Opinions
Daniel J. Velez v. Christy M. Velez
Mother appeals the parenting plan adopted by the trial court, the award of child support, alimony and the allocation of the federal income tax dependent exemptions to Father. We affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the parenting plan and allocation of the federal income tax exemption.Finding error with the amount of income the courtimputed to Mother, and what appears to be an error regarding the cost of insurance, we reverse the award of child support and remand with instructions to impute Mother’s income based on the federal minimum wage and to recalculate the child support award in accordance with this opinion. We also hold that the trial court erred in denying Mother rehabilitative alimony,and therefore reverse and remand the issue of alimony to the trial court for a determination of the appropriate sum and duration of rehabilitative alimony. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: K. B. Ronald Lynn Brewer, Jr., et al. v. Ronald Lynn Brewer, Sr., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court concluded that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse. On appeal, the sole issue presented by Mother is whether the trial court erred in determining that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Edward G. rochelle v. Grange Mutual Casualty Company, et al.
This appeal results from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee insurance company. Appellee denied Appellant’s claim for fire loss on the ground that Appellant made material misrepresentations in the application for insurance. The trial court determined that Appellant took contradictory positions in his examination under oath and in his discovery deposition on the question of whether his application for insurance was completed when he signed it, or whether he signed it in blank before it was completed by the insurance agent. The trial court determined that Appellant’s inconsistent statements were not effective to create a dispute of material fact for purposes of summary judgment. We conclude that the motion for summary judgment was improperly granted. Reversed and remanded. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason Peter Meeks
The Defendant, Jason Peter Meeks, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), violating the implied consent law, and leaving the scene of an accident, all misdemeanor offenses. The Defendant appeals pursuant to Rule 3, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, contending that he should be granted a new trial because the State failed to record his trial. We disagree with the Defendant’s claim and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glenda Nash Clemmons
The appellant, Glenda Nash Clemmons, pled guilty in the Marion County Circuit Court to failure to appear in case numbers 8109 and 8721. In case number 8109, the trial court sentenced her to two years to be served as sixty days in jail and one year, ten months in community corrections. In case number 8271, the trial court sentenced her to three years to be served in community corrections and consecutively to the two-year sentence in case number 8109. Subsequently, the trial court revoked her community corrections sentences and ordered her to serve her effective five-year sentence in confinement. The appellant contends that the trial court erred by revoking her community corrections sentences and ordering her to serve her original sentences in confinement. She also contends that she did not receive all the jail credits to which she was entitled. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Willie Juanell Campbell
In this appeal, numerous beneficiaries under a will challenge the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees of $9,024.75 out of the funds of the estate to another beneficiary who is their adversary. At an earlier time, the court had entered an order setting the attorney’s fees of that beneficiary at $34,669.25 without specifying who was responsible for the payment of those fees. On the motion of that beneficiary, the court granted a new trial on the subject of attorney’s fees. When the matter came on for the “new trial,” the court announced that it would listen to argument but would not receive substantive evidence on the subject. Following that “hearing,” the court awarded the fees now before us. The court’s order does not articulate any findings with respect to whether the attorney’s services were reasonable, necessary or benefited the estate. The “challenging” beneficiaries filed a notice of appeal. We vacate the order awarding attorney’s fees and remand to the trial court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing and enter an order on attorney’s fees complying with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley D. Ramsay v. Starlett J. Custer
In this case, the Trial Court initially granted plaintiff a default judgment against the defendant, and set a trial on the issue of damages. Defendant was given notice of the subsequent hearing, and defendant's attorney moved to set aside the default judgment, which the Trial Court granted and dismissed plaintiff's case. Plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Hembrook
Defendant, who was arrested for DUI and subsequently refused to submit to a blood test, appeals the revocation of his driver’s license, contending that he was not properly informed of the consequences of refusal to take the test. We hold that the defendant was adequately advised under the circumstances presented and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Van Buren | Court of Appeals | |
In Re James Preston Hess, IV
This is an appeal from an order appointing a conservator for the adult son of divorced parents. The father contends that the evidence does not support the determinations that the son lacks the capacity to fully attend to his needs without assistance and that the appointment of a conservator is warranted; Mother contends that the father does not have standing to appeal. We affirm the court in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Franklin v. Duro Standard Products Co., Inc.
In this claim for workers’ compensation benefits, the trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits to the employee for hearing loss. Her employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of the employee’s medical expert into evidence and by finding that her hearing loss was caused by her employment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Chester | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Keisha M. Howard
The Defendant-Appellant, Keisha M. Howard, was indicted for theft of property valued at $60,000 or more and for violating the Tennessee Computer Act, both Class B felonies. She entered guilty pleas to the offenses as charged in the Bradley County Criminal Court, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of her sentence as well as the amount of restitution, if any. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105(5), -602(a)(1) (2006). The trial court sentenced Howard as a Range I, standard offender and imposed concurrent sentences of eight years. Under the special conditions in the theft judgment, the court ordered that Howard “may apply to Community Corrections” and that she “owes $215,000 [and] cannot pay that amount but must pay no less than $200 a month.” Howard filed a motion to clarify the total amount of restitution owed, and the trial court, in determining that its previous judgment regarding restitution violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304(c), ordered Howard to pay $1,000 per month for eight years, for a total of $96,000 in restitution. On appeal, Howard argues that the trial court’s order requiring her to pay $96,000 in restitution was unreasonable, given her financial resources and ability to pay. Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s order that Howard pay $1,000 per month for eight years for a total of $96,000 in restitution, and we amend the judgments to show that the victim’s loss in this case is $156,951.30 and that the restitution, based on the proof established of Howard’s present ability to pay, is reduced to $48,000, which shall be paid at the rate of $500 per month for eight years. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lisa Smith as Guardian of the Person and Estate of Rodterrius M. Tinnel (Deceased) v. State of Tennessee et al.
This appeal arises out of a wrongful death action involving numerous defendants. We dismiss the appeal as to two defendants for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. We dismiss the appeal as to the remaining defendants for lack of a final judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel B. Eisenstein v. WTVF-TV, News Channel 5 Network, LLC et al.
The plaintiff, a public official, sued the defendants for libel and false light invasion of privacy. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the truth of the statements. The plaintiff sought to complete discovery before the motion was heard. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion and plaintiff appealed. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the libel claims, but reverse the grant of summary judgment as to some of the false light claims. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Donnell T. Porter v. Prestige Auto Sales, Inc.
Buyer purchased used automobile and signed contract stating the vehicle was being sold “as is” and without any warranties. After the transaction was completed and Buyer complained to Seller that the power steering was not working properly, Seller agreed to credit Buyer’s account with the cost of repairing the power steering. Buyer was unwilling or unable to pay for the repair out of his own pocket, and Seller ultimately repossessed the vehicle. Buyer sued Seller for breach of contract and trial court awarded Buyer damages. Seller appealed and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Seller modified the parties’ original contract when it agreed to compensate Buyer for the cost of repairing the vehicle. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Haily A. S.
Mary G. (“Foster Mother”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Putnam County (“the Trial Court”) to adopt Haily A. S. (“the Child”), then under the guardianship of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child’s paternal grandparents, Marvin S. and Sandra S. (“the Grandparents”), filed an intervening petition to adopt the Child and shortly thereafter filed a motion to intervene. DCS filed a motion to dismiss the Grandparents’ petition. After a hearing at which the parties’ respective counsels made their arguments, the Trial Court granted DCS’s motion to dismiss the intervening petition for adoption. The Grandparents appeal, arguing that the Trial Court should have permitted them to present evidence on the issue of the Child’s best interest. We hold that because DCS, the Child’s guardian, did not consent to the Grandparents’ adoption of the Child, the Grandparents’ intervening petition properly was dismissed. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Mariah K. D.
The great aunt and the great-grandmother of a little girl obtained an emergency order giving them temporary custody of the child when she was less than eight months old. The child’s mother was informed that she was entitled to appear at a preliminary hearing and an adjudicative hearing on a more permanent custody order, but she failed to appear for those hearings. The trial court found that the child was dependent and neglected, and awarded custody of the child to her two older relatives. They subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother on the grounds of abandonment and of persistence of conditions. The trial court found that both grounds were proved and granted the petition. We affirm the termination on the ground of persistence of conditions. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bert Durand Hatmaker
A Campbell County jury convicted the Defendant, Bert Durand Hatmaker, of one count of reckless endangerment, one count of assault, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of two years for the reckless endangerment conviction, eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault conviction, and thirty days for the leaving the scene of an accident conviction, with sixty days to be served in jail and the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless endangerment. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Ray Henson v. Jeri Lynn Pilkington Henson
The issue presented in this divorce case is which parent should be designated as the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor children. The trial court named the Appellee/Mother primary residential parent, and Appellant/Father appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph A. Hale v. David Osborne, Warden
The Petitioner, Joseph A. Hale, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2007 conviction for second degree murder and resulting seventeen-year sentence. He contends that his sentence is void because the trial court improperly sentenced him pursuant to the 2005 Sentencing Amendments when the offense date was 2004. The State has moved this court to affirm the trial court’s denial of relief by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion for a memorandum opinion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeff King v. Gerdau Ameristeel US, Inc.
An injured employee returned to work for his pre-injury employer. The employee was moved to a different area and worked fewer overtime hours because of his medical restrictions. The trial court held that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008) and awarded permanent partial disability benefits in excess of one and one-half times the anatomical impairment. The employer appealed. We hold that the employee had a meaningful return to work and that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) limits the employee’s recovery to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment. We therefore modify the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Robert Keenan, Sr., et al. v. Barry C. Fodor, et al.
This case arose from a dispute between neighbors over the ownership of an elaborate stone and metal gate used for entry into both their residential properties. The predecessors-ininterest of the defendants installed the gate at their own expense, placing it on an easement over the plaintiffs’ adjoining lot. The plaintiffs decided to sell their house, and included a picture and a description of the gate in their real estate listing and advertisements. The defendants asserted that they owned the gate and compelled the plaintiffs’ realtor to remove all mention of the gate from sales materials. The plaintiffs then filed a complaint to quiet title. After a bench trial, the court found that the gate belonged to the defendants and dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint. The plaintiffs argue on appeal that the trial court erred because the gate is a fixture and, thus, that it has become part of the plaintiffs’ property by operation of law. We affirm the trial court. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Matthew Kinnard
A Putnam County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Matthew Kinnard, charging him with one count of aggravated child abuse. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault. He received a sentence of three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation or some other form of alternative sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Glena Meares, et al v. Thomas R. Traylor M.D.
Plaintiffs charged defendant with medical malpractice. The case was tried before a jury, resulting in a judgment for the defendant. An out-of-state medical doctor testified on behalf of the defendant, over the objection of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court, insisting that it was reversible error for the Trial Court to allow that expert to testify in violation of the "Locality Rule". On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sherri A. Bogle
Defendant, Sherri A. Bogle, appeals from the trial court’s order revoking Defendant’s probation and requiring her to serve the sentence in incarceration. Defendant argues on appeal that her sentence had expired before the State initiated revocation proceedings. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wendi Nicole Garrison
A Carter County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Wendi Nicole Garrison, of the second degree murder of the victim, Joshua Perry. The trial court imposed a sentence of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction, that the trial court erred in denying her request to charge assisted suicide as a lesser-included offense of second degree murder, and that the trial court erred in denying her request for a jury instruction regarding assisted suicide as a defense to second degree murder. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals |