Opinions
George Haskel Stewart V. Demple L. Sewell et al.
We granted this appeal to clarify the applicability of the rule of ademption by extinction and of Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-3-111 concerning the sale of specifically devised property. In August 1994, the decedent Clara Stewart executed her last will and testament in which she left a parcel of real estate to her stepson, the plaintiff in this matter. In November 1994, the decedent executed a durable power of attorney to her natural children, defendants Sewell and Judkins. In January 1997, the decedent’s health had so far deteriorated that she required placement in a nursing home. In February 1997, Sewell and Judkins sold a portion of the devised real estate in order to fund the decedent’s nursing home expenses. After their mother’s death, Sewell and Judkins inherited the remaining proceeds of the sale; the plaintiff inherited that portion of the real estate which had not been sold. Plaintiff sued Sewell and Judkins as well as the purchasers of the real estate, alleging fraud. After a trial, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that Sewell and Judkins had acted improperly and granted the plaintiff relief. We granted the defendants’ application for permission to appeal and hold that the specific devise of the real property was adeemed by extinction and that the Court of Appeals erred in applying retroactively Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-3-111 and in imposing a constructive trust in order to avoid that result. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s case. |
Franklin | Supreme Court | |
Christin M. Johnson, LPN v. Tennessee Board of Nursing
A formerly licensed practical nurse appeals a default judgment revoking her license by the Board of Nursing and claims, inter alia, that the Board failed to comply with applicable notice requirements. Because the administrative record does not reflect consideration of the rule governing proceedings by default, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Edward Hogue - Order
This cause came before the court upon the State of Tennessee’s petition for a rehearing, wherein the State posited that the court’s opinion in this cause incorrectly referred to the statutory provision for the writ of error coram nobis in civil cases when a reference to the statute governing criminal cases should have been used. We agree. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Edward Hogue
Before the court is petitioner Thomas Edward Hogue’s appeal from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his October 2005 “Petition to Set Aside Guilty Plea and to Issue a Writ of Error Coram Nobis.” Based upon an untimely filing of the petition, we affirm the order of dismissal. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daniel Eugene Bradford
The Appellant, Daniel Eugene Bradford, appeals the sentencing decision of the Hardin County Circuit Court. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Bradford pled guilty to aggravated assault and misdemeanor assault, receiving concurrent sentences of three years for the felony conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor conviction. The manner and service of the sentences were to be determined by the trial court. On appeal, Bradford challenges the trial court’s denial of probation. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Parris Roofing & Sheetmetal Co. v. SCR Electric, Inc.
Parris Roofing & Sheetmetal Co. (“Plaintiff”) sued SCR Electric, Inc. (“Defendant”) seeking, in part, payment for work Plaintiff had done pursuant to an alleged agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant. The case was tried without a jury and the Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff and Defendant did not have an enforceable agreement, but that Plaintiff was entitled to recover $3,613.50, from Defendant in quantum meruit. Plaintiff appeals to this Court claiming that the Trial Court erred in finding that the reasonable value of the work performed was only $3,613.50. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael D. Gilliam
The Defendant, Michael D. Gilliam, appeals from the order of the Montgomery County Circuit Court revoking his probation and ordering that his eight-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction. In December of 2003, the Defendant pled guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine for resale and received an eight-year sentence. The sentence was suspended following service of twenty days in the county workhouse, and the Defendant was placed on probation. On June 23, 2005, a warrant was issued, wherein it was alleged that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probation. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probationary sentence and ordered that his original eight-year sentence to the Department of Correction be reinstated. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering that his sentence be served in confinement. After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kim Brown v. William Shappley, M.D.
We affirm the trial court’s award of summary judgment to Defendant physician in this medical malpractice action. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Alan Hale v. U.S. Xpress Enterprises, Inc.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the employee's complaint. On appeal, the employee contends that the employer had actual notice of his injury on a timely basis. The employee also contends that he sustained a gradually occurring injury and that timely notice of injury was given. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Claiborne | Workers Compensation Panel | |
James Snow v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
The Employee claimed an injury to his respiratory system, which the employer denied. The trial court dismissed the action finding that the evidence did not preponderate in favor of a causal connection between the respiratory condition and the employment. After consideration of the evidence, the Workers’ Compensation Panel concludes that the evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial court affirms the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Anthony Keshun Goods v. Tony Parker, Warden
The State appeals the habeas court’s grant of a petition for habeas corpus relief filed by the Petitioner, Anthony Keshun Goods. The Petitioner alleged in his petition that his sentence was illegal because he was sentenced to concurrent terms when the law required him to be sentenced to consecutive terms. On appeal, the State contends the statutory requirement of consecutive sentences does not apply to the Petitioner, his petition is not yet ripe, and the remedy set out by the habeas court is improper. Finding reversible error in the judgment of the habeas court, we reverse the judgment and dismiss the habeas corpus petition. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raymond Earl McKay
The Appellant, Raymond Earl McKay, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Fayette County Circuit Court. McKay pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced, as a career offender, to twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he asserts that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we conclude that McKay received erroneous advise from counsel during the plea bargaining process, which resulted in the entry of an involuntary and unknowing guilty plea. Finding both deficient performance and prejudice, the case is remanded to the trial court for withdrawal of the guilty plea. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Calvin Fleming
The Defendant, Calvin Fleming, was convicted of attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. The Defendant was sentenced, as a career offender, to an effective sentence of sixty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted photographs of the victim’s wounds into evidence because the State failed to authenticate them; (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions for attempted first degree murder because there was no proof of premeditation; and (3) his convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault violate constitutional principles of double jeopardy. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the attempted murder, but we reverse the judgment as to the aggravated assault because the aggravated assault should have been merged into the attempted murder. Thus, we remand the case for the trial court to enter a judgment consistent with this opinion. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tenn-Fla Partners v. Henry C. Shelton, III, et al.
Client appeals the dismissal of its legal malpractice action against the attorneys who represented it in a bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court determined that the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations and that there were no grounds upon which the trier of fact could find that the loss alleged by the client was caused by any negligent act or omission of the defendants. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jikinte Lashane Morris
The defendant, Jikinte Lashane Morris, was convicted of sale of a schedule II drug, fined $3,000, and sentenced to eleven years and nine months as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the jury access, as part of its deliberations, to the surveillance video introduced as evidence at trial. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding the surveillance video. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jim Corbett Corder
The defendant, Jim Corbett Corder, was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to four years in prison. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Madkins v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Richard Madkins, filed a February 2005 Davidson County Criminal Court petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1994 jury-tried conviction of especially aggravated robbery, for which he was originally sentenced to a term of 60 years and re-sentenced in 2003 to a term of 25 years. Before the habeas corpus court, the petitioner argued that he was illegally re-sentenced because the 1994 jury verdict and conviction were void and because, instead of re-sentencing, he should have been immediately released from custody. Following a hearing, the habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, and we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Wayne Green
The Defendant, Jimmy Wayne Green, was indicted for theft of property and two counts of assault. In accordance with a plea agreement, he submitted a best interest plea to one count of assault in exchange for the State dismissing the other count of assault and the theft charge. The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, thirty days of which was to be served in confinement with the remainder to be served on probation. The Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donte Montgomery
The Petitioner, Donte Montgomery, pled guilty to one count of possession with the intent to sell more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, and the trial judge imposed a sentence of six years in the workhouse as a standard offender. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was dismissed by the post-conviction court after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel, and his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Demond Gardner v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Demond Gardner, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After appointing the Petitioner counsel and holding a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner filed this appeal, contending that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marvin D. Nance
The Defendant, Marvin D. Nance, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the State failed to elect a set of facts upon which it was relying to sustain his convictions; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) the trial court erred by not granting him a mistrial after the State made allegedly improper argument; (4) the State committed a discovery violation; and (5) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frank Lee Tate
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Frank Lee Tate, was convicted of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and incest, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, career offender, to concurrent sentences of sixty years for his aggravated rape conviction and fifteen years for his incest conviction. In his pro se appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, and his classification as a career offender for sentencing purposes. The State argues on appeal that the trial court erred in not sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after finding that Defendant was a repeat violent offender. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and his sentence for his incest conviction. We set aside the sentence for aggravated rape, and remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing on the sole issue of whether Defendant should be sentenced as a repeat violent offender or as a career offender for his aggravated rape conviction. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Zachary V. Henning
The defendant, Zachary V. Henning, was convicted at a jury trial in Lauderdale County Circuit Court of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10.000. He was sentenced, as a Range I offender, to 10 years for aggravated robbery, three years for aggravated assault, and two years for theft of property. The trial court merged the conviction of aggravated assault with the aggravated robbery conviction and imposed the theft sentence to run concurrently with that for aggravated robbery, for an effective sentence of 10 years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and complains that his sentence is excessive. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts but that multiple convictions for aggravated robbery and theft violate double jeopardy protections. Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction judgments for aggravated assault and theft are vacated, and the jury’s “guilty verdict” for the theft is merged into the judgment of conviction of aggravated robbery. The defendant’s aggravated robbery sentence is affirmed, and we remand solely for the correction and entry of an appropriate judgment consistent with this opinion. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Garnett Lynn Goforth, R. Lynn Goforth and wife, Susan D. Goforth v. State of Tennessee
Plaintiffs, parents and son brought suit against the University for injuries to the son sustained while practicing football, charging the coaches were negligent in allowing practice to continue under dangerous conditions. The Commissioner ruled in favor of the University, except as to the dispute over insurance, and awarded plaintiffs $3,600.00 under the contract of insurance with the University. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sharon Kay Jackson v. Randall D. Jackson
This is a divorce case. The parties had a long-term marriage and their children are now adults. During the marriage, the husband worked in the telecommunications industry and the wife was primarily a homemaker. The parties’ marital estate consisted largely of real property. They had incurred a substantial debt to the Internal Revenue Service. After a three-day hearing, the trial court declared the parties divorced and ordered that the real property be sold to satisfy the debt owed to the IRS. The trial court equally divided the IRS debt and any remaining proceeds from the sale of the properties. The trial court also awarded the wife a lump sum judgment representing temporary support during the pendency of the action, ordered the husband to pay the wife transitional alimony for five years, and denied the wife’s request for attorney’s fees. The wife now appeals the division of the marital estate, the decision to make the alimony award transitional rather than in futuro, and the denial of her request for attorney’s fees. The husband appeals the amount of the alimony award and the judgment for temporary support awarded to the wife. We modify the alimony to award alimony in futuro instead of transitional alimony, and affirm the remainder of the trial court’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |