Opinions
Patricia Ross v. Robert T. Stooksbury, Jr.
Robert T. Stooksbury, Jr. (the creditor) obtained a judgment in federal district court against, among others, Rebecca Ross Jordan, the daughter of Patricia Ross, the plaintiff in the case now before us. The creditor then attempted, in federal court, to garnish the funds in three bank accounts jointly held by Jordan and plaintiff. Plaintiff argued to the federal court that the funds should not be subject to garnishment because, according to her, they were solely owned by plaintiff. The federal district court, applying Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703(a) (2007), held that the “applicable statutory authority directs that the moneys deposited into the account[s] owned by both Ms. Ross and Ms. Rebecca Ross Jordan are subject to the claims of creditors of either depositor . . .” and, consequently, the federal court allowed execution on and garnishment of the funds. The federal court later ordered, without objection by plaintiff, disbursement of the funds to the creditor. Plaintiff then brought this action under Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703(a), which provides in pertinent part that “any other depositor not indebted to the creditor may, by commencing a separate action against the creditor, establish the rights that the depositor may have in the funds.” The creditor in the case now before us filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court agreed and dismissed plaintiff’s action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Arthur B. Roberts et al. v. Robert Bailey et al.
The plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants to settle a boundary dispute. During the litigation, the defendants, who had for years enjoyed the continuous and exclusive possession of their lands, discovered that their ancestors, husband and wife, had acquired title during the “gap years” and, in consequence, had owned the lands as tenants in common rather than tenants by the entirety. The defendants, proceeding as third-party plaintiffs, filed a motion to quiet title against third-party defendants, also descendants of their ancestors, who each claimed an ownership interest in the disputed lands by inheritance. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the third-party defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On remand, the defendants/third-party plaintiffs amended their complaint, seeking to establish title by prescription. The trial court again denied relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the third-party defendants‟ “undisputed ignorance” of their status as co-tenants in common with their relatives precluded a “presumptive ouster” and, therefore, prevented the defendants/third-party plaintiffs from taking title by prescription. Because the undisputed facts establish that each of the elements of title by prescription has been satisfied, the Court of Appeals is reversed and the original defendants are awarded title by prescription. This cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James W. Grooms, Jr.
The Defendant-Apellant, James W. Grooms, Jr., was convicted by a Hawkins County jury of two counts of aggravated assault, for which he received an effective sentence of four years and six months' confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that (1) the trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury that aggravated assault was a lesser-included offense of attempted first degree murder, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patricia Bazemore v. Performance Food Group, Inc. et al.
Patricia Bazemore brought this action against her former employer, Performance Food Group, Inc. (PFG) and Barry Pearson, a former employee of PFG. Ms. Bazemore claimed that, while she and Mr. Pearson were working for PFG, she was subjected to a pattern of unwanted sexual harassment by him – conduct that she alleges created a hostile work environment in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA). As a result of the unwanted sexual harassment, Ms. Bazemore also alleged constructive discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision and retention.1 PFG subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that no genuine issue of material fact exists in support of Ms. Bazemore’s claims against PFG as an entity. The trial court ultimately granted PFG’s motion for summary judgment after finding (1) no evidence of a hostile work environment; (2) facts indicating that PFG took reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment from occurring; (3) proof that PFG’s response to Ms. Bazemore’s complaint was objectively reasonable; (4) insufficient evidence to support the claims of either intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (5) no proof of negligent retention and supervision by PFG. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Travis Richards v. Veronica Denise Richards
Anthony Travis Richards (Husband), who was incarcerated in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed this divorce action against Veronica Denise Richards (Wife). Husband also filed a “motion for leave of court to appear by means of video communications technology or, in the alternative, by telephone in lieu of personal attandence” in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-809 (2014). The trial court did not address Husband’s motion. Rather, the court entered an order dismissing Husband’s complaint predicated on his failure to appear and prosecute the action. We hold that the trial court committed prejudicial error by dismissing Husband’s action without first considering his pending motion. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Plaise Edward Spangler
The defendant, Plaise Edward Spangler, appeals the revocation of his probation, raising essentially the following issues: whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the defendant violated the terms of his probation by failing to submit to a drug screen and failing to pay court costs and fees when neither failure was willful; whether the trial court erred by not considering all lesser alternative means to incarceration, including intensive drug rehabilitation by referral to a drug court; and whether the trial judge committed plain error by not sua sponte recusing himself because he had been the prosecutor in a number of the defendant's previous criminal cases. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Raymond Andrew Herbst v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Raymond Andrew Herbst, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas to one count of rape and three counts of attempted rape were constitutionally infirm because he was not informed that he would be subject to lifetime community supervision. Because due process does not require tolling of the statute of limitations, the decision of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brent Allen Blye
A Sullivan County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Brent Allen Blye, of possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class B felony; simple possession of dihydrocodeinone, a Class A misdemeanor; and simple possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this delayed appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to question a co-defendant about her criminal history; that the trial court erred by giving, or failing to give, certain jury instructions; and that the trial court erred by allowing a police detective to testify about the value of the cocaine. The State concedes that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the simple possession offenses could be committed with a mens rea of recklessness but contends that the error was harmless. The State maintains that the trial court committed no other error. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding the necessary mens rea for the lesser included offense of simple possession of cocaine but that the error was harmless. For the charged offenses of simple possession of dihydrocodeinone and marijuana, we conclude that the trial court also erred in its instructions on the necessary mens rea and that the error was not harmless. Therefore, we must reverse those convictions and remand for a new trial. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Solima v. Stephanie Solima
Mother, the primary residential parent, filed a petition seeking permission to relocate to Texas with the parties’ minor son. Father opposed Mother’s petition and filed a separate petition to be designated the primary residential parent. One week before trial, Mother notified the court that her petition to relocate was moot because she no longer needed to relocate; the trial proceeded on Father’s petition. Following trial, the court did not name Father the primary residential parent but increased Father’s residential parenting time. The trial court also modified child support by imputing additional income to Father upon a finding his current income was “significantly less than . . . his ability to earn,” and decreasing Mother’s because she recently lost her job and was unemployed as of the trial. Father appealed, contending that the trial court erred by failing to designate him as the primary residential parent. He also contends the court erred in modifying child support based on imputed income above his salary, and a finding that Mother’s ability to earn had diminished. Mother did not allege that Father was voluntarily or willfully underemployed; therefore, Father was not put on notice the issue would be tried. Furthermore, because the issue was not tried by consent, the court erred in imputing income to Father. Accordingly, we reverse the imputation of additional income to Father and remand the issue of child support. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
A-1 Waste, LLC v. Madison County Municipal Solid Waste Planning Region Board, et al.
The Madison County solid waste planning region board rejected an application, submitted on behalf of A-1 Waste, LLC, to construct a solid waste landfill. In light of the rejection, the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation declined to issue the landfill permit. A-1 Waste appealed the region board’s rejection to the Chancery Court for Davidson County. A-1 Waste also requested review of the Commissioner’s action by the Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Control Board. The chancery court stayed A-1 Waste’s appeal pending the outcome of the control board’s review. The control board reversed the region board and ordered that the permit be granted. The region board subsequently petitioned the chancery court for review of the control board’s decision. The chancery court consolidated A-1 Waste’s appeal with the appeal filed by the region board and a third action filed by a group of concerned citizens. Following a hearing, the chancery court reversed the control board’s decision and the issuance of the permit. On appeal, A-1 Waste claims the trial court applied an incorrect standard of review to the region board’s decision and that the decision was properly reversed by the control board. A-1 Waste also claims that the group of concerned citizens lacked standing to seek judicial review of the control board’s decision. We conclude that the control board lacked authority to review the region board’s decision and that the region board properly rejected the permit application. We also conclude the concerned citizens had standing to appeal the control board’s decision. Therefore, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Katja Ute (Franz) Buchanan v. Steven James Larry Buchanan
Mother, a German citizen, married Father while he was stationed in Germany with the United States Army. The two moved to the United States, had one child, and were divorced. Approximately five years after being divorced, Mother sent Father a letter notifying him of her intention to relocate to Germany with the child. Father responded with a letter expressing his opposition to the child’s relocation and subsequently filed a petition opposing relocation; the petition was filed outside the 30-day time period set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108. Mother moved to dismiss Father’s petition for failure to file it within 30 days of receipt of the notice of proposed relocation; the motion was denied, and after a hearing on Father’s petition, the court found that Mother’s motive for moving was vindictive and that she had no reasonable purpose in relocating. Finding that the petition opposing Mother’s relocation should have been dismissed, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth E. Crockett v. Mutual Of Omaha, et al.
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a complaint filed by a pro se litigant. The complaint sought injunctive and declaratory relief against several banks and a corporation, alleging that the banks and the corporation colluded to foreclose on her property. The trial court, after giving the complainant several opportunities to amend, dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm the dismissal of the complaint. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darrell Dean Hochhalter
The defendant, Darrel Dean Hochhalter, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of six counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and one count of rape. He was sentenced to five years for each count of sexual battery by an authority figure and twelve years for the rape conviction. The court ordered that two of the sentences for sexual battery by an authority figure and the sentence for rape be served consecutively, for an effective term of twenty-two years. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the forensic interview of the victim at trial; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to twenty-two years in confinement. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 7 to reflect the rape conviction as a Class B felony. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John S. Taylor v. Timothy L. Cloud
In this action seeking to enforce a judgment lien against the debtor‘s real property, the debtor claimed that he was not properly served with process in the underlying lawsuit wherein the judgment was entered. The trial court granted summary judgment to the creditor, and the debtor appealed. We affirm the trial court‘s grant of summary judgment based on the validity of the underlying judgment, determining that such judgment was not void on its face and thus not subject to collateral attack. We reverse the issue of whether the creditor should have been granted an award of attorney‘s fees at trial pursuant to the parties‘ fee agreement and remand for specific findings by the trial court. We decline to award attorney‘s fees to the creditor incurred in defending this appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In re C.A.F., et al.
The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and the Guardian ad Litem both filed petitions in the Juvenile Court for Johnson County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of D.A.F. (“Father”) and J.D.F. (“Mother”) to four of their minor children: C.A.F., born 08/06; J.A.F., born 01/08; C.R.F., born 01/09; and, S.R.F., born 09/11 (“the Children,” collectively). The ground alleged was severe child abuse, of a sexual nature. After a trial, the Juvenile Court found that clear and convincing evidence established the ground of severe child abuse and that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights, arguing, in part, that the ground of severe abuse must be overturned because no medical exam was conducted on the Children. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Ryan Mallady
In this procedurally complex case, in 2006, a trial court found the Defendant, Kenneth Ryan Mallady, not guilty by reason of insanity for the offenses of first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder, and aggravated assault. The judge ordered that the Defendant be transported to Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute (“MTMHI”). The Defendant was subsequently discharged from MTMHI with the requirement that he participate in mandatory outpatient treatment. In 2012, the trial court found that the Defendant had not complied with his mandatory treatment plan, appointed him counsel, and ordered him temporarily recommitted to MTMHI. In 2014, the trial court held a hearing and ordered that he be permanently recommitted to MTMHI. The Defendant appeals his permanent recommitment, contending that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard when making its findings. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s judgment. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Doyale Montez Blacksmith
The Defendant, Doyale Montez Blacksmith, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and aggravated stalking, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-502 (2014), 39-13-304 (2014), 39-17-315 (2010) (amended 2012). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of thirty years for aggravated rape and fifteen years for aggravated kidnapping each at 100% service. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to five years for aggravated stalking and ordered the sentence be served consecutively to the aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping sentences, for an effective thirty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated rape conviction. We affirm the Defendant’s aggravated rape conviction. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Wayne Cutshaw et al v. Kenton D. Hensley et al.
In 2009, William Wayne Cutshaw and Tincy Faye Cutshaw sold a piece of commercial real property (the property) to Kenton D. Hensley and Pamela F. Hensley. The property was improved with a retail business whose trade name was Glendale Market & Deli. The total purchase price of the property, including its contents, was $215,000. The Hensleys executed two notes, one of which was for $175,000. It was secured by a deed of trust on the property. After the Hensleys defaulted in 2011, the Cutshaws bid in the property at a foreclosure sale for $20,000. The Cutshaws then brought this action seeking a deficiency judgment for the balance owed by the Hensleys. The trial court, applying the governing statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-5-118 (Supp. 2014), found that the property had sold at the foreclosure sale for an amount materially less than its fair market value, which latter amount the court found to be $215,000 as of the time of the foreclosure sale. The trial court relied upon the formula prescribed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-5-118(c), which code section provides that ―the deficiency shall be [(1)] the total amount of the indebtedness prior to the sale plus the costs of the foreclosure and sale, less [(2)] the fair market value of the property at the time of the sale.‖ The trial court found concept number one to be $173,620.30 and the second concept to be $215,000. Since the difference is a negative figure, the trial court declined to award the Cutshaws a deficiency judgment in any amount. The Cutshaws appeal. We hold that the evidence preponderates in favor of the conclusion that the fair market value of the property at the time of the foreclosure sale was $89,000. We agree with the trial court‘s determination that the foreclosure sale price – $20,000 – was materially less than fair market value. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Takashi v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Mark Takashi, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Knox County. He was convicted of aggravated child abuse and sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment, to be served at 100 percent. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Curtis Cecil Wayne Bolton v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Curtis Cecil Wayne Bolton, was convicted of the first degree premeditated murder of his two and one-half year old son and received a life sentence. In the present post-conviction action, the post-conviction court granted relief on two ineffective assistance of counsel claims but denied relief on the Petitioner’s remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In this appeal, the State contends that the post-conviction court erred by granting relief for ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to seek a severance and in failing to object to the State’s bolstering and vouching for the codefendant’s testimony. The Petitioner also contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to failure to consult with a medical expert and investigate the medical evidence, failure to advise the Petitioner accurately during plea discussions regarding the sentence he would face if convicted, and failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court granting post-conviction relief on the ground that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a severance.
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Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Louis Tyrone Robinson
Appellant, Louis Tyrone Robinson, appeals the Circuit Court of Gibson County’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Debra L. Heath
The Defendant-Appellant, Debra L. Heath, has appealed the Morgan County Criminal Court’s denial of her motions to suppress evidence obtained during searches of her property. The appellate record, however, does not contain a motion for new trial, a transcript from a motion for new trial hearing, or an order denying a motion for new trial. Pursuant to Rule 3(e) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we conclude that the issue presented herein has been waived. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. LeDerrius Thomas
Appellant, Lederrius Thomas, was convicted of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced appellant to life for his first degree murder conviction and to fifteen years for his attempted first degree murder conviction, to be served concurrently. Appellant now challenges his convictions, arguing that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove premeditation and that the trial court erred in issuing a supplemental jury instruction regarding the element of premeditation. Following our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kingston Neale B/N/F Dion Russell v. United Way of Greater Kingsport et al.
This negligence action arose when a minor child injured his finger while participating in a woodworking shop activity at a facility operated by the Boys and Girls Club of Greater Kingsport. The child's father and mother originally filed a joint action as next friends of the child, naming as defendants the Boys and Girls Club of Greater Kingsport and the United Way of Greater Kingsport (collectively, “Defendants”). The parents eventually nonsuited the original action. The child's father subsequently filed this action as next friend of the child, seeking damages for permanent impairment, pain and suffering, medical expenses, and loss of earning capacity. Defendants filed concomitant motions for summary judgment, each asserting that the father lacked standing to bring this action pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-1-105(b). Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The father has appealed. Having determined that Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-1-105(b) (2009) operates only to bar an action brought by the father on his own behalf to recover medical expenses and loss of the child's service, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Defendants only as to the father's claim for these damages. We reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the claims brought on behalf of the child and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Zantuan A. Horton
The defendant, Zantuan A. Horton, appeals the revocation of his probationary sentence, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals |