APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A property owner relocated several monuments from a historic family burial ground located on his property and later filed a petition seeking to terminate the land’s use as a burial ground. The defendants, who are other descendants of those identified on the monuments, denied that the burial ground should be closed and filed a counterclaim seeking injunctive relief. After a bench trial, the court found that the statutory requirements for closure were not met and dismissed the petition. The trial court entered an injunction ordering the return of the monuments and the honoring of a defendant’s wish to be buried there. We reverse the portion of the order regarding the defendant’s burial rights. Finding no other reversible error, we affirm in all other respects.

This appeal arises from the termination of parental rights of Dustin S. ("Father"), and Katlyn H. ("Mother"). The trial court found that two grounds had been proven: (1) both parents had committed severe child abuse under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1 113(g)(4) against their children, and (2) each had received a felony sentence of two years for severe child abuse under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(5). The trial court also found that termination of their rights was in the best interest of the children. Both parents appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from claims of negligence and negligence per se stemming from a dog bite. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff after the defendant failed to respond to the lawsuit. Nine months after the entry of the final order, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. The defendant claimed that he had not been served, had not been aware of the lawsuit, and the facts upon which summary judgment had been granted were false. The trial court denied the motion to set aside. The defendant appeals. We affirm.

The pro se Defendant, Julius Gionni Godbolt-Roserie, has filed an application for
extraordinary review of the trial court’s May 27, 2026 order dismissing a probation
violation warrant. Upon review of the Defendant’s application and applicable law, we have
determined that a response from the State is not necessary. Upon full consideration, the
Defendant’s application is DENIED.

The pro se Petitioner has filed an application for extraordinary appeal, see Tenn. R.
App. P. 10, seeking review of two trial court orders: (1) the April 10, 2026 order
adjudicating the Petitioner’s motion seeking return of seized property pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) and (2) the May 27, 2026 order denying the
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The Petitioner asserts that “the lower court has so
far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings so as to require
immediate review,” Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a) because the April 10, 2026 order incorporated
an inventory document, with which the Petitioner disagrees, and the trial court denied
reconsideration of that order.

This is an action for access to records from a homicide investigation assigned to the “cold case” section of the Metropolitan Police Department of Nashville and Davidson County (“MNPD”). The petitioner sought, among other things, all reports in the case file, all E-911 recordings in the file, and the personnel records of any employee who authored a report or memo in the file. MNPD denied the request in full because the investigation was still open. Petitioner then commenced this action against MNPD and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) to compel them to comply with the records request. Petitioner argued that the records she requested were not related to a “pending or contemplated” criminal action because MNPD had no active leads and had transferred the investigation to the Cold Case Section. After conducting an evidentiary hearing based on declarations, the trial court ordered Metro to disclose the E-911 records, but it held that MNPD had no duty to produce the personnel records because the request was not sufficiently detailed. Relying on the decision in Tennessean v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, 485 S.W.3d 857 (Tenn. 2016), the trial court concluded that the remaining records were exempt from disclosure under the state law exception to the Tennessee Public Records Act and under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. The court also denied the petitioner’s request for an award of attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Christian Pitts, of second degree murder and of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and challenges the trial court’s self defense instruction that included the “duty to retreat” language. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Joe Jackson, of aggravated assault and
reckless endangerment, and the trial court sentenced him to fourteen years. The Petitioner
appealed. This Court affirmed. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief,
which the post-conviction court dismissed for failure to prosecute, and this Court reversed
and remanded for further post-conviction proceedings. On remand, the post-conviction
court recused itself, a new judge was assigned, and the new judge appointed counsel, who
filed an amended petition that alleged that the Petitioner had received the ineffective
assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The
Petitioner now appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective
assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Felix Tate, III, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions
of attempted first degree murder and employment of a firearm during the commission of a
dangerous felony. The Defendant received an effective thirty-one-year sentence. On
appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.
We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Jeffery Cantrell, appeals his Knox County convictions for aggravated sexual battery and sexual exploitation of a minor via electronic means, for which he is serving an effective ten-year sentence. Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of pornography found on his cell phone; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) the trial court erred by not granting Defendant’s request for a judgment of acquittal on Count 2of the presentment after the State’s case-in-chief. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal comes before us from the Shelby County Chancery Court’s order affirming
Respondent-Appellee’s denial of a disability retirement to Petitioner-Appellant. At issue
are the following questions: (1) whether the denial was arbitrary and capricious and
unsupported by the evidence; and (2) whether a statutorily created presumption should
apply retroactively to establish that Petitioner-Appellant’s disability was incurred in the
line of duty and is compensable. Discerning no error, we affirm the chancery court’s
judgment.

The Defendant, Wiley Vanover, pled guilty to multiple offenses in two cases. The trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence and placed the Defendant on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant violated the conditions of his probation, and the trial court revoked the suspended sentence in part and ordered him to serve five of the six years in custody. On appeal, the Defendant admits that he violated his probation conditions but asserts that the trial court should have imposed a lesser sanction, such as reinstatement to probation or split confinement. Upon our review, we conclude that the record does not contain the findings necessary for this court to conduct meaningful appellate review of the consequence determination as required by State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. 2022). Accordingly, we respectfully vacate the revocation orders and remand the case to the trial court for further findings regarding the appropriate consequence for the violations.

While serving a probated sentence, the Defendant, Susan Escobar, was arrested and
charged with one count of evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, creating a risk
of death or serious bodily injury. The Defendant entered a best interest guilty plea and,
following a combined probation revocation and sentencing hearing, the trial court revoked
her probation in full and imposed a sentence of seven years’ incarceration. On appeal, the
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing her sentence because it failed to
place sufficient findings on the record regarding the applicable enhancement factors.
Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Kenneth Earl Murphy, appeals his Hardin County Circuit Court
convictions of rape of a child and incest, for which he received an effective sentence of
thirty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
convicting evidence and argues that the trial court committed plain error by 1) failing to
issue a curative instruction following his testimony regarding a polygraph test; 2)
permitting the introduction of the indictment while simultaneously instructing the jury not
to consider it as evidence; 3) instructing the jury that an admission against interest had been
raised by the proof; and 4) permitting the introduction of irrelevant and prejudicial
character evidence. The Defendant also asserts that the cumulative effect of the errors in
this case entitles him to a new trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Amanda Hurst, entered a guilty plea to child abuse with the trial court to
determine sentencing. The trial court held a hearing and sentenced the Defendant to two
years in confinement. The trial court denied the Defendant’s requests for judicial diversion
and probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied
judicial diversion and probation. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Wiley Vanover, pled guilty to multiple offenses in two cases. The trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence and placed the Defendant on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant violated the conditions of his probation, and the trial court revoked the suspended sentence in part and ordered him to serve five of the six years in custody. On appeal, the Defendant admits that he violated his probation conditions but asserts that the trial court should have imposed a lesser sanction, such as reinstatement to probation or split confinement. Upon our review, we conclude that the record does not contain the findings necessary for this court to conduct meaningful appellate review of the consequence determination as required by State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. 2022). Accordingly, we respectfully vacate the revocation orders and remand the case to the trial court for further findings regarding the appropriate consequence for the violations.

Tennessee attorney Fred C. Dance represented a client in a wrongful death action that eventually settled. Rather than promptly disburse the settlement proceeds to his client, he used the funds to pay for personal expenses while ignoring his client’s inquiries about the money. A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility concluded that Dance had violated Rules 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 1.15(a), 1.15(d), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. Based on its finding that Dance had knowingly converted client property, the hearing panel recommended that Dance be disbarred. In this appeal, we consider whether disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Dance’s misconduct. As a preliminary matter, we clarify that in an appeal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 33.1(d), this Court reviews the hearing panel’s recommended punishment de novo rather than for abuse of discretion. We affirm the hearing panel’s finding that Dance knowingly converted client property and its application of aggravating and mitigating factors. But after considering the sanctions imposed in similar cases, we conclude that Dance should be suspended rather than disbarred. We therefore reverse the hearing panel’s judgment in part and suspend Dance from practicing law for five years, with three years to be served on active suspension.

The Petitioner, Demarcus Keyon Cole, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
Circuit Court for Madison County, which the habeas corpus court summarily dismissed as
deficient. The Petitioner argues on appeal that the habeas corpus court erred by failing to
appoint counsel and failing to allow him to amend the petition. Because he was not entitled
to the appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing on his deficient petition, the habeas
corpus court did not err in summarily dismissing it. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Donald Ragland, Jr., appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s
summary dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his
judgment is void based on alleged deficiencies in the arrest warrant and affidavit of
complaint underlying his convictions. We conclude that the Petitioner’s brief does not
comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a), but that,
notwithstanding waiver, the habeas corpus court did not err by summarily dismissing the
petition. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A Williamson County jury convicted Defendant, Jorge Alberto Garcia, of four counts of aggravated sexual battery, eight counts of rape of a child, and two counts of solicitation to commit rape of a child. The trial court imposed an effective sixty-two-year sentence with sex offender registration and community supervision for life. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his confession was involuntary and the detective failed to obtain a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. Additionally, Defendant argues that the erroneous admission of his confession was not harmless error. After a thorough review of the record, the parties’ briefs and arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand for clarification of the trial court’s sentencing order and any resulting corrections of the judgment forms.

A general sessions court, on its own motion, set aside a default judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs. After an unsuccessful attempt to reinstate the judgment, the plaintiffs appealed
to the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal because the general sessions
court had not entered a final judgment. We affirm.

The instant appeal requires us to determine whether the probate court properly granted summary judgment in this caseinvolving the ownership of interpleaded funds. Appellee Nancy Cheairs filed a federal district court copyright infringement lawsuit against Helen Thomas and her son, Appellee Mark Thomas. Helen Thomas died during the lawsuit’s pendency. Cheairs was granted judgment against Mark Thomas, who subsequently filed bankruptcy. Appellee Lisa Fox, as Helen Thomas’s Personal Representative, filed the instant interpleader action in the trial court, seeking guidance as to who would receive Mark Thomas’ expected inheritance from Helen Thomas. Appellant/law firm, who represented Mark Thomas in the federal lawsuit, filed a notice of attorney’s lien as to the interpleaded funds. The bankruptcy court discharged all of Mark Thomas’ debts except for Cheairs’ judgment and extinguished the law firm’s purported lien. The trial court gave full faith and credit to the federal court orders and granted Cheairs’ motion for summary judgment, awarding her the interpleaded funds. Appellant/law firm appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Jamesway Construction, Inc., filed a petition for judicial review in chancery court following an administrative law judge’s denial of its motion to dismiss administrative proceedings. Jamesway argued the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation’s appeal to the Board of Water Quality, Oil, and Gas was untimely, and therefore the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. The chancery court and Court of Appeals found in Jamesway’s favor on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, yet the chancery court’s own subject matter jurisdiction under Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(a)(1) was never questioned. After granting review, we subsequently directed the parties to brief whether the chancery court had jurisdiction under Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(a)(1) to review a preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency decision. We find that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction under section 4-5-322(a)(1) because Jamesway has not shown that judicial review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy. We vacate the judgments of the lower courts and remand to the Board of Water Quality, Oil, and Gas for further proceedings.

Because the trial court and parties failed to comply with the prior orders of this Court concerning the sealing of the record, the appeal is not ready for appellate review.

This appeal concerns post‑divorce proceedings. For many years, wife has sought to enforce husband’s alimony obligation, pursuing civil and criminal contempt based on allegations of nonpayment and nondisclosure of assets. The trial court entered a series of orders denying most of wife’s requested relief, concluding among other things that it could not make husband get and keep a job and that wife had not proven fraud sufficient to reopen the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. Wife appeals. We affirm.