

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs July 9, 2026

FILED

08/17/2026

Clerk of the
Appellate Courts

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DAVID EDWIN KNIEJSKI

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County
No. 24-381 Joseph T. Howell, Judge

No. W2025-01409-CCA-R3-CD

Defendant, David Edwin Kniejski, pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault and one count of simple assault. At sentencing, Defendant requested an alternative sentence of probation, but the trial court found that Defendant was “not properly suited for a suspended sentence” and imposed an effective sentence of six years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for probation. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

MATTHEW J. WILSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, P.J., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., joined.

J. Colin Morris, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, David Edwin Kniejski.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Kelly Telfeyan, Assistant Attorney General; Jody S. Pickens, District Attorney General; and Scott G. Kirk, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plea Agreement

On a December 2023 morning, Defendant assaulted Jackie Carl Wood in the parking lot of the Daybreak Inn and Suites in Jackson. When Mr. Wood’s spouse, Scott Taylor,

tried to intervene, Defendant struck him twice in the head. When other bystanders tried to intervene, Defendant pushed them away.

An unknown caller dialed 911, and when police officers arrived, they found Mr. Wood “semi-conscious” and “badly beaten with a swollen and bloody face and head.”¹ Officers also encountered Defendant standing nearby; they described him as “shirtless,” wearing “heavy work boots,” and acting “irate.” Both victims denied striking Defendant, and an eyewitness confirmed that Defendant was the aggressor, telling officers that Defendant kicked Mr. Wood multiple times in the head and face while Mr. Wood was lying defenseless on the ground. Mr. Wood was transported by ambulance to the emergency room at Jackson-Madison County General Hospital, where doctors determined that he suffered multiple fractures in his face and back. Officers recovered surveillance video from the motel that confirmed the eyewitness’ account.

Following Defendant’s arrest, a Madison County grand jury indicted him on one count of aggravated assault of Mr. Wood, *see* Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(i), and one count of simple assault of Mr. Taylor, *see id.* § 39-13-101. Defendant later entered open guilty pleas to both charges. The State filed a notice of its request for enhanced punishment based on Defendant’s criminal history, which included prior convictions for criminal trespass, simple battery, disorderly conduct, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and two convictions for driving under the influence (“DUI”). Defendant sought an alternative sentence of probation that included mandatory inpatient alcohol treatment followed by participation in an outpatient program at the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) Day Reporting Center in Jackson.

The Sentencing Hearing

At sentencing, the trial court recounted the plea agreement: as to Count One, Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, as a standard offender and was subject to a Range I sentence of three to six years; as to Count Two, Defendant pleaded guilty to simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and was subject to a jail term of up to eleven months and twenty-nine days. The State exhibited Mr. Wood’s medical records, three photographs taken after the attack depicting Mr. Wood’s facial injuries, surveillance video taken from the motel, and the presentence report (“PSR”).

The State highlighted certain evidence from the medical records—namely, that Mr. Wood was left shirtless in freezing weather for about twenty minutes before first

¹ The transcript from the plea hearing was not included in the record on appeal; therefore, we rely upon the two affidavits of complaint for the facts underlying Defendant’s guilty pleas.

responders arrived; that he suffered several fractures to his orbital bones, cheekbones, and spine; and that he reported being in severe pain during medical treatment. The medical records reflect that Mr. Wood was in so much pain that doctors were unable to complete an MRI until his pain was under control. The photographs show Mr. Wood lying on a hospital bed with a neck brace. The photographs were consistent with the officers' description that Mr. Wood was "badly beaten with a swollen and bloody face and head." At the time of sentencing, Mr. Wood had died from causes unrelated to the assault.

The State played the surveillance video for the trial court and identified "numerous individuals" in the video who attempted to intervene but were unsuccessful. The State described Defendant as having "continued on" with the assault against Mr. Wood despite multiple attempts by bystanders to intervene. The State noted that Defendant repeatedly stopped striking Mr. Wood only to return moments later to resume attacking Mr. Wood as he lay on the ground.

The video began at 6:00 a.m. and contained no audio. In the footage, Defendant was seen blocking the path of a white pickup truck driven by Mr. Taylor. As Defendant and Mr. Taylor appear to exchange words, Mr. Wood approached the rear of the truck from the motel at 6:02 a.m. Once Mr. Wood approached the truck, Defendant met him at the driver's door; the two were standing nose-to-nose and appeared to be arguing. A bystander attempted to intervene, but Defendant pushed the bystander away. At 6:03 a.m., Defendant struck Mr. Wood for the first time, causing him to fall to the ground. As the bystander attempted to intervene again, Defendant raised his hands above his head. As soon as the bystander backed off, Defendant struck Mr. Wood a second time as he lay on the ground. Mr. Wood then stood up and began to walk toward where Mr. Taylor, who had gotten out of the truck, was standing. Defendant blocked Mr. Wood's path, pushed him away, and struck him a third time. Mr. Taylor intervened, and as Defendant and Mr. Taylor exchanged words, Mr. Wood walked toward a nearby curb and sat down.

At 6:05 a.m., Defendant stood over Mr. Wood and then dragged him into the grass. Defendant hovered over Mr. Wood for roughly ninety seconds before dragging him back onto the pavement. Defendant pulled Mr. Wood's sweater off, leaving him shirtless.

At 6:07 a.m., Defendant struck Mr. Wood a fourth time as Mr. Wood attempted to stand up, causing him to fall back into the grass. As Mr. Taylor attempted to intervene, Defendant kicked Mr. Wood as he lay on the grass. Defendant then struck Mr. Taylor two times, knocking him to the ground. Defendant walked away as a second bystander approached but quickly turned around and grabbed Mr. Wood's hair and dragged him from his knees to a seated position. Defendant then walked away from Mr. Wood to exchange words with the two bystanders and Mr. Taylor.

At 6:10 a.m., Mr. Taylor got back into the truck and pulled it forward, while Defendant approached Mr. Wood, who was still seated on the grass. Defendant appeared to taunt Mr. Wood for about thirty seconds before appearing to strike him again. At that point, Defendant walked away, removed his sweatshirt, and tossed it toward a bystander. Throughout the next minute or so, Defendant continued to taunt Mr. Wood and exchanged words with the bystander. When the bystander attempted to approach Mr. Wood, Defendant pushed him away.

At 6:12 a.m., Defendant approached Mr. Wood again. Defendant positioned himself over Mr. Wood's body, taunting him before striking him again and then delivering back-to-back kicks to Mr. Wood's face. After absorbing the kicks, Mr. Wood fell face-down in the grass. Another bystander approached from the motel as Defendant walked away from Mr. Wood. Defendant then removed his T-shirt, walked back to Mr. Wood, and straddled his body as three bystanders attempted to intervene. As the three bystanders exchanged words with Defendant, Defendant was seen delivering another strike to what appeared to be the backside of Mr. Wood's torso. He delivered at least two more strikes to Mr. Wood's torso before he began pushing one of the three bystanders.

At 6:16 a.m., Defendant was flailing his arms and exchanging words with the bystanders. The bystanders began attending to Mr. Wood while attempting to shield him from Defendant. Soon thereafter, Mr. Taylor returned to the scene with what appeared to be a law enforcement officer. The video ended at 6:19 a.m. with the officer standing next to a motionless Mr. Wood.

The PSR included victim impact statements from both Mr. Wood and Mr. Taylor. Mr. Wood stated that Defendant "took [his] self-worth, pride, and dignity." He described seeing doctors two to three times a week, being unable to drive, and being "basically bedridden" because of Defendant's "rage of terror." He said he lost five teeth; received multiple facial, spinal, and neck fractures; and lost forty percent of his vision. Mr. Wood requested the maximum sentence available under the law. Mr. Taylor described missing two and a half months of work while caring for Mr. Wood. He stated that he had never seen "such rage as [Defendant] showed that morning" and that Defendant "beat [his] spouse to a pulp." Mr. Taylor also requested the maximum sentence.

The PSR indicated that Defendant had a valid Kansas driver's license, that he was a high school graduate, and that he attended Austin Peay State University but did not complete his course of study. Defendant described his health as "poor," stating that he had been prescribed Xanax to treat anxiety and suffered from other health problems. He recalled trying alcohol for the first time when he was eleven years old and illicit drugs when he was fifteen years old, but he claimed that he no longer used illicit drugs. He

described himself as an alcoholic who regularly drank over a liter of vodka every day. He indicated that his longest period of sobriety was only three months.

The PSR indicated that, at the time of the assaults, Defendant was in his forties with no prior felony convictions. He had seven prior misdemeanor convictions in various states. He denied having any friends and told the presentence investigator that he had been living at another motel for two years. He stated that he had worked as the general manager at a local Dunkin' Donuts before he was arrested.

The PSR also included a STRONG-R risk and needs assessment. Defendant received an overall risk score of "high." He was assessed as having high needs in "Friends/Associates & Residential" and "Attitudes/Behaviors." He was assessed as having moderate needs in "Aggression," "Alcohol & Drug Use," and "Partner/Family & Children." Finally, the PSR indicated that Defendant had been accepted into the TDOC Day Reporting Center if he were granted an alternative sentence.

Following the State's proof, Defendant offered the testimony of Dr. Ben Sinclair, the clinical director for the TDOC Day Reporting Center. Dr. Sinclair testified that he evaluated Defendant for admission into the center's program, and defense counsel exhibited his written report. Dr. Sinclair testified about the eligibility requirements for admission into the program, which included having at least eighteen months left on a sentence, at least one felony conviction, and a past or current drug or alcohol problem. Applicants must be willing to participate in an intensive outpatient treatment program for one to two years. Dr. Sinclair recommended Defendant "attend a long-term drug and alcohol residential program followed by" the program. He acknowledged that Defendant did not have housing, transportation, or an income but testified that those were problems the program would help him address. He then described the program's three-phase treatment program. Phase One involved reporting to the center between 8:30 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. four days a week with an additional forty hours of community service. During Phases Two and Three, Defendant would be required to find employment, pay his fines, and undergo weekly drug testing. Dr. Sinclair made clear that this program would begin only after Defendant completed long-term residential treatment.

When asked about his interview with Defendant, Dr. Sinclair described Defendant as "somewhat elusive and tended to minimize his situation." He testified that Defendant never "wholeheartedly" accepted responsibility for his actions. Following redirect, the trial court asked Dr. Sinclair directly whether Defendant "attempted to mitigate his responsibility in this case[.]" Dr. Sinclair clarified that he never spoke with Defendant about his assault convictions, only his subsequent arrest, which occurred while Defendant was on bond. The record reflects that Defendant posted bond in this case in December 2023, but his bond was revoked after he was arrested for public intoxication in July 2025.

Following Dr. Sinclair's testimony, Defendant testified on his own behalf. He said that he was seeking an alternative sentence so he could participate in a long-term residential treatment program before participating in the Day Reporting Center program. He admitted to being arrested for public intoxication while on bond in this case. Defendant said that before his arrest, he was the general manager of a local Dunkin' Donuts and that he had worked in the restaurant business for seventeen years. He described losing an infant daughter and turning to alcohol to cope with his pain.

Defendant said that he was "extremely intoxicated" on the morning of the assaults. He could only recall "[b]its and pieces" but "remember[ed] a lot of things that were said." According to Defendant, Mr. Wood had tried to enter Defendant's motel room multiple times during the night. He said that the motel office opened at 6:00 a.m. and that he was trying to get Mr. Taylor and Mr. Wood to go with him to the office. He claimed that his intention was to get them kicked out of their motel room before the victims began threatening Defendant. He said "didn't take [the threats] well . . . [a]nd it turned into a fight." He explained: "I've never done anything like that. I just—I was drunk, and I take full responsibility. I know it will never happen again." When asked whether he had ever had similar "high, heated moments" when he was not drinking, Defendant replied, "No, sir. I'm actually quite level-headed. I work with the public. I've been doing it for twenty-four years now. I've never had any issue." Defendant then addressed the trial court, stating: "Whether I get sentenced to six years or ten years now in prison or I go to rehabilitation, I'm never going to drink again. But I do think an [alcohol rehabilitation] situation would be helpful for me. . ."

The State argued for an enhanced, within-range sentence for the aggravated assault on Mr. Wood and a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the simple assault on Mr. Taylor. The State asked that the sentences be served consecutively and that the trial court impose confinement for both convictions. Defendant argued that he had accepted responsibility and that he would be successfully rehabilitated if granted an alternative sentence.

The Trial Court's Findings

In imposing sentence, the trial court found that Defendant was a standard offender. The trial court applied enhancement factors one, three, and six, placing "great weight" on Defendant's criminal history; the fact that there were two victims; and the fact that Mr. Wood's injuries were severe. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1) ("The defendant has a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior, in addition to those necessary to establish the appropriate range[.]"); *Id.* § 40-35-114(3) ("The offense involved more than one (1) victim[.]"); *Id.* § 40-35-114(6) ("The personal injuries inflicted upon . . . the

victim was particularly great[.]”). The court found that Defendant had seven prior misdemeanor convictions across three different states and that the injuries inflicted upon Mr. Wood were “particularly great.” The court noted that the severity of Mr. Wood’s injuries was reflected in the medical records and photographs introduced by the State. The court also referenced Mr. Wood’s victim impact statement in which Mr. Wood described seeing multiple doctors every week, losing his ability to drive, losing five teeth, being unable to dress or care for himself, and losing forty percent of his vision. The court also applied enhancement factor ten, finding that Defendant left Mr. Wood “outside shirtless in twenty-four-degree temperature,” and that “[t]here were multiple occasions that [Defendant] could have terminated the assault, but, instead, chose not to. Instead, [he] would go back and back and back and re-assault the victim.” *See* Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(10) (“The defendant had no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human life was high.”). As to mitigation, the court placed “moderate weight” on Defendant’s acceptance of responsibility. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(13) (“Any other factor consistent with the purposes of this chapter.”).

The trial court considered “the PSR[;] the defendant’s physical [condition], mental condition, and social history[;] the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense[;] and the nature and . . . circumstances of the criminal conduct involved.” The court also considered whether Defendant “might reasonably be expected to be rehabilitated” but found that Defendant “had multiple convictions, and, yet, [he] continue[d] to break the law.” The court then recited the confinement factors and described Defendant’s actions as “an absolutely savage beating.”

Relying on these facts, the trial court found that Defendant was “not properly suited for a suspended sentence,” and imposed a within-range, six-year sentence of confinement as to Count One and an eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence of confinement as to Count Two to run concurrently with Count One. This appeal followed.

Analysis

On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Specifically, Defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider whether “measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant” and whether confinement was the “least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence [was] imposed.” Defendant also argues that the trial court failed to consider the statistical information provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”). The State responds that the trial court acted within its discretion by imposing confinement. We agree with the State.

We review the length and manner of service of within-range sentences imposed by the trial court under an “abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of reasonableness.’” *State v. Bise*, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its ruling on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or applies reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” *State v. Phelps*, 329 S.W.3d 436, 443 (Tenn. 2010). The abuse of discretion standard applies to all sentencing decisions, *State v. King*, 432 S.W.3d 316, 324 (Tenn. 2014), including “questions related to probation or any other alternative sentence.” *State v. Caudle*, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012).

To be afforded deference on appeal, the trial court must “place on the record any reason for a particular sentence.” *Bise*, 380 S.W.3d at 705; Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(e)(1). There is no presumption of reasonableness when the trial court fails to consider and weigh the applicable factors. *See King*, 432 S.W.3d at 327-28; *Caudle*, 388 S.W.3d at 279. Yet “there are no ‘magic words’ that trial judges must pronounce on the record” during sentencing. *State v. Trent*, 533 S.W.3d 282, 292 (Tenn. 2017). Still, it is “critical that . . . trial judges articulate fully and coherently the various aspects of their decision as required by our statutes and case law.” *Id.*

Under our Sentencing Reform Act, only those defendants who are classified as “an especially mitigated or standard offender convicted of a Class C, D or E felony” are considered favorable candidates for alternative sentencing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)(A). Probation is one form of alternative sentencing. *See, e.g., Caudle*, 388 S.W.3d at 279. When imposing sentence, courts should consider “the potential or lack of potential for the rehabilitation or treatment of the defendant.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(5).

Sentences involving confinement should be based on the following considerations:

- (A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct;
- (B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or
- (C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant[.]

Id. § 40-35-103(1). Whatever the sentence imposed, it “should be no greater than that deserved for the offense committed,” and it “should be the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence is imposed.” *Id.* § 40-35-103(2), (4).

A defendant is eligible for probation if the sentence actually imposed is ten years or less and the offender is not convicted of certain enumerated offenses. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(a). But the defendant bears the burden to establish his or her suitability for probation before the trial court. *Id.* § 40-35-303(b); *Trent*, 533 S.W.3d at 291. This includes demonstrating that probation will “subserve the ends of justice and the best interest of both the public and the defendant.” *State v. Carter*, 254 S.W.3d 335, 347 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting *State v. Housewright*, 982 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)).

The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that the sentence is improper. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sentencing Comm’n Cmt.; *see also State v. Ashby*, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). We will uphold the trial court’s sentencing decision on appeal “so long as it is within the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” *Bise*, 380 S.W.3d at 709-10.

Here, the trial court considered the seriousness of the offense, the severity of Mr. Wood’s injuries, Defendant’s long history of alcohol abuse and criminal behavior, Defendant’s health and social information contained in the PSR, Dr. Sinclair’s testimony, and Defendant’s testimony. The trial court made specific findings with respect to the relevant enhancement and mitigating factors as well as the relevant confinement factors. Because the trial court placed its reasons for imposing confinement on the record, its decision is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. *See Bise*, 380 S.W.3d at 708.

Although Defendant was eligible for alternative sentencing because his sentence was less than ten years, *see* Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(a), he still had the burden to establish his suitability for probation, *see id.* § 40-35-303(b); *Trent*, 533 S.W.3d at 291. He failed to do so. The trial court found that Defendant’s seven prior misdemeanor convictions—all of which resulted previous alternative sentences and all of which were caused by his own alcohol abuse—weighed against granting an alternative sentence in this case. Further, the trial court made explicit findings about the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct and the severity of Mr. Wood’s injuries. The trial court noted that this was an “absolutely savage beating” and that Defendant could have “terminated the assault, but, instead, . . . [he] would go back and back and back and re-assault the victim.” These findings were supported by Mr. Wood’s medical records, the victim impact statements, and the surveillance video taken from the motel. The record shows that the trial court based its decision to confine Defendant upon two of the relevant confinement factors—namely, Defendant’s “long history of criminal conduct” and the need “to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(A), (B).

Defendant contends that the trial court failed to consider the third confinement factor—that is, whether “[m]easures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant.” But neither the plain language of the statute nor our precedent required the trial court to make findings for every confinement factor. The statute itself uses a permissive “or” when listing the confinement factors, and our supreme court has repeatedly held that confinement may be justified by a single confinement factor. *See, e.g., State v. Hooper*, 29 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tenn. 2000) (upholding denial of alternative sentencing based upon deterrence alone); *State v. Trotter*, 201 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tenn. 2006) (holding the seriousness of the offense alone may justify denial of alternative sentencing). Here, two of the relevant factors support a sentence of confinement.

Defendant also contends that the trial court failed to consider whether confinement was “the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence [was] imposed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(4). We disagree. The trial court clearly weighed Defendant’s criminal history and the seriousness of his conduct in this case against his need for treatment and his acceptance of responsibility. The trial court found that confinement was warranted and concluded that Defendant was “not properly suited for a suspended sentence.” Absent an abuse of discretion, this court will not “substitute our judgment for that of the trial court simply because a party believes that another choice would have been a better decision.” *State v. Garrett*, No. W2024-01925-CCA-R3-CD, 2026 WL 1481536, at *26 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27, 2026), *perm. app. filed* (Aug. 11, 2026). Defendant fails to show that the trial court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard, reaching an illogical conclusion, basing its ruling on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or applying reasoning that caused an injustice. *See Phelps*, 329 S.W.3d at 443.

Lastly, Defendant contends that the trial court failed to consider any statistical information provided by the AOC. Of course, trial courts are required by statute to consider such information. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b). But here, Defendant failed to raise the question of AOC statistics at sentencing or argue their relevance before the trial court. Further, Defendant’s appellate briefing on this issue is limited to the following conclusory statement: “The Appellant argues that the Court must address the statistical information from the [AOC].” Nowhere in his brief does he argue that Defendant received a sentence disproportionate to other similarly situated offenders, nor does he identify the particular statistics that might support such a claim. Even so, “any omission of the trial court’s consideration, or lack thereof, of applicable statistical information does not overcome the presumption of reasonableness afforded the trial court’s within-range sentence.” *State v. Clark*, No. M2025-00435-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 3269096, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 24, 2025) (citing *State v. McDowell*, No. W2015-01765-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 4147047, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 2, 2016)), *perm. app. denied* (Tenn.

Apr. 27, 2026). Because Defendant has failed to show that he received a sentence that was disproportionate to other similarly situated offenders, he is not entitled to relief on this ground.

The trial court’s decision to impose confinement rather than probation was based on two of the relevant confinement factors and reflected a “proper application of the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act.” *Bise*, 380 S.W.3d at 708. The trial court placed its reasons for imposing confinement on the record, and Defendant has failed to establish any instance where the trial court abused its discretion. *See id.* Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to relief.

Conclusion

For the reasons above, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

s/ Matthew J. Wilson
MATTHEW J. WILSON, JUDGE