APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellee-plaintiff sued the appellant-defendant alleging breach of contract and
professional negligence with regard to a contract for architectural services. The plaintiff
ultimately moved for summary judgment on these claims, to which the defendant failed to
respond. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion, finding that the undisputed facts
entitled the plaintiff to judgment on both claims, and awarded the plaintiff its damages.
The defendant appeals the final judgment. Finding no error in the trial court’s decision,
we affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We further find
this appeal frivolous and grant the plaintiff its costs and expenses, including reasonable
attorney’s fees.

Defendant, Michael Steven Borel, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s order fully revoking his sentence of probation. On appeal, Defendant contends his conduct amounted only to a technical violation and the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence incarcerated. After review, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking Defendant’s probationary sentence for his felony conviction following a finding of a first technical probation violation. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and reinstate Defendant’s probation for the felony offense. Asto Defendant’s probated misdemeanor sentences however, following our de novo review, we affirm the trial court’s full revocation of probation.

Devonta Curry, Movant,filed a pro se motion titled “Motion for Rule 36.1 Correction of Illegal Sentence.” The trial court summarily denied the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. We affirm the trial court’s judgment but remand for entry of corrected judgments of conviction for Counts 1-7 in Case No. 18-551,reflecting that Movant was convicted by a jury.

The Defendant, Charles Gary Blankenship, II, has filed a pro se application for extraordinary appeal, see Tenn. R. App. P. 10, seeking review of the trial court’s August 24, 2026 capias for failure to appear. We have determined that a response from the State is not necessary in this matter. Tenn. R. App. P. 10(d). Upon review of the application and its supporting documents, we conclude that the Defendant has not demonstrated grounds for extraordinary relief under Rule 10. Accordingly, the application is DENIED.

Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the Defendant, William B. Morton, appeals a certified question of law related to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the results of blood alcohol testing performed on a sample of his blood obtained via search warrant. Following our de novo review of the question presented and our examination of the record, we conclude that the certified question fails to identify the scope and limits of the issue presented and is not dispositive of the case. Thus, in keeping with the recent directive of our supreme court, we dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the trial court to provide the Defendant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.

The Defendant, James Chadwick Vaughn, pled guilty in the Criminal Court for Sumner County to three Class D felonies and two misdemeanors. The plea petition provided that the trial court would determine the specific sentence, within a range of eight to twelve years for the felony convictions, with all sentences served concurrently. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twelve years in confinement and ordered the Defendant to participate in a rehabilitative program as a condition of parole. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court committed plain error by classifying the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender; (2) whether the trial court erred by imposing a condition of parole; and (3) whether the Defendant’s plea was valid and complied with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Upon our review, we respectfully vacate the parole condition and remand the case for entry of corrected judgments. We further conclude that we lack authority to review the validity of the Defendant’s guilty plea. We respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects.

The Defendant, Jason Cooper, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court conviction of
aggravated burglary, for which he received a sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration. On
appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction.
Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tony Samuel, Petitioner, filed a pro se petition that the trial court construed as a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner failed “to plead with particularity both the substance of the newly discovered evidence and the factual basis for tolling the statute of limitations. ”Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Defendant, Celso Valentin Ferto, appeals his convictions for two counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of solicitation of a minor, arguing (1) the trial court erred in admitting forensic interviews pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-123, (2) the admission of the forensic videos violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause, and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Eric Sims, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged in effective assistance of trial counsel. The Petitioner claims on appeal that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition in that he established in effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel 1) stipulated to the Petitioner’s gang affiliation;2) failed to file a motion to suppress an unduly suggestive photographic lineup;and3) failed to adequately cross-examine and impeach three of the State’s witnesses. He also argues that he is entitled to post-conviction relief under the cumulative error doctrine. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment but remand for entry of corrected judgments of conviction.

This is a negligence action arising from an accident wherein the plaintiff pedestrian was
struck by a motor vehicle driven by the defendant driver in a crosswalk. The crosswalk
was partially blocked by a parked repair truck belonging to the defendant city and operated
by a city employee. Following a jury trial, the jury found that all parties were negligent
and assigned comparative fault of twenty-five percent to the plaintiff, seventy percent to
the city, and five percent to the driver. Upon the jury’s finding that the plaintiff had suffered
$250,000.00 in damages, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the
amount of $187,500.00 (as seventy-five percent of his damages), with $175,000.00 to be
paid by the city and $12,500.00 to be paid by the driver. The city and the driver each filed
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and remittitur, and the city also filed a
motion for new trial. Following a hearing, the trial court denied all post-trial motions. The
city appealed, and the driver has also raised an issue on appeal. Discerning no reversible
error, we affirm.

The plaintiff appeals a final order dismissing his complaint. Because the plaintiff did not file his notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Appellate Court within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Tony Markee Mosley, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Because we conclude that a self-represented criminal defendant has no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel from an attorney acting in a standby or advisory role, and because trial counsel provided effective assistance while actively representing the petitioner, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Gena Kilgore, of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $2,500.Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a two-year term of judicial diversion and ordered the Defendant to pay $2,500 in restitution. The Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s denial of her request to sit at counsel table during her trial. Because we conclude we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal, we dismiss it.

The defendant, Caleb James Fryfogle, was convicted by a Maury County jury of two counts of driving under the influence and one count of driving without a license for which he received an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to probation after service of four days incarceration and suspension of his license for a year. Additionally, as a result of his convictions, the defendant’s license was suspended for a year. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in finding that he voluntarily consented to the warrantless blood draw. Following our review of the record, the applicable law, the parties’ briefs, and oral arguments, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress.

This matter is before the Court upon petition of the Defendant, Harshal Dilip Trivedi, for an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2. The Defendant seeks review of the trial judge’s order denying his motion to recuse. Upon review, and for the reasons stated below, the petition is denied.

In this interlocutory appeal, two of the defendants appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion to dismiss for the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the pre-suit notice and good faith certificate requirements of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. We affirm the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

This litigation arises from a dispute between cousins who started a business together. During discovery, the trial court found that the plaintiff failed to respond in good faith to the defendants’ requests for admission and deemed all requests admitted. Shortly thereafter, the court entered an order granting the plaintiff’s attorney leave to withdraw. The defendants/counter-plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment on all claims asserted by and against them, relying on the admissions as well as declarations they submitted. The plaintiff failed to file any response to the motions for summary judgment. However, he did appear pro se at the summary judgment hearing and claimed that he was unaware of the summary judgment motions until two days earlier because he did not know that his email address had been provided to opposing counsel and the court, and he had not checked that email since his counsel withdrew. The trial court allowed the plaintiff to testify as to these facts. However, the court ultimately found that the plaintiff was properly served with the motions and had notice of the hearing date. Considering the evidence submitted by the defendants in support of the motions for summary judgment, in addition to the plaintiff’s admissions and his failure to respond to the statements of material facts, the court found that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on all claims. Thus, the trial court dismissed the claims asserted by the plaintiff and also granted the defendant/counter plaintiffs damages on their counterclaims. The plaintiff retained counsel and timely filed a motion to alter or amend, asserting that his failure to respond to the summary judgment motions was due to excusable neglect. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff’s proffered excuse was a tactic for delay, he was not credible, and he acted intentionally. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

During a divorce proceeding, a husband and wife signed a marital dissolution agreement that provided two trusts they had previously formed would be terminated, and the assets distributed to the wife. However, neither the trustee nor the two trust beneficiaries were made parties to the divorce proceeding, and the trusts remained in existence for several years. The wife filed a lawsuit in circuit court and named the trustee and other beneficiaries as defendants. Default judgments were entered against each defendant. The trustee filed a motion to set aside the judgment that was granted. The wife non-suited the circuit court action as to the trustee and filed a lawsuit against him in chancery court. The trustee filed an answer and countercomplaint in which he sought an award of trustee’s fees and attorneys’ fees. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The chancery court entered an order granting the trustee’s motion for summary judgment and later awarded him trustee’s fees and attorneys’ fees. The wife appeals. We affirm and remand.

This matter is before the Court upon petition of the Defendant, Kortney Ball, for an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2. The Defendant seeks review of the trial judge’s order denying his motion to recuse. Upon review, and for the reasons stated below, the petition is denied.

This appeal arises from a suit filed by a borrower and his son against a mortgage lender in an attempt to avoid a foreclosure sale. The plaintiffs alleged that the lender breached a settlement agreement the parties entered into by unreasonably imposing an escrow account and by failing to provide a required notification to credit reporting agencies. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the lender on both claims and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

The plaintiff-appellant sued the defendant-appellee alleging that the defendant engaged in
pregnancy discrimination when it terminated the plaintiff’s full-time employment. The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiff
did not rebut the defendant’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its
decision. We conclude that the plaintiff demonstrated the existence of specific facts in the
record that could lead a rational trier of fact to find in her favor regarding whether the
defendant’s proffered reasons for her termination were pretextual. Accordingly, we reverse
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in the defendant’s favor.

The defendant, Calandra Carina Clark, was convicted by a Madison County jury of theft of property greater than $10,000, but less than $60,000, for which she received a nine-year sentence suspended to supervised probation. She appeals the judgment of the trial court based on the admission of hearsay evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence, improper argument by the State, and cumulative error. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The chancery court found clear and
convincing evidence of four statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in
the children’s best interest. Based on our review, we conclude that the evidence was less
than clear and convincing for two of the statutory grounds relied on by the chancery court.
However, because the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the
remaining grounds for termination and that termination is in the children’s best interest, we
affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

Defendant, Jarett Wilson, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss a violation of probation warrant and subsequent probation revocation. Defendant contends he was denied the right to a speedy trial and the trial court should have dismissed the probation violation warrant; the trial court failed to place adequate findings on the record to support its decision to revoke Defendant’s probation; and one of Defendant’s sentences had expired prior to the revocation and should be removed from the revocation order. After a review, we determine that Defendant’s sentence in case number 18-640 had already expired and was not subject to revocation. Accordingly, we vacate the revocation order in that case. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in case number 18 727, but because the trial court made insufficient findings as to its consequence determination, we remand for further findings.