted). Here, the judgments against Mother and Father for “Child Abuse/Neglect/Endangerment 8 Yrs or Less” are part of the record.

We therefore affirm the trial court’s determination that two grounds were proven, specifically that Mother and Father knowingly or with gross negligence either committed severe child abuse or failed to protect the child from severe child abuse under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(4), and that Mother and Father had been sentenced to more

⁵ “Unless otherwise stated, for purposes of subdivision (g)(5), ‘sentenced’ shall not be construed to mean that the parent or guardian must have actually served more than two (2) years in confinement, but shall only be construed to mean that the court had imposed a sentence of more than two (2) years upon the parent or guardian[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(5).

than two years' imprisonment for conduct against a child that has been found under any prior order of a court or that is found by the court hearing the petition to be severe child abuse, as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-102. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(5).

Because at least one ground for termination has been proven, we shall now address the Children's best interests.

III. BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN

Once a court has found clear and convincing evidence of one or more grounds for termination, "the interests of parent and child diverge." *In re Jude M.*, 619 S.W.3d 224, 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020) (citations omitted). "While the parent's interests do not evaporate upon a finding of unfitness, the focus of the proceedings shifts to the best interests of the child." *In re Audrey S.*, 182 S.W.3d at 877 (citation omitted).

"Facts considered in the best interest analysis must be proven by 'a preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.'" *In re Gabriella D.*, 531 S.W.3d 662, 681 (Tenn. 2017) (citations omitted). After a court makes its factual findings regarding the grounds for termination, it must consider the combined weight of the best interest factors to determine whether it amounts to clear and convincing proof that termination is in the child's best interests. *See id.*; *see also In re Kaliyah S.*, 455 S.W.3d 533, 555–56 (Tenn. 2015).

In determining whether termination of parental rights is in a child's best interest, courts must consider the non-exhaustive list of statutory factors in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i)(1). *In re M.A.R.*, 183 S.W.3d 652, 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). These statutory factors are not exclusive, and courts are free to consider any other proof offered at a termination proceeding that is relevant to the best interest analysis. *In re Neveah M.*, 614 S.W.3d 659, 679 (Tenn. 2020) (citations omitted).

Evaluating the best interest factors is not as simple as tallying which weighs in favor of and against termination. *In re Chayson D.*, 720 S.W.3d 123, 146 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2023). Instead, courts must conduct a holistic assessment of whether terminating a parent's rights is in the best interest of the child. *In re Violet L.*, No. W2025-00982-COA-R3-PT, 2026 WL 1831898, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2026).

The best interest factors the courts are to consider in termination proceedings are set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i), which read as follows:

- (A) The effect a termination of parental rights will have on the child's critical need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the child's minority;

- (B) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to have on the child's emotional, psychological, and medical condition;
- (C) Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting the child's basic material, educational, housing, and safety needs;
- (D) Whether the parent and child have a secure and healthy parental attachment, and if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that the parent can create such attachment;
- (E) Whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact with the child and used the visitation or other contact to cultivate a positive relationship with the child;
- (F) Whether the child is fearful of living in the parent's home;
- (G) Whether the parent, parent's home, or others in the parent's household trigger or exacerbate the child's experience of trauma or post-traumatic symptoms;
- (H) Whether the child has created a healthy parental attachment with another person or persons in the absence of the parent;
- (I) Whether the child has emotionally significant relationships with persons other than parents and caregivers, including biological or foster siblings, and the likely impact of various available outcomes on these relationships and the child's access to information about the child's heritage;
- (J) Whether the parent has demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial for the child to be in the home of the parent, including consideration of whether there is criminal activity in the home or by the parent, or the use of alcohol, controlled substances, or controlled substance analogues which may render the parent unable to consistently care for the child in a safe and stable manner;
- (K) Whether the parent has taken advantage of available programs, services, or community resources to assist in making a lasting adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions;

- (L) Whether the department has made reasonable efforts to assist the parent in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in the custody of the department;
- (M) Whether the parent has demonstrated a sense of urgency in establishing paternity of the child, seeking custody of the child, or addressing the circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made an award of custody unsafe and not in the child's best interest;
- (N) Whether the parent, or other person residing with or frequenting the home of the parent, has shown brutality or physical, sexual, emotional, or psychological abuse or neglect toward the child or any other child or adult;
- (O) Whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the child or any other child;
- (P) Whether the parent has demonstrated an understanding of the basic and specific needs required for the child to thrive;
- (Q) Whether the parent has demonstrated the ability and commitment to creating and maintaining a home that meets the child's basic and specific needs and in which the child can thrive;
- (R) Whether the physical environment of the parent's home is healthy and safe for the child;
- (S) Whether the parent has consistently provided more than token financial support for the child; and
- (T) Whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision of the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1).

The trial court made specific findings of fact regarding each factor it deemed relevant and found that ten factors, A, B, C, H, I, L, N, O, Q, and R, favored terminating Mother's parental rights and that fourteen factors, A, B, C, D, E, H, I, L, N, O, P, Q, R, and S, favored terminating Father's parental rights, each of which we discuss below.

The trial court found that the first three factors, A, B, and C, favored termination of both Parents' parental rights. In pertinent part, the court found that foster parents provide

excellent care for the Children and, although the Children's current placement is of short duration, they are thriving in this home due in part to the fact that the foster family provided respite for the Children while they were in their former foster home, and the Children developed a relationship with the family. Significantly, the court found a disruption from yet another placement would be detrimental to the Children. The court also found it significant that the foster mother is a nurse practitioner who focuses on diagnoses and treating conditions related to in-utero drug exposure and finding resources and therapies for them. Additionally, the court noted that she is familiar with recognizing deficits and behavior that the Children have, such as PTSD, learning delays, toxic encephalopathy, speech delays, and sensory processing concerns. Because of her expertise and the services she has obtained for the Children, the Children have improved. The court also found that any disruption of their relationship could certainly be detrimental to the medical, emotional, or psychological condition of the Children. Based on these and other findings the court found that these factors favor terminating both Parents' rights.

As for factors D and E, the court found the Children have a healthy parental attachment to Mother, but not Father, as she has visited them regularly, having missed only five of 25 scheduled visits, which go well. Father, however, has not seen the Children in over a year and there is no reasonable expectation that such an attachment would be created any time soon. Therefore, the court found that this factor does not weigh in favor of terminating the parental rights of Mother, but it does weigh in favor of terminating the parental rights of Father.

The court found that factors F and G were not relevant.

As for factors H and I, the court found that the Children are well bonded with the foster parents and their other children, that the Children refer to their foster parents as "Mom" and "Dad." Thus, the court found that these factors weigh in favor of terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father.

As for factor J, whether the parent has demonstrated a lasting adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial for the Children to be in the home of the parent, the trial court did not make a finding as to this factor, other than to note that it was too early to determine. The court noted that Parents' current lodging, a halfway house, is not appropriate for the Children. And, there is a substantial history of drug abuse, particularly by Father, which include episodes of relapses. Based on these findings, the court declined to state whether this factor did or did not favor termination.

Regarding factor K, the trial court found that both parents have taken advantage of several resources, including assessments and programs designed to treat drug addiction. It noted that Father attends weekly addiction meetings and is seeking a sponsor, both Parents live in a halfway house, and both work. Thus, the court found that this factor weighs against terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father.

Concerning factors L and M, the court found that DCS made reasonable efforts to assist Parents by maintaining contact with them, performing drug screens, and paying for assessments and services. Nevertheless, the court found that both parents completed some assessments and programs to achieve sobriety and regain custody. Therefore, it concluded that factor L weighs in favor of terminating their parental rights while factor M does not weigh in favor of terminating their rights.

As for factor N, the court found that both parents pled guilty to child abuse in criminal court in Hamblen County and they were both found to have severely abused the Children in the dependency and neglect action. It also noted that the parents did not contest these facts. Thus, the trial court found that this factor weighs in favor of terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father.

Concerning factor O, whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the children or other children, the court noted that both Parents and both Children were positive for methamphetamine. While Mother regained custody of Brantley, her older child, for a few months, she relapsed on methamphetamine. Accordingly, the court found that this factor weighs in favor of terminating both Parents' rights.

As for factor P, the court noted that Mother exhibited genuine interest in the Children's health and wellbeing while Father remains under a no contact order with the Children, and there is no evidence that he made any effort to keep up with their needs or develop an understanding of what the Children need at this time. Thus the court found that this factor weighs against terminating the parental rights of Mother but it weighs in favor of terminating the parental rights of Father.

Regarding factors Q and R, the court noted that both parents currently reside in a halfway house that is not appropriate for the Children. Consequently, these factors weigh in favor of terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father.

As for factor S, the court found that Mother pays \$60 per month for child support and she provided in kind support by bringing clothing, food, and other items during her visits with the Children while there is no evidence that Father has provided any financial support. Thus, the court found that this factor weighs against terminating the parental rights of Mother but weighs in favor of terminating the parental rights of Father.

The court made no finding concerning factor T.

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court found that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the Children that the parental rights of Mother and Father be terminated.

After considering the relevant factors and having conducted our own de novo review of the record, we have determined that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court's factual findings. We also hold that the combined weight of the relevant factors amounts to clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother and Father's parental rights is in the best interest of the Children. *See In re Carrington H.*, 483 S.W.3d at 535; *see also In re Kaliyah S.*, 455 S.W.3d at 555–56.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's determination that termination of Mother and Father's parental rights is in the Children's best interest.

IN CONCLUSION

The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed. Costs of appeal are assessed against the appellants, Katlyn H. and Dustin S.

FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., C.J.