Opinions
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Joyner
The State appeals the trial court’s dismissal of the following charges against the Defendant, Jimmy Joyner: driving under the influence ("DUI"), third offense; violation of the open container law; and failure to maintain a traffic lane. The trial court dismissed the charges finding that the State had not commenced prosecution before the expiration of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court improperly dismissed the charges because the Defendant waived his preliminary hearing and agreed to allow the case to be bound over to the grand jury before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for reinstatement of the indictments against the Defendant. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jason Clinard v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jason Clinard, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner, who was convicted of first degree murder, contends that his conviction was illegal because he was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole, which he states contravenes statute. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Phillip A. Corbitt et al. v. Rolanda Amos
The sellers of real estate brought this action against the successful bidder at a real estate auction after the bidder failed to close because she was unable to obtain a loan sufficient to purchase the property. The sellers later auctioned the property for a substantially lower price. It is undisputed that the buyer breached the contract by not closing and that the sellers are entitled to recover certain special damages; the buyer challenges the trial court’s award of $55,300 for the seller’s general damages for their loss of the benefit of the bargain. We have determined the trial court’s decision is not supported by competent evidence in the record and that the sellers failed to prove the fair market value of the property on the date of the breach was less than the contract price. Therefore, we reverse the award of $55,300 for the loss of the benefit of the bargain. We, however, affirm the award of special damages, specifically the expense of conducting a second auction and sale, property taxes paid between the date of the breach and the second sale, and prejudgment interest, which shall be calculated based upon the judgment as modified. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Chas Alan Sandford v. Kristine Elaine Sandford McKee
Husband and Wife were married for eight years when Husband filed for divorce. Husband had purchased 63 acres of real property before marrying Wife and split the property into two parcels. When dividing the property between the parties, the trial court determined the house and ten acres was Husband’s separate property, but the appreciation on that parcel was marital property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B). The trial court determined the remaining 53 acres was Husband’s separate property and that Wife had no interest in that parcel. Wife appealed, claiming both parcels transmuted into marital property during the marriage. In the alternative, Wife argued that the increase in value of the other 53 acres was marital property due to work she performed on a guesthouse located on the 53-acre parcel. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Christopher L. B.
Mother appeals the finding that termination of her parental rights to her son was in the son’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the termination of her rights. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dixie M. M.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights upon finding that four grounds for termination had been established – the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the provisions of the permanency plan, abandonment by willful failure to visit and support, and failure to establish parentage, and that termination of Father’s rights was in the child’s best interest. We have determined that three grounds for termination were established by the requisite proof and that termination of his rights is in the child’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Darion X. Y., Darius D. Y.
Father’s parental rights to his son were terminated on the ground that Father is confined in a correctional facility for more than ten years as a result of a criminal act and that the child was under the age of eight at the time of Father’s sentencing. Father contends that the trial court should have considered the possibility of his receiving parole in determining whether grounds for termination of his rights were present and whether termination was in the child’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Orlando Ladd v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board
Appellant, an inmate with the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his appeal for review of disciplinary actions taken against him by the prison, and affirmed by the TDOC Commissioner. The trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-9-102. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Paul Lewis
The Defendant, Joshua Paul Lewis, was convicted by a jury of two counts of rape of a child and one count of attempted rape of a child. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years on each of the rape convictions and to ten years on the attempted rape conviction, all sentences to run concurrently, for an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal due to variances between the bill of particulars and the proof at trial; and (3) he was denied a fair trial due to cumulative error. After a review of the record and relevant authorities, we have determined that the Defendant’s issue are waived for failing to preserve them in a timely filed motion for new trial. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrance Gabriel Carter
Appellant,Terrance Gabriel Carter,pled guilty in Marshall County to five counts of violating the sex offender registration act in two separate cases with the length and manner of service of sentence to be determined by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of five years. Appellant appeals his sentence, arguing that it is excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Parham
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Randy Parham, of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. On remand for resentencing following Parham’s first appeal, State v. Randy Parham, No. W2009-02576-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 5271612 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2010), the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifty-five years. In this appeal, Parham argues that the trial court erred by (1) ordering the sentences for attempted first degree murder and aggravated robbery to be served consecutively, (2) ordering the sentence for attempted first degree murder to be served at one hundred percent release eligibility as a “violent” offense, and (3) failing to state on the record which enhancement factors it applied to which offenses while at the same time applying a non-statutory enhancement factor. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in part and reverse them in part. We also note the need for entry of corrected judgments. The case is remanded for entry of judgments in accordance with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Allison Louise Battles v. Andrew Bruce Battles
This is an appeal of an alimony award. On appeal, Husband contends that the trial court |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sherri Mathis
The defendant, Sherri Mathis, appeals her Warren County Circuit Court jury convictions of two counts of felony murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (2006); two counts of aggravated child abuse of a child six years of age or less, see id. § 39-15-402(a)(1), (b); two counts of aggravated child neglect of a child six years of age or less, see id.; one count of child abuse of a child six years of age or less, see id. §39-15-401(a); and two counts of aggravated child abuse, see id. § 39-15-402(a)(1). At sentencing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus 32 years’ incarceration. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court erroneously denied her motion for continuance, (2) the trial court erroneously admitted photographs of the deceased victim, (3) the trial court erroneously denied her motion to dismiss the indictment based upon a fatal variance, (4) the trial court erroneously denied a motion for mistrial, (5) the trial court erroneously allowed the State to call the defendant’s civil attorney as a witness knowing that the attorney would claim privilege, (6) the trial court erroneously limited testimony of defendant’s expert witness,(7)the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during opening statements and closing arguments, and (8) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Additionally, the defendant contends that the trial court erroneously dismissed her petition for writ of error coram nobis and erroneously denied her the right to depose Doctor Bruce Levy concerning the claims contained in the coram nobis petition. We discern that the trial court failed to merge certain counts and failed to enter judgments as corrected at the hearing on the motion for new trial. We further conclude that the State failed to establish serious bodily injury with respect to the defendant’s convictions of aggravated child abuse in Counts Eight and Nine and direct the trial court on remand to enter judgments reflecting convictions of child abuse and three-year sentences. Accordingly,the case is remanded for the trial court to enter modified judgments in Counts Eight and Nine, judgments effectuating proper merger, and judgments reflecting modified sentences, and we affirm the judgments in all other respects. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Susan Renee Bise
Following a burglary in Greene County, the defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated burglary and two counts of theft of property. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilt for one count of facilitation of aggravated burglary and for two counts of theft of property. After finding the presence of one enhancement factor, the trial court imposed concurrent three-year sentences for each offense. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the enhancement factor did not apply and reduced each of the sentences to two years. Because we find that a sentence imposed by a trial court should be upheld so long as it is within the appropriate sentencing range and is otherwise in compliance with the purposes and principles of the sentencing statute, we reverse the sentence modification by the Court of Criminal Appeals and, upon review under an abuse of discretion standard with a presumption of reasonableness, reinstate the sentence imposed by the trial court. |
Greene | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Robin Elizabeth Willis
The Defendant-Appellant, Robin Elizabeth Willis, was convicted by a Hawkins County jury of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender and ordered her to serve three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Willis argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction; and (2) her sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robin Elizabeth Willis - Concurring in part, Dissenting in part
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, P.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to convict the Defendant. I respectfully disagree, however, with its conclusions that the victim was particularly vulnerable and that the three-year sentence should be served in confinement |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Blake Ball
The Defendant-Appellant, Robert Blake Ball, was convicted by a Greene County jury of attempted second degree murder and sentenced to eleven years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, Ball challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Heather Junghanel v. Andres Hernandez
Andres Hernandez (“Father”) filed a petition seeking to terminate his child support obligation. The Trial Court held a hearing and entered an order on March 17, 2011 awarding a judgment against Father of $5,726.47 in child support arrearages but also providing for further hearing for a full review and calculation of arrearages. The case subsequently was heard before a Special Master who found that Heather Junghanel (“Mother”) was entitled to a judgment against Father of $21,976.27 in child support arrearages. Father appealed the Special Master’s report to the Trial Court. The Trial Court found that the March 17, 2011 order was a final order and awarded a judgment against Father of $5,726.47 in child support arrearages. The State of Tennessee ex rel. Mother appeals to this Court arguing that the Trial Court improperly retroactively modified Father’s child support obligation. We find and hold that the Trial Court erred in holding that the March 17, 2011 order was a final order. We vacate the Trial Court’s September 20, 2011 order and remand this case to the Trial Court for a hearing on Father’s objections to the Special Master’s report. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mario Jones
A Hamilton County jury convicted Defendant, Mario Jones, of possession of more than 50 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty years as a Range I standard offender. In his appeal, Defendant presents the following issues for review: (1) the stop of Defendant’s vehicle and the subsequent detention of Defendant violated his constitutional rights, and the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion tosuppress; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction; (3) the trial court improperly allowed Lieutenant Queen to testify concerning the calendar, notes, and pills found in Defendant’s vehicle; (4) the trialcourt erred in finding that chain of custody had been established; and (5) the trial court erred in rejecting Defendant’s proposed mitigating factor. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Allen Gooch, Jr.
A jury convicted appellant, James Allen Gooch, Jr., of one count of the sale of not less than one-half ounce of marijuana, a Schedule VI controlled substance, within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class D felony, and one count of attempted sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony. The trial court ordered appellant to serve consecutive sentences of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the Class D felony and fifteen years for the Class C felony. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever and in sentencing him as a persistent offender. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever the offenses and that the trial court properly sentenced appellant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry Gupton, et al. v. Gary A. Davis d/b/a Gary A. Davis & Associates, et al.
This appeal arises from what essentially is a fee dispute between lawyers. A Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) coal ash spill in 2008 damaged the farm of Sandra and Terry Gupton (“the Guptons”). The Guptons signed contingent fee agreements with Gary A. Davis (“Davis”), Stephen Crofford (“Crofford”), and Mary Parker (“Parker”) (“the Defendants,” collectively) to pursue their case. Rebecca Vernetti (“Vernetti”), a lawyer in Davis’s firm who worked on the Guptons’ case, left Davis’s law firm to start her own law firm. The Guptons fired Davis and hired Vernetti. The Guptons later reached an agreement with TVA to sell their farm to TVA, and Vernetti received her fee. The Guptons sued the Defendants in the Chancery Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”), seeking judgment to the effect that they need not pay any fees to the Defendants. The Defendants counterclaimed and also sued Vernetti, arguing that they should be paid as per their original agreement with the Guptons. The Trial Court declined to award the Defendants their original contingency fee, but instead granted a judgment to the Defendants against Vernetti and her law firm on a quantum meruit theory for their legal services to the Guptons. Vernetti appeals, and the Defendants raise additional issues. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Mark T. Wickham v. Sovereign Homes, LLC
Plaintiff homeowner brought an action against Defendant builder alleging, inter alia, breach of warranty and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant builder. We affirm summary judgment on Plaintiff’s breach of warranty claim; reverse summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Consumer Protection Act claim; and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Little v. City of Chattanooga, Tennessee
This action involves requests made by the appellant pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 10-7-501, et seq. and 6-51-108(b), to the appellee city. After not receiving access to certain records to which she felt entitled, the appellant filed this petition. The trial court ruled that the city never refused to disclose the records but it just had not done much as of the time the petition was filed. However, because appellant did not prove that the city acted in bad faith as a result of its slowness in producing the public record requested the appellant was denied an award of attorney’s fees for the filing of the petition. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Benjamin E. Barlow
Defendant, Benjamin E. Barlow, pled guilty in the Criminal Court of Hamblen County to Driving Under the Influence of an Intoxicant (DUI), 1st offense, properly reserving for appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). The certified question is “[d]id the officer have specific and objective facts on which to have reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged or had engaged in any criminal activity to warrant a traffic stop of defendant’s vehicle.” After a thorough review of the record and the briefs we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kailyn Loren McKeown
The defendant, Kailyn Loren McKeown, entered a best interest plea to one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), see T.C.A. § 55-10-401, and reserved a certified question of law concerning the propriety of her detention and arrest. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b). Determining that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings as they relate to the scope of the certified question of law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charge. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals |