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I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I believe the trial court erred by limiting the definition of passion to anger relative to the adequate provocation necessary for voluntary manslaughter.
John Iovinelli vs. Steadman Estes W2001-02968-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
This is an appeal of the grant of summary judgment. The Appellants contend that the trial judge granted the Appellees summary judgment, sua sponte, and that they did not have notice or an opportunity to respond to the issues decided by the judge. We disagree and, for the following reasons, we affirm.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Janice Evans vs. Thomas Evans W2001-03037-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris
This is an appeal of a final decree of divorce involving issues of division of marital property, rehabilitative alimony, child support, and admission of evidence. Wife appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Henderson
Court of Appeals
Stella Keltner vs. Open Lake Sporting Club W2002-00449-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
This is a dispute over ownership of the Right Hand Arm portion of Open Lake. The trial court awarded summary judgment to Open Lake Sporting Club. Having determined that there are genuine issues of material facts, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Lauderdale
Court of Appeals
Dept. of Transportation vs. Sammy/Yvonne Hanna W2002-00152-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley
This is a condemnation case. The Tennessee Department of Transportation alleges that the trial judge committed error by allowing the landowners to discover the opinions of an appraiser not designated to testify at trial and that these errors require overturning the jury's verdict because of the prejudice they caused. We find that errors were committed in the court below, but that these errors were harmless. Therefore, we affirm the verdict of the jury.
The defendant, Michael Douglas Willis, was charged with DUI, violating the open container law, and violating the implied consent law. A jury convicted the defendant of violating the implied consent law but acquitted him of the other charges. The trial court subsequently overturned the jury's guilty verdict but nevertheless revoked the defendant's license for one year for violating the implied consent law. The defendant now appeals the trial court's revocation of his license. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The petitioner, Gary Eugene Aldridge, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Hickman County of one count of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated rape, one count of rape, and two counts of simple assault. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to an effective sentence of sixty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, followed by an effective consecutive sentence of seventeen months and twenty-nine days in the local workhouse. After an unsuccessful appeal of his convictions, the petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the post-conviction court's denial of his petition. After reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
Defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class C felony. Defendant's motion to suppress evidence was denied by the trial court. Defendant claimed that evidence found on him was the result of an illegal search and should have been suppressed. The suppression issue was certified for review. We affirm the trial court and hold the evidence was properly admissible.
After entering a guilty plea, the defendant reserved certified questions for review: (1) whether the Terry search was justified, and (2) whether the incriminating nature of the contraband was immediately apparent. We hold that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry frisk and that the object felt was not immediately apparent as contraband. We reverse and dismiss the defendant's conviction.
A Hamilton County jury convicted the petitioner of first degree felony murder and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. The petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and to eight years incarceration for the conspiracy conviction. This court affirmed the convictions, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. Specifically, the petitioner alleged that counsel: (1) failed to request an alibi instruction at trial; (2) failed to raise the alibi instruction issue on direct appeal; and (3) failed to challenge an erroneous accomplice instruction at trial and on appeal. Also, the petitioner alleged that the trial court: (1) failed to instruct the jury on the defense of alibi, thus violating the petitioner's due process rights and his right to a jury trial; and (2) failed to instruct the jury on "the natural and probable consequences rule." Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief, and this appeal ensued. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
Hamilton
Court of Criminal Appeals
Harper Enterprises vs. City of Bean Station E2002-01734-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Vance
The City of Bean Station ("the City") denied the application of the plaintiff ("the applicant") for a permit to sell beer for off-premises consumption. The applicant filed a petition for certiorari, naming the City and seeking a writ of mandamus to compel it to issue the requested permit. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted the City summary judgment. The applicant appeals. It contends that the City, "by actions and/or inaction," has caused its beer ordinance, which limits beer permits within the municipality to two, to be invalid. In the alternative, it contends that the City "has engaged in discriminatory, arbitrary and capricious application of the ordinance." We vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Grainger
Court of Appeals
James Killingsworth vs. Ted Russell Ford E2002-01562-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
This is an action under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act that arises out of the sale of an SUV. James Killingsworth, and his wife, Kathy Killingsworth ("the purchasers"), sued Ted Russell Ford, Inc. ("the seller"), alleging that the seller failed to advise them about damage to the previously-unowned vehicle sold to the purchasers. At the conclusion of the trial below, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the purchasers, awarding them $2,500. The purchasers then moved for attorney's fees and discretionary costs, which the court granted, but only in the amount of $500. The purchasers appeal, arguing that the fees and expenses awarded by the trial court are unreasonably low. By way of separate issues, the seller argues that the purchasers' second reply brief should be stricken and that the trial court erred in granting any fees and costs to the purchasers. We vacate and remand.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Krishina Leach v. Nashville and Davidson County M2000-01487-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Brothers
This is a Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act case. A tow truck owned and operated by an employee of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County was traveling northwardly on Second Avenue South when it struck and killed Jacob Leach, age three, and seriously injured his mother, Krishina Leach. Jacob and his mother were walking southwardly on the sidewalk when Jacob broke free of his mother's restraint and darted into the path of the truck. The trial judge concluded that the driver of the tow truck was negligent because he "should have seen what was there to be seen." The judgment is reversed upon a finding that a motorist is under no duty to assume that an escorted child, in the restraint of an adult, will suddenly break free and run into traffic.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Hillsboro Plaza v. H.T. Pope Enterprises M2001-02943-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
This cause of action involves damages resulting from the breach of a commercial lease agreement. The trial court awarded judgment to the landlord, including forfeiture damages, prejudgment interest and attorney's fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Glenn Elizabeth Tefft v. Weakley County Ambulance M2001-02270-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer insists (1) the evidence preponderates against the trial judge's finding that the plaintiff sustained a back injury on September 13, 1999 from lifting a patient where the evidence shows the plaintiff never lifted a patient, (2) the evidence preponderates against the trial judge's finding that the plaintiff gave proper notice as required by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-21 where, without a reasonable excuse for delay, plaintiff began treatment but did not inform defendant that plaintiff's alleged injury was work related until a month and fourteen days later, (3) the trial judge erred in admitting the plaintiff's entire deposition into evidence, over the objection of the defendant, when the plaintiff offered the same after excerpts of the deposition were properly offered by defendant pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 32.1, and (4) the trial judge erred in awarding the plaintiff medical expenses paid by the plaintiff's health insurance, a nonparty. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (21 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SR. J., joined. Sean Antone Hunt, Spicer, Flynn & Rudstrom, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Weakley County Ambulance Service Charles L. Hicks, Camden, Tennessee, for the appellee, Glenn Elizabeth Tefft MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Ms. Tefft, initiated this civil action to recover workers' compensation benefits, as provided by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-11 et seq, for injuries allegedly suffered in a work related accident on September 13, 1999. Following a trial on August 9, 21, the trial court awarded to her, among other things, permanent partial disability benefits based on 35 percent to the body as a whole. The employer, Weakley County Ambulance Service, has appealed. For injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1985, appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (21 Supp.). The reviewing court is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Weakley
Workers Compensation Panel
Chester Gray Thompson v. Nashville Electric Service M2001-02306-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: John H. Gasaway, III, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer insists (1) the award of permanent partial disability benefits based on 37.5 percent to the body as a whole is excessive, (2) the trial court erred in finding that the employee suffered a back injury "in the scope and course of the employment," and (3) the trial court erred in commuting the award to a lump sum. The employee questions the admissibility of the treating physician's records because the records were neither admitted through a medical records custodian nor the deposition of the treating physician, and no C-32 form was submitted. As discussed below, the panel has concluded that any error in the admission of the medical records was harmless. We therefore affirm the judgment. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (21 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SR. J., joined. Mark A. Baugh and Eugene Ward, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Nashville Electric Service E. Guy Holliman and William Joseph Butler, Lafayette, Tennessee, for the appellee, Chester Thompson MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Mr. Thompson, initiated this civil action to recover workers' compensation benefits for injuries to his back and ankle allegedly resulting from a fall during a training exercise authorized by the employer, Nashville Electric Service. The trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on 37.5 percent to the body as a whole and 5 percent to his ankle.1 Both parties have appealed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (21 Supp.). The reviewing court is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Chester
Workers Compensation Panel
Royal & Sunalliance v. Barbara Cooper M2001-01580-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Robert Corlew, III, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer's insurer questions the trial court's finding that the employee's injury is causally related to her employment; and the employee questions the sufficiency of the award. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (21 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed. JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J., and TOM E. GRAY, SP. J., joined. Diana C. Benson and Larry G. Trail, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Royal and SunAlliance Keith Jordan, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Barbara Cooper MEMORANDUM OPINION The appellant initiated this civil action seeking a declaration of its rights and liabilities relative to the appellee's claim for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Law. By her answer and counterclaim, the employee or claimant, Barbara Cooper, demanded medical and permanent disability benefits for an injury allegedly arising out of and in the course of her employment by Nissan North America, Inc. After a trial on the merits, the trial court awarded lifetime medical benefits and permanent disability benefits based on 13 percent to the left leg. Both parties have appealed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The reviewing court is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Rutherford
Workers Compensation Panel
Alma Haney v. Mabry Health Care, Inc. M2001-02533-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Clara Byrd, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer questions the trial court's award of permanent partial disability benefits based on 8 percent to the left leg. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (21 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed. JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J., and TOM E. GRAY, SP. J., joined. Kirk L. Clements, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Mabry Health Care, Inc. William E. Halfacre, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Alma Haney MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Alma Haney, commenced this civil action to recover workers' compensation benefits for injuries arising out of and in the course of her employment with the employer, Mabry Health Care, Inc. Specifically, the employee alleged that on or about November 18, 1998, she suffered injuries to her left leg, including reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD). After a trial on the merits, the trial court awarded the claimant, among other things, permanent partial disability benefits based on 8 percent to the left leg. The employer has appealed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The reviewing court is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Jackson
Workers Compensation Panel
Denver Waddell vs. Lawrence Ogledzinkski E2001-03131-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
Knox County -In this appeal from the Knox County Circuit Court the Appellant, Denver J. Waddell, contends that the Trial Court erred in dismissing his case by grant of summary judgment upon grounds that the cause of action against the Appellee, Lawrence M. Ogledzinkski, is precluded by T.C.A. 50-6-108(a). We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
The Defendant, Jerry W. Souder, pled nolo contendere to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range II offender to six years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals as of right, alleging that the trial court erred by denying him an alternative sentence, specifically probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant pled guilty to two counts of driving after being declared an habitual motor vehicle offender and one count each of "third or subsequent" offense DUI, child endangerment, and vehicular assault, and it was agreed the trial court would determine the sentences. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of five years, eleven months, and twenty-eight days in incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in sentencing him. We conclude the defendant was indicted for fourth offense DUI, a Class E felony; he pled guilty to the offense as charged in the indictment, yet the plea erroneously referred to the non-existent enhancement classification of "third or subsequent" offense DUI rather than fourth offense DUI; and the defendant was erroneously sentenced for a misdemeanor based upon this non-existent enhancement classification. Because the defendant's guilty plea and sentence for this offense were erroneous and his pleas to all other offenses were part of his agreement to plead guilty, we vacate all judgments of conviction and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
