Ronald Moore v. Averitt Express
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Hessmer v. Rosa Hessmer
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Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Seal v. Charles Blalock & Sons
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Hancock | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Tyrone Crawford - Order
The Appellant, Randy Tyrone Crawford, appeals from the order of the Sumner County Criminal Court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Dee Huskey - Order
On August 23, 2002, the defendant filed a petition to rehear claiming that the opinion of this court fails to consider material facts, contains misstatements of fact, and overlooks or misapprehends case law. We disagree. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rufus E. Neeley
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Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State, ex rel Mary Clark v. Vernon Wilson
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Leslie Moore v. James DeVault
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mitzi Gay Gregory Blair v. John David Blair
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Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Lee Kraft, Executor for Ms. Helen Bergida v. Ezo-Goten
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jenny Parrott v. John Abraham
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Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Eilene Copenhagen v. Roger Copenhagen
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara Cagle v. Gaylord Entertainment Co.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
J.C. Bradford v. Douglas Kitchen
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sydney Couch v. Bell South Telecommunications, Inc.,
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Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Eric Boyd v. State of Tennessee
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Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Andrew Jackson, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, David Andrew Jackson, Jr., was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of Knox County of six counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies, and two counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies. Prior to sentencing, the petitioner also pled guilty to one pending count of aggravated sexual battery and two pending counts of rape of a child. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the petitioner received an effective sentence of twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction to be served at one hundred percent (100%). The petitioner timely filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied his petition. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the post-conviction court's finding that the petitioner received effective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donnie W. Foulks v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Donnie W. Foulks, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court, citing Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-202(c) (1997), determined that the petitioner had previously filed a petition for post-conviction relief and was therefore precluded from seeking relief in a second proceeding. Concluding that the post-conviction court failed to consider that the petitioner's first post-conviction petition was not resolved on the merits, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas Dyer v. Tennessee Department of Correction
Thomas Dyer has filed a respectful and timely Petition to Rehear. He states that our opinion mistakenly asserted that he failed to petition the Department for a Declaratory Order. Upon further examination of the record, we are obligated to conclude that he is correct. The record shows that he indeed filed a Petition for Declaratory Order, and that the petition was denied. Thus, we were mistaken to conclude that we lacked jurisdiction to consider his Petition for a Declaratory Judgment under the UAPA. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Textron Financial Corp., v. Elaine E.Powell, et al.
This dispute arises out of a personal guaranty executed by the defendants securing a loan. Following a trial by jury, the court below awarded the plaintiff $68,330 in damages plus attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the defendants contend that the court below erred in applying the parol evidence rule to evidence which would show mistake and in not permitting the defendants to amend their answer. We reverse the judgment entered below and remand for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven D. Fish
As a result of his guilty plea to one count of attempted rape of a child, the appellant, Steven D. Fish, was sentenced to eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with thirty days to be served in confinement and the balance served on supervised probation. After the appellant began serving his probationary sentence, a probation violation warrant was issued. Subsequent to a probation revocation hearing, the trial court found that the appellant had violated the terms of his probation and ordered the appellant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant alleges that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark D. Nunnally
The defendant seeks appellate review of his motion to clarify the prior judgments of the trial court. We dismiss the appeal because the record does not reflect any order of the trial court concerning the motion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donna F. Benson
The defendant, a former employee of the Shelby County Criminal Court Clerk's office, pled guilty to two counts of public servant accepting a bribe, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-102, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of three years on each count, but suspended all but ninety days of the sentence, to be served on weekends at the county workhouse. The defendant was also placed on probation for three years, ordered to perform 300 hours of community service, and assessed a $1000 fine for each count. She argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying her judicial diversion or full probation. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harold Wayne Nichols v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Harold Wayne Nichols, filed post-conviction petitions seeking relief from his conviction for felony murder, his sentence of death, and his numerous convictions for aggravated rape, first degree burglary, and larceny upon the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as other legal grounds. After conducting several evidentiary hearings, the trial court denied relief as to the felony murder conviction and sentence of death, but granted partial relief by ordering new sentencing hearings as to the remaining convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court erred by allowing the petitioner to assert his right against self-incrimination during the post-conviction proceedings, yet upheld the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude: (1) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel based on the failure to investigate and challenge his confessions as false; (2) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel based on the failure to challenge the legality of his arrest; (3) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial based on the failure to present additional mitigating evidence; (4) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial based on the failure to object to misconduct by the prosecution; (5) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial based on the failure to request mitigating instructions; (6) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial based on the failure to raise issues regarding the constitutionality of capital punishment; (7) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial based on the failure to object to the discovery of notes prepared by a defense psychologist on self-incrimination grounds; (8) that the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in refusing to remand the case for additional DNA testing; (9) that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by addressing the issue of whether the petitioner had a right against self-incrimination in this post-conviction proceeding but the error had no effect on the outcome; and (10) that the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and cumulative -2- error did not require the reversal of the petitioner’s convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Harold Wayne Nichols v. State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
I fully concur in the conclusion of the majority that Nichols's convictions should be affirmed. To the extent, however, that the petitioner's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel may be interpreted to include the failure to object to the method of proportionality review, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in a long line of dissents beginning with State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913, 923-25 (Tenn. 2000) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting), and elaborated upon in State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 793-800 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting). Those dissents suggest, essentially, that the comparative proportionality review protocol currently embraced by the majority is inadequate to shield defendants from the arbitrary and disproportionate imposition of the death penalty. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c) (1997). Accordingly, while I concur in the affirmance of Nichols's convictions, I cannot, for the reasons above stated, concur in the imposition of the death penalty in this case. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court |