Opinions
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Royston, Jr.
Aggrieved of the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing for his convictions of aggravated assault and coercion of a witness, the defendant, Johnny Royston, Jr., appeals. Because the record supports the trial court's judgments, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Kimbrough
The appellant, James Wayne Kimbrough, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and two counts of spousal rape. Following a capital sentencing hearing, the jury imposed a sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction without the possibility of parole for his felony murder conviction. Additionally, he received a sentence of fifteen years for each of his spousal rape convictions as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant "all aspects" of his motions to suppress, that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court made numerous errors during the sentencing phase of his trial. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Emmanuel S. Trotter
The appellant, Emmanuel S. Trotter, also known as "Batman," was indicted on charges of felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated burglary, and especially aggravated robbery. The appellant primarily represented himself at trial and was ultimately convicted by a jury of criminally negligent homicide, especially aggravated burglary, criminal attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery, and second degree murder. The trial court merged the criminally negligent homicide conviction with the second degree murder conviction and sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of fifty-five years. The issues presented on appeal are whether: (1) the appellant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel; (2) the evidence sufficiently corroborated the accomplice testimony of Helen Trotter; (3) the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; and (4) the State knowingly proffered false testimony. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael McKellar
The appellant, Michael McKellar, pled nolo contendere to multiple charges of theft of property between $10,000 and $60,000 arising from indictments in both Cheatham County and Humphreys County where the appellant and a partner solicited funds from investors to finance the purchase of a defaulted Nigerian oil contract. In Cheatham County, the appellant was sentenced to a three (3) year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction, but the sentence was suspended. In Humphreys County, the appellant was sentenced to a four (4) year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Humphreys County sentence was also suspended. After a joint restitution hearing, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay restitution to one of the victims in Cheatham County in the amount of $1,000 and to one of the victims in Humphreys County in the amount of $22,900 based on finding that the appellant had converted that amount of money to his own personal use. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence presented at the restitution hearing was insufficient to support the award of restitution and that the trial court erred in ordering the appellant to pay restitution without making specific findings or reviewing evidence of the appellant's ability to pay the restitution. Because we hold the trial court erred in determining the amount of restitution by focusing on whether the appellant had converted the money for his own use rather than the actual pecuniary loss suffered by the victims and because the trial court did not make specific findings regarding the appellant's ability to pay restitution, we remand for a new restitution hearing. |
Humphreys | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald Wallace v. State of Tennessee
This case has taken a rather Byzantine course through the Tennessee courts. Originally, the defendant was convicted of the 1996 first degree premeditated murder of Melinda Sue Perrin. This court reversed the conviction based upon insufficiency of evidence of a premeditated killing. We imposed a conviction of second degree murder and remanded to the trial court for sentencing. See State v. Donald Wallace, No. 01C01-9711-CC-00526 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Sept. 30, 1998) (Wallace I). In Wallace I, this court declined to adjudicate certain issues on appeal for lack of a timely motion for a new trial. Id., slip op. at 7-8. On remand, the court imposed a sentence of 25 years, and this court affirmed the sentence. See State v. Donald Wallace, No. M1999-00954-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Nov. 29, 1999) (Wallace II). During the pendency of the sentencing appeal, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied relief except to grant the defendant a new opportunity to file a motion for new trial and an appeal. See Donald Wallace v. State, No. M2001-02722-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Dec. 9, 2002) (Wallace III). The post-conviction ruling was not appealed, but after the trial court denied the defendant's new motion for new trial, the defendant appealed the denial of the motion, resulting in the opinion in Wallace III. In that opinion, this court held that the defendant was entitled to no statutory delayed appeal and that the post-conviction court had erred in availing a new opportunity for a new trial motion and appeal without requiring a showing of prejudice as a prerequisite of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Wallace III, slip op. at 5-8. Our supreme court granted an appeal, reversed, and remanded the case to this court for adjudication of the issues raised in the dispensatory motion for new trial and appeal in Wallace III. See Wallace v. State, 121 S.W.3d 652 (Tenn. 2003) (Wallace IV). We now undertake to fulfill the terms of the supreme court's remand by determining whether (1) the trial court erred in allowing the state to use hearsay evidence and (2) the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct that deprived the defendant of due process and a fair trial. Upon our review, we discern no reversible error and affirm the conviction of second degree murder. |
Stewart | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Martin Jeffery Edwards
The Appellant, Martin Jeffery Edwards, was convicted following a jury trial of two counts of delivery of a schedule II controlled substance, Class C felonies. On appeal, Edwards argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and (2) the trial court erred in denying a severance of the two counts. After review, we conclude that these issues are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the Lauderdale County Circuit Court is affirmed. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael C. Mallen v. American International Group Inc., et al.
We granted the Tenn. R. App. P. 9 application of the AIG defendants to review their claim that an order of the trial court entered December 31, 2003, nunc pro tunc December 22, 2003, pertaining to pre-trial discovery is "overly broad, unduly burdensome, and extraordinarily costly both in terms of human effort and financial expense, and that disclosure of the documents ordered by the trial court would violate the [federal] Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act." We have determined that the AIG defendants' application was improvidently granted. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings as outlined in this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. F.S.B.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of F.S.B. ("Father") with respect to his two minor children, K.L.B. (DOB: September 19, 1997) and S.L.B. (DOB: July 21, 1999). Father appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding, stated to be by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds for termination exist. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Daugherty v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
The appellant principally alleges that she had a plea agreement with the State that if she pleaded guilty to the charge of vehicular assault, the punishment for which would run consecutively to prior sentences, she would be paroled after serving thirty percent of her sentence, and that the State, in effect, reneged on the agreement. She presented no evidence other than her own assertions of the plea, and her petition was denied. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lesley LaPointe Walker v. Kenneth Wayne Walker
This appeal involves a former husband's efforts to avoid paying spousal support. Less than one year after the parties' divorce, the husband filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking to reduce his spousal support obligation because his income had decreased. He also unilaterally stopped paying spousal support. Following a bench trial, the trial court denied the former husband's petition to modify his support payments based on its conclusion that he was wilfully underemployed. The trial court also found the former husband to be in criminal contempt for wilfully failing to make five spousal support payments. The husband appeals. We affirm the trial court's conclusion that the former husband is wilfully underemployed and two of the five counts of criminal contempt. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Town of Cornersville, Tennessee v. Meleathie Harmon, et al.
The Town of Cornersville filed suit against a local business seeking injunctive relief to require compliance with its zoning ordinance. During the pendency of the matter, the trial court found the local business in contempt on three separate occasions for failure to comply with orders of the court requiring compliance with the ordinance. At a hearing on the merits, the trial court found that since the property at issue was within the town limits, it was subject to the zoning ordinance. Furthermore, the court found the business in contempt for failure to comply with its prior orders and thus subject to a fine of fifty dollars ($50.00) per day. The business appeals insisting that part of the subject property is not within the town's zoning jurisdiction, that the trial court exceeded its statutory contempt authority, and that the town is estopped from raising any complaint regarding zoning noncompliance. We agree with the trial court and affirm its judgment. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Stone v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, et al.
The petition sought judicial review by way of certiorari to review the Warden's action in terminating his wife's visitation for inappropriate behavior. We affirm the dismissal of the petition on grounds of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: A.T.S.
Paternal grandparents, the legal guardians of their granddaughter, filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights and to adopt their granddaughter. The child’s father joined in the petition. The trial court found that the mother had abandoned the child by her willful failure to provide financial support; however, the trial court denied the grandparents’ petition based on its finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights was not in the best interest of the child. Grandparents appealed. We affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: A.T.S. - Concurring
Adhering to my longstanding view that a clear and convincing evidence standard is totally incompatible with a preponderance of the evidence standard both at the trial level and on appeal, I disagree with a portion of majority opinion dealing with such issue. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin L. Lawrence
We granted permission to appeal in this case pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 to determine whether the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during the investigation of a shooting death. To resolve this issue, we must determine whether the investigators had probable cause to arrest the defendant and whether the delay in taking him before a magistrate for a judicial determination of probable cause should independently require the exclusion of the evidence obtained during the first few hours of his detention. Because we are of the opinion that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant, we conclude that the evidence recovered at the scene was not subject to suppression. As to the defendant’s claim of “unreasonable delay,” it is obvious that the defendant was not taken before a magistrate for a judicial determination of probable cause within a constitutionally reasonable time. However, the evidence the defendant sought to suppress was obtained during the first few hours of his arrest. Thus, these evidentiary items were not tainted by exploitation of the constitutional violation and are not, therefore, subject to suppression. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Timmie D. Boston
This is a direct appeal as of right from convictions on a jury verdict of rape of a child and assault. The Defendant, Timmie D. Boston, was sentenced as a Range I offender to twenty years' imprisonment for the rape conviction and six months for assault, with the two sentences to be served concurrently. The Defendant argues two issues on appeal: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to find the Defendant guilty of rape of a child, and (2) that the trial court erred in imposing a mid-range sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert L. Smith, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert L. Smith, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court found the petition be barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that the Petitioner had filed previous petitions that were resolved on the merits. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Murff v. David Mills, Warden, West Tennessee State Penitentiary
The Petitioner, Anthony Murff, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground entitling him to habeas corpus relief, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Wallace
The defendant, Brandon Wallace, was convicted by a jury of two counts of attempted first degree murder (Counts 1 and 2); attempted second degree murder (Count 3); attempted especially aggravated robbery (Count 4); especially aggravated burglary (Count 5); and felony reckless endangerment (Count 6). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-three years in the Department of Correction for Counts 1 and 2, to be served consecutively; ten years for Count 3, to be served concurrently with Counts 1 and 6; ten years for Count 4 which the trial court merged with Count 5, for which he also was sentenced to ten years, to be served consecutively to Count 1 and concurrently with Count 2; and two years for Count 6, to be served concurrently with Counts 1 and 3, for a total effective sentence of forty-six years. Additionally, the jury set fines totaling $138,000, which were reduced by the trial court to $1,000. The defendant raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions, excluding his felony reckless endangerment conviction; and (2) whether the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for resentencing and for entry of corrected judgments reflecting the offense date as July 1, 2002. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Judy Kesterson v. Bruce Varner
Bruce Varner seeks review of the trial court's dismissal of his Petition to Modify Custody. The trial court dismissed the petition at the close of the petitioner's proof, holding that petitioner had failed to carry his burden of proof that a change of custody was in the best interest of the child. The trial court assessed attorney's fees and costs to the petitioner. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth E. Braswell v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc.
This appeal involves a customer who tripped over a floor mat while waiting in a cashier's line at a home improvement store. The customer filed suit against the store in the Circuit Court for Davidson County, and a jury returned a verdict for the store after determining that the customer was sixty-five percent at fault for his injuries. The customer asserts on this appeal that the evidence does not support the jury's verdict. We affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Wyatt Rowan v. Michael Howard Rowan
In this appeal, Appellant Michael Rowan challenges the trial court's grant of a post-divorce contempt petition. Appellee Lisa Rowan challenges the trial court's denial of her attorney's fees in connection with the petition, and seeks frivolous appeal damages in this court. We hold that the language of the parties' marital dissolution agreement is plain and unambiguous, affirm the trial court's grant of the wife's petition, reverse the trial court's refusal to award attorney's fees, and hold the appeal frivolous. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Stevie Caldwell v. Bridgett Collette Caldwell
This appeal involves a lawsuit brought by a prison inmate against his former wife for defamation and failure to properly care for their child including the failure to facilitate visitation. The trial court dismissed the complaint after determining that the inmate's slander claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that the remainder of the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. We affirm the judgment. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
In Re K.A.S.
This Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal concerns a father's efforts to set aside a default judgment granting custody of his daughter to the child's maternal grandparents. The grandparents asserted in their petition for custody that the father's whereabouts were unknown and they therefore served their petition on the father by publication in a Lebanon, Tennessee newspaper. Two and one-half years later, the father filed a motion to set aside the custody order asserting that service by publication was insufficient because the grandparents knew or should have known he was residing in Greensboro, North Carolina at the time they filed their petition for custody. We have determined that the default judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction and we thus reverse the trial court's order denying the father's motion to set aside. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Warren Kesser v. Peter Hale Kesser
Following their divorce in 1995, Wife filed a petition for contempt against Husband in 1997, alleging Husband failed to comply with certain provisions of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. Husband filed an answer and submitted his counter-petition for modification of his child support obligation based on changed circumstances. Wife, in turn, filed a motion asking the court to determine Husband’s child support obligation following his receipt of a large severance payment from his previous employer. After holding a hearing on the parties’ respective petitions, the trial court entered one order addressing the visitation of the parties’ minor daughter and another order addressing the financial issues. In the order addressing the financial issues, the trial court increased Husband’s base child support obligation, ordered Husband to pay additional child support in various amounts pursuant to the marital dissolution agreement, ordered Husband to pay additional amounts from improperly withheld taxes on the exercise of certain stock appreciation rights, and ordered Husband to pay Wife’s attorney’s fees. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |