Opinions
IN RE SEVIER COUNTY GRAND JURY
This appeal stems from a trial court’s order in a declaratory judgment action. However, because the appellant’s notice of appeal is untimely, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
James Paul Burkhart v. Kathryn Jean Burkhart
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right. The petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s denial of his motion for recusal. Discerning no error upon our review of the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Cedric D. Coleman v. Candace Marie Coleman
Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to award the parties essentially equal parenting time despite the parties’ inability to communicate effectively, Father’s almost-three-year absence from the ten-year-old child’s life, and the court-appointed expert’s recommendation that Father’s parenting time be increased incrementally. We reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for reconsideration of the parenting time issue. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roy Jones, Sr.
Defendant, Roy Jones, Sr., was indicted by a Shelby County grand jury for first degree murder for the shooting death of his wife. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years of incarceration. In this timely appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s refusal to give a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter, the trial court’s jury instruction on flight, and his sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Shelby B.
This appeal arises from dependency and neglect proceedings concerning the minor child, Shelby B., (“Shelby”), the child of Tyffany B. (“Mother”), and Lakota B. (“Father”). The petitioner, Sophia H. (“Grandmother”), with whom Shelby had been residing for several years, filed the petition alleging that Shelby was dependent and neglected under Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-102(b)(13)(J), which defines a dependent and neglected child as one “[w]ho has willfully been left in the sole financial care and sole physical care of a related caregiver for not less than eighteen (18) consecutive months by the child’s parent . . . and the child will suffer substantial harm if removed from the continuous care of such relative[.]” After the juvenile court found Shelby was dependent and neglected, Mother appealed to the circuit court. Following a two-day de novo hearing, the circuit court also ruled Shelby dependent and neglected and vested custody with Grandmother. Mother appealed. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Milam, Jr.
The Defendant, William Milam Jr., appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated child neglect and aggravated child abuse. The Defendant was sentenced to twenty-one years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen Richard Pratt
A Campbell County jury convicted the Defendant of three counts of sexual battery by an |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. David Edwin Kniejski
Defendant, David Edwin Kniejski, pleaded guilty toone count of aggravated assault and one count of simple assault. At sentencing, Defendant requested an alternative sentence of probation, but the trial court found that Defendantwas “not properly suited for a suspended sentence” and imposed an effective sentence of six years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for probation. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frank Wilbourn, Jr.
The Defendant, Frank Wilbourn, Jr., was convicted by a Madison County jury of simple possession of cocaine, unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon previously convicted of a crime of violence, unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon previously convicted of a drug offense, and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the Defendant’s weapons convictions and imposed an effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for a jury instruction on the defense of necessity and that his sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jon Engle v. Aaron Payne, DDS
The plaintiff brought suit against his dentist, asserting that the dentist was negligent in failing to diagnose and treat a cavity which the plaintiff contends was apparent from an x-ray and from his complaints of discomfort, ultimately resulting in loss of the plaintiff’s tooth. The action was dismissed because the plaintiff never filed a certificate of good faith. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that his claim falls within the common knowledge exception to the certificate of good faith requirement. We conclude that the allegations do not fall within the common knowledge exception, and we affirm the dismissal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Wayne Norrod
The Defendant, Richard Wayne Norrod, appeals from the DeKalb County Criminal Court’s probation revocation of the three-year sentence he received for his guilty-pleaded conviction for the sale or delivery of less than one-half gram of methamphetamine. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking the Defendant’s probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement for a first technical violation. The State concedes that the court abused its discretion. We agree with the parties, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court and immediately reinstate the Defendant’s probation. |
DeKalb | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rene Sherrod v. Keanna R. et al.
A grandmother filed petitions for dependency and neglect and for grandparent visitation in juvenile court. The juvenile court dismissed her petitions for failure to meet her burden of proof. She challenged these decisions before the circuit court, where a de novo proceeding was held. The circuit court similarly did not believe the grandmother’s allegations and likewise dismissed her petitions. She appealed to this court. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Hayden S. Fryer v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Hayden S. Fryer, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in sustaining the State’s hearsay objection regarding a codefendant’s out-of-court statements, in denying the Petitioner’s request to make an offer of proof regarding those statements, and in finding that he failed to establish that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
KALYN DOXLEY, ET AL. v. CLARENCE L. “BUZZ,” NABERS, JR., DDS, ET AL.
This is a healthcare liability action, governed by Tennessee Code Annotated section |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lamont Luster
The Defendant, Christopher Lamont Luster, appeals his Robertson County Circuit Court conviction of rape of a child, for which he received a sentence of thirty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, (2) he was denied a fair trial because he was unable to adequately hear the testimony, and (3) his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction but vacate his sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry E. Parrish, P.C. v. Nancy J. Strong
This is one of many appeals in the protracted litigation between the parties. Following a third jury trial, the jury found that Ms. Nancy J. Strong proved by a preponderance of the evidence all the facts necessary to pierce the veil of the corporate entity Larry E. Parrish, P.C. and to hold Larry E. Parrish personally liable for the actions of the P.C. The jury awarded Ms. Strong her attorney fees and costs of the cause. The trial court ordered that Mr. Parrish is personally liable for all the damages, attorney fees, costs, and interest whether statutory, contractual, or previously ordered by any court and thereby assessed and awarded against the P.C. Ms. Strong appeals certain of the trial court’s later rulings, including denial of her motion for Rule 11 sanctions and the scope of an injunction against further filings. We affirm the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Larry E. Parrish, P.C. v. November 14, 2017 Judgment
This appeal involves an attempt to set aside an allegedly void judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(3). The trial court determined that the Rule 60.02(3) independent action was frivolous and dismissed it pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
City of Shelbyville v, Bedford County
This appeal requires us to determine whether a contract—silent as to duration—was terminable at will or after a reasonable time, and whether the trial court properly set a termination date. In 1974, Appellant Bedford County and Appellee City of Shelbyville entered into a contract, under which Appellee agreed to pay Appellant a portion of its sales tax revenue. The purpose of the contract was to effectuate the building and maintenance of County schools as described in a separate “Building Program B,” which was completed in 1999. The parties’ contract contained no termination date, and the parties dispute whether certain requirements set out therein constitute conditions precedent to termination. After the City notified the County of its intent to terminate the contract, the City filed this declaratory judgment action. The trial court held that the requirements set out in the contract did not address termination. In the absence of a termination date or event, the trial court held that the contract was terminable within a reasonable time or at will upon reasonable notice. The trial court set the termination date as July 1, 2027. The County appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jose Murillo-Salgado
A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Jose Murillo-Salgado, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder(counts one and three), two counts of first degree felony murder (counts two and four), and one count of especially aggravated burglary(count five). The trial court sentenced Defendant to life sentences for the murder convictions and merged counts one and three with counts two and four, and sentenced Defendant to an additional twelve years at 100%for the especially aggravated burglary conviction. All counts were ordered to be served consecutively. On appeal, Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to support his convictions. However, under the facts of this case, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-1004(d) prohibits Defendant from being convicted of both especially aggravated burglary and felony murder, we reduce Defendant’s conviction for especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary and modify his sentence for that conviction to a six-year term as a Range I Standard offender to be served consecutively. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments as to the murder convictions and modify the judgment for especially aggravated robbery. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Torrian Seantel Bishop
In this appeal, we address the requirement that a certified question of law reserved for appeal as part of a conditional guilty plea under Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure be “dispositive of the case.” Police stopped Torrian Seantel Bishop for driving on a suspended license and smelled what they believed to be marijuana. A search of his car yielded a stolen handgun. The trial court denied a motion to suppress the handgun, finding that the smell of marijuana provided probable cause to search the car. Thereafter, Mr. Bishop negotiated an agreement with the State under which he entered a conditional guilty plea but reserved for appellate review a certified question of law challenging whether there was probable cause to search his car. The basis for the challenge was the admitted inability of police to distinguish between the smell of illegal marijuana and that of legal hemp. The Court of Criminal Appeals initially affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but this Court remanded for reconsideration after we released our decision in State v. Green, 697 S.W.3d 634 (Tenn. 2024) (addressing the impact of the legalization of hemp on the probable-cause analytical framework). State v. Bishop, No. W2023-00713 CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 1564346, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 11, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Sep. 12, 2024) (remanding for reconsideration) (“Bishop I”). On reconsideration, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the certified question was not “dispositive of the case,” as required under Rule 37(b)(2)(A), and dismissed the appeal. State v. Bishop, No. W2023-00713-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 4798895, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Mar. 14, 2025) (“Bishop II”). We granted review and requested that the parties also address potential revisions to the procedure and analysis for appeals involving certified questions. After careful consideration, we hold that the best practice for a certified question before the trial court includes an on-the-record colloquy to aid in determining whether the question is dispositive of the case. We also hold that if an appellate court determines that a certified question is not dispositive of the case, the court cannot consider the appeal but should vacate the judgment of the trial court to give the defendant the opportunity to withdraw the conditional guilty plea that attempted to reserve the question. As for the decision in this case, we conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in determining that the certified question was not dispositive in light of our recent decision in Green. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Obion | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. William Tony Burrell
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant William Tony Burrell pleaded guilty to driving under the influence (“DUI”) and possession of a handgun while under the influence. As part of the plea, the Defendant reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law challenging the constitutionality of the seizure that led to his arrest. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Defendant’s certified question did not meet the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as set forth by this Court in State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). State v. Burrell, No. E2023 01404-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 4512446 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 17, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2025). Specifically, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the Defendant’s certified question did not “identif[y] clearly the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved” as required by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii). We granted the Defendant’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether he satisfied the procedural requirements for certifying a question of law and to consider revisions to Tennessee’s certified-question procedure. We hold that a reviewing court must consider the certified question statement together with the record in determining whether the scope and limits requirement of Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) has been met. Reading the Defendant’s certified question together with the record, we conclude that Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) is satisfied. We also conclude that the remaining requirements of Rule 37(b)(2) are met. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Court of Criminal Appeals for consideration of the merits of the certified question. |
Polk | Supreme Court | |
IN RE BELLA F.
In this case involving termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights to their minor |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Caleb B.
A father filed a petition for a permanent parenting plan regarding a minor child. The child’s mother was in the process of moving with the child to Florida when the petition was filed. At the final hearing, the court ordered the mother to return the minor child to Tennessee and, after the mother chose to remain in Tennessee, entered a parenting plan designating the mother as the primary residential parent. The mother appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its application of the parental relocation statute. We have determined that the parental relocation statute did not apply and affirm the trial court’s decision |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vincent Johnson
The Defendant, Vincent Johnson, seeks review of his continued pretrial custody. The Defendant is currently represented by appointed counsel in the trial court. He filed the instant pleading pro se, however. It has long been the rule that a defendant may not be represented by counsel and simultaneously proceed pro se on appeal before this Court. State v. Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tenn. 1976); State v. Parsons, 437 S.W.3d 457, 478 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011); Robinson v. State, No. W2024-01916-CCA-R3-PC, 2026 WL 1781863 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 22, 2026). Accordingly, the instant pro se pleading is hereby dismissed. Counsel may seek review of the Defendant’s custody status, if appropriate. Tenn. R. App. P. 8. Because it appears the Defendant has been declared indigent, costs are taxed to the State. The Clerk shall forward a copy of this order to the Defendant, counsel of record and the trial court clerk. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Odell Holcomb ex rel. Marianna Walls
This matter is before the Court upon the pro se petition of the Defendant, Thomas Odell Holcomb, for an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2. The petition is signed by the Defendant’s “next friend,” Marianna Walls. The Defendant did not attach to his petition a copy of a trial court order addressing any motion to recuse. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, Sec. 2.03. Instead, he included a copy of a trial court order, entered on July 29, 2026, appointing counsel to represent him on a pending post-conviction petition. Thus, it is evident the Defendant is currently represented by counsel. Aside from the fact the petition is incomplete, Rule 10B, Section 1.01, specifically prohibits a party who is represented by counsel from filing a pro se motion to recuse. The same prohibition holds true for a party filing a pro se petition to appeal. See State v. Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tenn. 1976); State v. Parsons, 437 S.W.3d 457, 478 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011); Robinson v. State, No. W2024-01916-CCA-R3-PC, 2026 WL 1781863 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 22, 2026). Accordingly, the instant pro se petition is hereby denied |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals |