APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

After a bench trial, the trial court convicted the Defendant, Trevarius Dewayne Houston, of two counts of assault against a law enforcement officer, one count of retaliation for past action, one count of theft of merchandise, and one count of resisting arrest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve a total effective sentence of two years, suspended to a year of probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. After review, we reverse the trial court’s judgments in Count 1 and Count 3 and affirm the remaining judgments.

The defendant, Traci Marie House, pled guilty to attempted possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a prior violent felony, and the trial court imposed a sentence of twelve years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to reconsider her sentence. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, LaCarl Tigg, appeals from the Circuit Court of Rutherford County’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction DNA Analysis and his pro se motion to vacate his guilty plea which the post-conviction court treated as a petition for post-conviction relief. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal.

Defendant, Ronnie Keith Rea, appeals from his convictions for three counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of solicitation of a minor. On appeal, he raises five issues. After a thorough review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we conclude that four of the five issues have been waived. The only preserved issue is Defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, which we find legally sufficient to support his convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her minor child, the
trial court determined that two statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear
and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing
evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s
best interest. The mother has appealed.1 Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Defendant, Chelsea Louise Smith, appeals her Dickson County Circuit Court convictions for aggravated child abuse and first-degree felony murder committed in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, for which she received sentences of fifteen years and life, respectively. Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions; that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the proposed testimony of her expert in biomechanics; and that her constitutional right to present a defense was violated by the trial court’s exclusion of the proposed expert testimony. Following a thorough review, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Teresa Kay Nolan, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault and one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, for which she received a total effective sentence of four years. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions for aggravated assault; (2) the trial court committed plain error by failing to provide a jury instruction on self-defense; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to cross-examine Defendant regarding her prior conviction for attempted impersonation of a licensed professional; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the State to cross-examine her regarding her violation of bond conditions. Upon review, we affirm the conviction in count 2 but remand for entry of a corrected judgment, reflecting Defendant’s conviction for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and imposing a concurrent one-year sentence. We affirm the judgments of conviction in counts 1 and 3 in all respects.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims. Appellee asks this Court to award frivolous appeal damages under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We grant Appellee its request for frivolous appeal damages.

The Defendant, Nickalous Ladd a/k/a Nickalous Clark, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a Class C felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range IV career offender to fifteen years at 60% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue the Defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a breach of contract lawsuit following the sale of a body shop
business. Prior to the sale, the owner entered into a paint-purchasing agreement requiring
him to purchase $900,000 worth of paint over time in exchange for discounts and up-front
“pre-bate” payments. Under the paint-purchasing agreement, the paint supplier could
terminate the agreement if the business was sold without the supplier’s prior written
consent. The owner later sold his business to buyers pursuant to an asset purchase
agreement whereby the buyers agreed to take on the business’s paint-purchasing
obligations. The buyers initially kept buying paint from the same supplier but eventually
stopped. The paint supplier demanded repayment of the up-front funds from the prior
owner under his personal guarantee. The prior owner then sued the buyers, asserting that
they were required to hold him harmless. The buyers filed a counterclaim asserting that
the prior owner committed the first breach by selling the business without the paint
supplier’s consent, resulting in the buyers never receiving the expected value of the deal.
The trial court ruled in the prior owner’s favor. The buyers appeal. We affirm.

This is an unlawful detainer action in which the plaintiff landlord was awarded possession
and a judgment for unpaid rent and attorney fees when the defendant lessee refused to
vacate. We now affirm on appeal.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Johnny Mack Powell, of one count of
attempted voluntary manslaughter, three counts of aggravated assault, one count of
possession of marijuana, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, and one count of
trespassing. The trial court merged the aggravated assault convictions and sentenced the
Defendant, a Range II offender, to ten years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for attempted voluntary
manslaughter and aggravated assault because he was not the first aggressor and because he
acted in self-defense. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Petitioner, Jacob Lee Carney, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arising from his guilty-pleaded convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a life sentence. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered. After review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Leigh Ann Champion Thweatt, appeals the Lewis County Circuit Court’s revocation of her probation, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking her probation in full rather than allowing her to address her substance abuse issues on probation, contending that full revocation did not serve the ends of justice for the public or the Defendant. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a recusal appeal filed by the pro se petitioner relative to the underlying delinquent
taxpayer action. Because the petitioner has not demonstrated a factual basis warranting
recusal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the motion to recuse.

A Henderson County jury convicted the Defendant, Gabriel Seth Box, of first degree premeditated murder, theft of a firearm, and two counts of tampering with evidence. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus six years. On appeal, the Defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue the trial date so that he could present an expert witness; and (2) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s motion to continue should have been granted, though the error was harmless in light of the expected testimony of the defense expert. We also conclude that the case should be remanded for reconsideration of consecutive sentencing under the factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). Accordingly, we respectfully affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for reconsideration of the issues related to consecutive sentencing.

An Anderson County jury convicted the Defendant, Sean Kirk Wagner, of sexual battery
by an authority figure, a Class C felony, and the trial court sentenced him to four years,
364 days of which were to be served at 100% in the county jail and the balance to be
suspended and served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that:
(1) when the trial court instructed the jury on sexual battery by an authority figure as a
lesser-included offense to Count 1, rape, it constructively amended the indictment; (2) the
evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) the State improperly failed to elect
specific facts to support his conviction; (4) the trial court erred when it allowed the State
to elicit testimony that the Defendant had referred to the victim and her friends as “sluts”;
and (5) the trial court erred when it did not allow the results of his polygraph test to be
admitted into evidence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Shannon Leigh Smith, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying her claim that trial counsel was ineffective in 1) failing to uncover evidence of a detective’s sexual relationship with a State’s witness and the same detective’s termination from the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission for misconduct; 2) failing to file a motion to suppress searches of Petitioner’s cell phone and Facebook account; 3) inadequately cross-examining the victim’s sister-in-law; 4) failing to put forth evidence to support self-defense; 5) failing to call defense witnesses including an expert on battered woman syndrome; 6) and withdrawing motions to disqualify the clerk’s office and the district attorney general’s office. She further argues that she is entitled to relief based on the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s alleged errors. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jacob Franks, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of sexual exploitation of a minor involving fifty or more images, a Class C felony, and fifteen counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1003(a), (d)(2025). The trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the Defendant’s roommate’s notarized written statement after the roommate invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at the trial. We conclude that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence. We affirm the judgments in Counts 5, 6,7, 8, 9,10, 11, 13, 14, and 15. We reverse the judgments in Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, and 16 and remand for a new trial on these counts.

The Petitioner, William Rolandus Keel, pro se, was convicted of two counts of rape of a
child. In this consolidated appeal, he challenges the orders of the Hardeman County Circuit
Court summarily dismissing his petitions seeking habeas corpus relief. Upon review, we
affirm.

Frank Delmar Raines, Jr., the Petitioner, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted rape and
attempted aggravated kidnapping, for which he is serving an effective thirty-year sentence.
On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on
his ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to trial counsel’s investigation of a
State’s witness and counsel’s decision not to call character witnesses at the sentencing
hearing. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s division of marital debt and award of alimony in a divorce action. After the trial, the court assigned most of the marital assets and debts to the husband and awarded the wife alimony in futuro based on an affidavit that included her “anticipated” expenses. The court also awarded the wife alimony in solido to pay for her attorney’s fees. The husband then filed a motion to alter or amend. While the motion was pending, the net proceeds from the sale of marital real estate were distributed to the parties. In its order on the husband’s motion, the trial court reallocated responsibility for the balance on a credit card account in the husband’s name, and it ordered the balance be paid out of the net proceeds from the real estate sale. On appeal, the husband argues that the trial court erred by relying on the wife’s “speculative future needs” rather than her actual expenses at the time of trial when awarding alimony. The husband also argues that the court should have awarded rehabilitative alimony rather than alimony in futuro because the wife has several vocational certificates that she could use to obtain a better paying job. And both the husband and the wife contend that the division of marital debt was inequitable. We conclude that the parties have waived their objections to the division of marital debt and the award of alimony in solido by failing to comply with the briefing requirements of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. As for the award of alimony in futuro, we find no error in the trial court’s reliance on evidence of the wife’s “anticipated expenses,” and we find no support in the record for the husband’s assertion that the wife could obtain a better paying job with her vocational certificates. Nonetheless, we find it necessary to modify the portion of the trial court’s order requiring the parties to pay off the credit card with funds from the real estate proceeds because they were previously disbursed.

The Defendant, Kyle Golden, entered a guiltyplea to one count of aggravated assaultand three counts of child abuse. The Shelby County Criminal Court accepted the Defendant’s guilty plea and, following a sentencing hearing, denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed an effective sentence of five years’ supervised probation. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.