APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Marcus Wade, appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court for Dickson County revoking his probation and ordering execution of his original ten‑year sentence. He argues that the trial court erred by considering hearsay evidence obtained from the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles website to find that he absconded from probation supervision. Following a review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Spencer Baucom, Jr., sought an interlocutory appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 and asked this court to review the trial court’s order denying him access to the audio recordings created by the court reporter during his rape trial. This court granted the Rule 9 application to address three questions. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the trial court’s order in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

On July 2, 2026, the pro se Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in
this court, which the appellate court clerk entered as a notice of appeal. See Tenn. R. App.
P. 3(b) (providing an appeal as of right from a trial court’s final judgment adjudicating a
petition for post-conviction relief). The fifteen-page pleading alleges various instances of
ineffective assistance of counsel alleged to have rendered his guilty pleas involuntary. On
July 20, 2026, the Petitioner filed a Uniform Affidavit of Indigency seeking permission to
proceed as an indigent person on appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 18(d).

This is the second appeal from the dismissal of a health care liability action for failure to comply with the Health Care Liability Act. In the first appeal, we held that the Health Care Liability Act required the plaintiff to file a new certificate of good faith with an amended complaint that added a new health care liability claim against the existing defendants. Even so, we vacated the dismissal and remanded for reconsideration of the plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to file a new certificate. On remand, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a good faith basis for an extension of time. Again, it denied the plaintiff’s motion and dismissed the amended complaint. Because we conclude that the court erred in denying the plaintiff’s motion, we reverse.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for recusal of the trial judge. We vacate and remand for entry of an order either providing the grounds upon which the trial judge denies the motion or granting the motion.

In 2022, the Defendant, Bernard Allen Wilson, pleaded guilty to possession with the intent
to sell or deliver Fentanyl, a Class C felony and was placed on judicial diversion for five
years. In July 2024, a violation of probation warrant was filed based on a new arrest for
drug possession and weapon-related charges. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court found the Defendant in violation and revoked his judicial diversion. After a
sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve a six-year sentence in
confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it imposed
a sentence of six years, which is longer than the five-years contemplated by his plea
agreement. He further contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request to
award him “street time” credit for the time he served on probation. After review, we affirm
the trial court’s judgment.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights on the statutory ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child and placing the child in the person’s custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the child. The trial court further concluded that termination was in the child’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The capital Petitioner, Gary Sutton, has filed an application for interlocutory appeal, see
Tenn. R. App. P. 9, seeking review of the trial court’s August 14, 2025 order denying the
Petitioner’s motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State at the
trial court level litigation of the Petitioner’s intellectual disability petition. The Petitioner argues
that interlocutory review of the trial court’s order is required to prevent irreparable injury, to
prevent needless and protracted litigation, and to develop a uniform body of law. Tenn. R. App. P.
9(a)(1), (2), and (3).

In this appeal, we address whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in dismissing a criminal defendant’s appeal because he did not include in the appellate record a transcript of his guilty plea hearing. Here, the defendant’s plea agreement resolved all issues except the manner of service for the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for probation. In the record for his appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals on the denial of probation, the defendant included the transcript from the sentencing hearing but not the transcript from the guilty plea hearing. Citing the absence of the guilty plea transcript, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the record was inadequate for appellate review of the trial court’s sentencing decision. Without giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard, the appellate court then dismissed the defendant’s appeal. We reverse. Under State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278–79 (Tenn. 2012), trial court decisions on the manner of service for a sentence are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. When an appellate record does not include an item such as a guilty plea transcript, the appellate court is to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the record is sufficient for meaningful review, in light of this standard. Id. at 279. The determination on the adequacy of the record is made with the understanding that the trial court has broad discretion in sentencing and the key question on appeal is whether the trial court recited a proper basis for its sentencing decision. Id. Here, the appellate record is sufficient for meaningful appellate review even without the transcript of the guilty plea hearing. But where an appellate court believes a guilty plea transcript is essential to appellate review, it has many options that allow the parties to be heard and to facilitate review of the issues on their merits. Those options include presuming the missing transcript would have supported the trial court’s decision, issuing a show-cause order and permitting written responses, ordering supplemental briefs, or ordering the parties to supplement the record. Here, dismissal of the appeal was not a reasonable option. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s closure of the decedent’s estate. Due to the deficiencies in appellant’s appellate brief, we dismiss the appeal. Appellees’ request for frivolous appeal damages is denied.

Father overpaid child support, and the trial court ordered the overpayment to be credited against future monthly payments. After the judgment became final, Father filed a motion for relief from judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60, seeking a judgment against Mother rather than credit against future child support payments. Father also sought to depose three State employees in an effort to determine why certain payments had been released to Mother instead of being held by the State. The trial court denied the Rule 60 motion, granted a motion to quash the depositions, and denied a motion to alter or amend. We affirm.

This case concerns the interpretation of an assigned risk workers’ compensation insurance policy. The trial court construed the contract to give the insurer the authority to determine the meaning of the NCCI classification code provision at issue and granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer. We have determined that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the pertinent code provision and, therefore, we reverse and remand.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on November 20, 2025. The notice of appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until December 26, 2025, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The trial court terminated the appellants’ parental rights to their three minor children. As
to the mother and the father, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence of the
grounds of persistent conditions and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume
custody of the children. The trial court also found that the mother abandoned the children
by failing to establish a suitable home. Finally, the trial court found that termination of the
mother’s and father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The mother
and father both appeal. Upon diligent review of the record, we find no reversible error and
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of a divorce proceeding. After the trial court entered a mediated
final judgment of divorce on stipulated grounds, the husband, who is pro se, filed a Rule
60 motion seeking to set it aside on the basis of fraud by the wife. The trial court denied
the motion. Due to significant deficiencies in the husband’s brief on appeal, we conclude
that he waived consideration of any issue and hereby dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Terrence Dewayne Lewis, Jr., was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder, and one count each of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and second degree murder. The trial court ordered all sentences to run concurrently for an effective life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the DNA testing of the swab from Defendant’s shoe; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing argument; (4) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to timely disclose discovery materials; (5) the trial court erred by admitting the video recording of the high speed police pursuit and other evidence at trial; (6) the trial court erred by limiting the cross-examination of Detective James Goehring; and (7) that cumulative error entitles him to a new trial. Following a review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A trust beneficiary filed a petition seeking the removal of the trustee and successor trustee of the trust due to purported breaches of trust committed by the trustees. The beneficiary also asked that the trustees be ordered to repay any trust funds that they wrongfully withdrew. The trial court granted the requested relief, and the trustees appeal. Upon diligent review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Webster Malone, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, we affirm.

The subject of an order of protection appeals the denial of a motion under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a final order extending the order of protection. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The parties to this appeal were divorced in Virginia, and the divorce decree provided that
they would alternate parenting time with their young child every three weeks. The mother
moved to Tennessee, and the father later moved to Minnesota. After residing in Tennessee
for ten months, the mother filed a petition in Tennessee seeking to have the Tennessee
court enforce the Virginia divorce decree with respect to her allegations of contempt and
modify the Virginia decree to name her primary residential parent. The father subsequently
sought to register the Virginia decree in Minnesota. After a hearing, the Tennessee court
found that Virginia had lost exclusive continuing jurisdiction because all parties had left
that state and that Tennessee now had jurisdiction to modify the divorce decree because it
qualified as the child’s home state. However, the Tennessee court declined to exercise its
jurisdiction upon finding that Minnesota would be a more convenient forum for the
litigation, primarily based on the fact that the Virginia divorce decree contained an
agreement of the parties stating that the child would be enrolled in school in Minnesota
upon reaching school age if the father was still residing there. The trial court dismissed
the petition and awarded the father a portion of his attorney fees. The mother appeals,
arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in its analysis of the statutory factors
under the inconvenient forum statute, erred by dismissing her request for enforcement of
the Virginia decree, and erred by granting the father his attorney fees. We agree and reverse
the trial court’s order of dismissal and its award of attorney fees. This matter is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Mother/Appellant appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) severe child abuse, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4); and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Appellant also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child. Because the
Department of Children’s Services declined to defend one ground, we reverse that ground.
In all other respects, we affirm.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal filed by the pro se petitioner relative to the underlying action involving sale of an automobile. Because the petitioner has not demonstrated a factual basis warranting recusal of the trial court judge, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the motion to recuse. 

Roddarrius Eugene Jenkins, the Defendant, was convicted of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, a Class B felony, by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury.  See T.C.A § 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder); § 39-13-403 (2025) (especially aggravated robbery); § 39-17-1307 (2018) (subsequently amended) (felon in possession of a firearm).  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) violating his Equal Protection rights by denying his motion to appoint a second attorney, (2) denying his motions to suppress his pretrial statements, (3) admitting the Defendant’s uncorroborated statements as evidence, (4) denying, at the close of the State’s proof, the Defendant’s request for a self-defense instruction, (5) restricting the scope of the codefendant’s cross-examination, and (6) finding enhancement factors applied to the Defendant’s sentence.  The Defendant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

The plaintiff filed this action against a trial court judge who had presided over a prior lawsuit involving the plaintiff. The Shelby County Circuit Court (“trial court”) dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, determining that they were barred by judicial immunity. The plaintiff timely appealed. Because the plaintiff has failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we dismiss this appeal.