Jerry R. Burkes v. Sysco, Knoxville, LLC, Et. Al.
This appeal involves an employee's request for extraordinary benefits. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the Appeals Board and adopt its opinion as set forth in the attached Appendix. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Cornelius Baylis
During a sting operation, Anthony Cornelius Baylis solicited sex from an undercover officer posing as a sixteen-year-old girl, encouraged her to come to Knoxville so that she could charge higher rates, and offered to be her “sponsor.” A jury convicted Baylis of commercial sex trafficking under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-309 (2018 & Supp. 2020). Baylis argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. To resolve Baylis’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, we must determine whether section 39-13-309 proscribes the attempted sex trafficking of a law enforcement officer posing as a minor during a sting operation when there is no evidence of coercion or deception. We conclude that it does, so we affirm Baylis’s conviction and the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Monroe | Supreme Court | |
Michael Eugene St. Clair v. State of Tennessee et al.
On December 11, 2002, Michael Eugene St. Clair (“the petitioner”) entered a guilty plea to one count of rape in Davidson County, Tennessee. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the petitioner received an eight-year sentence to be served on probation. The special conditions section of the judgment included “sex offender treatment” and “sex offender registry,” but the judgment did not include the condition of community supervision for life mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-524. The petitioner ultimately violated his probation and was ordered to serve his sentence in confinement. On June 4, 2010, the petitioner was released from Tennessee Department of Correction custody. The petitioner completed the required sex offender registry, which specified that the petitioner had “no supervised release.” On August 16, 2010, however, the Davidson County Criminal Court entered a “Corrected Judgment,” which included community supervision for life as a special condition. On September 20, 2024, the petitioner, a resident of Sumner County, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Williamson County, asserting that his liberty has been unlawfully restrained under a void judgment, citing the “Corrected Judgment. ”The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Williamson County was not the proper venue and that the petitioner had failed to include a copy of the guilty plea transcript. The habeas court granted the State’s motion to dismiss on those two procedural grounds. The petitioner appealed, contending that the habeas court erred in dismissing the petition on the two procedural grounds. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the habeas court’s dismissal of the petition on those two grounds. The court then concluded, sua sponte, that the petitioner would not be entitled to relief on the merits of his claim. The petitioner has filed an application for permission to appeal to this Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure. In the application, the petitioner maintains that the habeas court erred in dismissing his petition. The petitioner also argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in addressing the merits of his petition despite affirming dismissal of the petition on the two procedural grounds addressed by the habeas court. Upon consideration of the application for permission to appeal and the record before us, the application is granted in part and denied in part. As to the portion of the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals that affirmed the habeas court’s dismissal of the petition on the two procedural grounds, we deny the application for permission to appeal. Accordingly, we leave that portion of the opinion and judgment—and, therefore, the habeas court’s dismissal of the petition—undisturbed. The denial of review as to the dismissal on the two procedural grounds is, to the extent authorized by law, without prejudice to refiling a compliant petition in a proper venue. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Fred C. Dance v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
Tennessee attorney Fred C. Dance represented a client in a wrongful death action that eventually settled. Rather than promptly disburse the settlement proceeds to his client, he used the funds to pay for personal expenses while ignoring his client’s inquiries about the money. A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility concluded that Dance had violated Rules 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 1.15(a), 1.15(d), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. Based on its finding that Dance had knowingly converted client property, the hearing panel recommended that Dance be disbarred. In this appeal, we consider whether disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Dance’s misconduct. As a preliminary matter, we clarify that in an appeal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 33.1(d), this Court reviews the hearing panel’s recommended punishment de novo rather than for abuse of discretion. We affirm the hearing panel’s finding that Dance knowingly converted client property and its application of aggravating and mitigating factors. But after considering the sanctions imposed in similar cases, we conclude that Dance should be suspended rather than disbarred. We therefore reverse the hearing panel’s judgment in part and suspend Dance from practicing law for five years, with three years to be served on active suspension. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Jamesway Construction, Inc. v. David W. Salyers, P.E.
Jamesway Construction, Inc., filed a petition for judicial review in chancery court following an administrative law judge’s denial of its motion to dismiss administrative proceedings. Jamesway argued the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation’s appeal to the Board of Water Quality, Oil, and Gas was untimely, and therefore the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. The chancery court and Court of Appeals found in Jamesway’s favor on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, yet the chancery court’s own subject matter jurisdiction under Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(a)(1) was never questioned. After granting review, we subsequently directed the parties to brief whether the chancery court had jurisdiction under Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(a)(1) to review a preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency decision. We find that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction under section 4-5-322(a)(1) because Jamesway has not shown that judicial review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy. We vacate the judgments of the lower courts and remand to the Board of Water Quality, Oil, and Gas for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ginny Elizabeth Parker (Dissenting)
In this appeal, we consider whether the evidence is sufficient to support convictions on five counts of forgery. The convictions relate to five checks payable to and cashed by the defendant that were drawn on a bank account that belonged to the defendant’s grandparents. The defendant’s grandmother handled the grandparents’ bank account, and the checks were purportedly signed by her. Shortly after the defendant’s grandmother died, the defendant’s grandfather discovered their account was overdrawn and reported to the police that the checks written to the defendant were counterfeit. In a statement to police, the defendant maintained that the checks were authorized. After a bench trial, the trial court held the defendant’s statement was not credible and found her guilty of forgery. The Court of Criminal Appeals found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions. We agree. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ginny Elizabeth Parker
In this appeal, we consider whether the evidence is sufficient to support convictions on five counts of forgery. The convictions relate to five checks payable to and cashed by the defendant that were drawn on a bank account that belonged to the defendant’s grandparents. The defendant’s grandmother handled the grandparents’ bank account, and the checks were purportedly signed by her. Shortly after the defendant’s grandmother died, the defendant’s grandfather discovered their account was overdrawn and reported to the police that the checks written to the defendant were counterfeit. In a statement to police, the defendant maintained that the checks were authorized. After a bench trial, the trial court held the defendant’s statement was not credible and found her guilty of forgery. The Court of Criminal Appeals found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions. We agree. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Russell Lee Maze and Kaye M. Maze v. State of Tennessee
Upon consideration of the applications for permission to appeal of Russell Lee Maze and Kaye M. Maze and the record before us, the applications are granted in part and denied in part. In their Rule 11 applications, the Mazes raised an issue concerning their motions to remand to the post-conviction court. We summarily grant the applications as to this limited issue. As to this limited issue, we generally affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ denial of the requests to remand. However, to the extent the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals could be interpreted as addressing the merits of Dr. Levy’s affidavit beyond what was necessary to procedurally deny the Mazes’ request to remand, we vacate that portion of the opinion. To the extent Dr. Levy’s affidavit was not previously considered by the post-conviction court in the proceedings below, and to the extent authorized by law, this vacatur is without prejudice to the Mazes’ ability to seek relief related to Dr. Levy’s affidavit from the post-conviction court in the future. All other issues raised in the applications are denied. The entirety of the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals is designated “Not For |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Torrian Seantel Bishop
In this appeal, we address the requirement that a certified question of law reserved for appeal as part of a conditional guilty plea under Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure be “dispositive of the case.” Police stopped Torrian Seantel Bishop for driving on a suspended license and smelled what they believed to be marijuana. A search of his car yielded a stolen handgun. The trial court denied a motion to suppress the handgun, finding that the smell of marijuana provided probable cause to search the car. Thereafter, Mr. Bishop negotiated an agreement with the State under which he entered a conditional guilty plea but reserved for appellate review a certified question of law challenging whether there was probable cause to search his car. The basis for the challenge was the admitted inability of police to distinguish between the smell of illegal marijuana and that of legal hemp. The Court of Criminal Appeals initially affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but this Court remanded for reconsideration after we released our decision in State v. Green, 697 S.W.3d 634 (Tenn. 2024) (addressing the impact of the legalization of hemp on the probable-cause analytical framework). State v. Bishop, No. W2023-00713 CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 1564346, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 11, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Sep. 12, 2024) (remanding for reconsideration) (“Bishop I”). On reconsideration, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the certified question was not “dispositive of the case,” as required under Rule 37(b)(2)(A), and dismissed the appeal. State v. Bishop, No. W2023-00713-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 4798895, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Mar. 14, 2025) (“Bishop II”). We granted review and requested that the parties also address potential revisions to the procedure and analysis for appeals involving certified questions. After careful consideration, we hold that the best practice for a certified question before the trial court includes an on-the-record colloquy to aid in determining whether the question is dispositive of the case. We also hold that if an appellate court determines that a certified question is not dispositive of the case, the court cannot consider the appeal but should vacate the judgment of the trial court to give the defendant the opportunity to withdraw the conditional guilty plea that attempted to reserve the question. As for the decision in this case, we conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in determining that the certified question was not dispositive in light of our recent decision in Green. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Obion | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. William Tony Burrell
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant William Tony Burrell pleaded guilty to driving under the influence (“DUI”) and possession of a handgun while under the influence. As part of the plea, the Defendant reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law challenging the constitutionality of the seizure that led to his arrest. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Defendant’s certified question did not meet the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as set forth by this Court in State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). State v. Burrell, No. E2023 01404-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 4512446 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 17, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2025). Specifically, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the Defendant’s certified question did not “identif[y] clearly the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved” as required by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii). We granted the Defendant’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether he satisfied the procedural requirements for certifying a question of law and to consider revisions to Tennessee’s certified-question procedure. We hold that a reviewing court must consider the certified question statement together with the record in determining whether the scope and limits requirement of Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) has been met. Reading the Defendant’s certified question together with the record, we conclude that Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) is satisfied. We also conclude that the remaining requirements of Rule 37(b)(2) are met. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Court of Criminal Appeals for consideration of the merits of the certified question. |
Polk | Supreme Court | |
Kendal Collier ex rel. Chayce C. v. Periclis Roussis, M.D. et al.
exposure to extraneous information during deliberations in a civil case warrants a new trial. The parties in this healthcare liability action tried a complex, multi-day trial in which a central issue was whether it was appropriate for medical personnel not to use epinephrine to treat a pregnant patient’s anaphylactic reaction. The trial included extensive expert testimony about the risks, benefits, and usage of epinephrine during pregnancy. The jury returned a verdict for the Defendants. Thereafter, the Plaintiff learned that one night during jury deliberations, a juror at home examined the warning label on an EpiPen, an epinephrine auto-injector device, and shared that information with the jury during continued deliberations. The Plaintiff moved for a new trial based in part on a claim that the jury’s exposure to the EpiPen information “tainted the verdict.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that the Plaintiff had not established by clear and convincing evidence that exposure to the EpiPen information affected the jury. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard. We granted permission to appeal to decide the proper analysis when a party in a civil case implicating the constitutional right to a jury trial challenges a verdict because the jury allegedly was exposed to extraneous information. Considering our analogous precedent from criminal cases, we hold that our courts should use a burden-shifting framework to determine whether error occurred and a new trial is required. More specifically, the party challenging the verdict bears the initial burden of proving error—that the jury was exposed to material extraneous information—by a preponderance of the evidence. Upon a successful showing, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises. This circumstance places a burden on the party defending the verdict to rebut the presumption of prejudice by showing that exposure to the material extraneous information was harmless error. To make this showing, the party must demonstrate that there is no reasonable possibility that the information would have altered the verdict of a reasonable jury. Absent this showing, a new trial is warranted due to the violation of the constitutional right to a jury trial. Because the trial court did not have the benefit of this framework when deciding the motion for a new trial, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James R. Holley
In this appeal, we address whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in dismissing a criminal defendant’s appeal because he did not include in the appellate record a transcript of his guilty plea hearing. Here, the defendant’s plea agreement resolved all issues except the manner of service for the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for probation. In the record for his appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals on the denial of probation, the defendant included the transcript from the sentencing hearing but not the transcript from the guilty plea hearing. Citing the absence of the guilty plea transcript, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the record was inadequate for appellate review of the trial court’s sentencing decision. Without giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard, the appellate court then dismissed the defendant’s appeal. We reverse. Under State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278–79 (Tenn. 2012), trial court decisions on the manner of service for a sentence are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. When an appellate record does not include an item such as a guilty plea transcript, the appellate court is to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the record is sufficient for meaningful review, in light of this standard. Id. at 279. The determination on the adequacy of the record is made with the understanding that the trial court has broad discretion in sentencing and the key question on appeal is whether the trial court recited a proper basis for its sentencing decision. Id. Here, the appellate record is sufficient for meaningful appellate review even without the transcript of the guilty plea hearing. But where an appellate court believes a guilty plea transcript is essential to appellate review, it has many options that allow the parties to be heard and to facilitate review of the issues on their merits. Those options include presuming the missing transcript would have supported the trial court’s decision, issuing a show-cause order and permitting written responses, ordering supplemental briefs, or ordering the parties to supplement the record. Here, dismissal of the appeal was not a reasonable option. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Henderson | Supreme Court | |
Sarah Elizabeth Woodruff ex rel. Ethan Woodruff et al. v. Ford Motor Company et al.
In this appeal, we hold that this Court’s holding in Coffman v. Armstrong International, Inc., 615 S.W.3d 888 (Tenn. 2021), does not mandate dismissal as a matter of law of the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims. Here, the plaintiff filed a product liability lawsuit under the Tennessee Products Liability Act against the defendant manufacturer of a child’s booster seat. The lawsuit claimed the defendant was required to warn of risks of using the booster seat in combination with a seatbelt extender, manufactured by another defendant, but failed to do so. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Coffman bars the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims for risks associated with using the defendant’s product with another manufacturer’s product. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed and held that Coffman bars the plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law. We reverse the Court of Appeals and clarify that the holding in Coffman does not mandate dismissal of the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Sarah Elizabeth Woodruff v. Ford Motor Company
In this interlocutory appeal, we hold that this Court’s holding in Coffman v. Armstrong International, Inc., 615 S.W.3d 888 (Tenn. 2021), does not mandate dismissal as a matter of law of the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims. Here, the plaintiff filed a product liability lawsuit under the Tennessee Products Liability Act against the defendant alleged manufacturer of a seatbelt extender. The lawsuit claimed that the defendant was required to warn of risks of using the seatbelt extender in combination with a child’s booster seat, manufactured by another defendant, but the defendant failed to do so. After a mistrial, the trial court granted permission for interlocutory appeal on the question of whether Coffman bars the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims for risks associated with using the defendant’s product with another manufacturer’s product. The Court of Appeals granted the interlocutory appeal and held that Coffman bars the plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law. We reverse the Court of Appeals and clarify that the holding in Coffman does not mandate dismissal of the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Connie Reguli v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
In this disciplinary appeal, the lawyer must be disbarred. The lawyer engaged in a years-long orchestrated effort on social media to publicly intimidate judges and justice system officials, and to inspire community fear and loathing against the justice system itself. She posted hyperbolic commentary on social media loaded with false allegations about judges and justice system officials, doxed judges and justice system officials, urged her social media followers to send them harassing messages, intimidated judges and justice system officials, spread disinformation and conspiracy theories, and flagrantly defied court orders. Her public comments to social media followers indicated she wished physical harm to judges and justice system officials, prompting them to fear for their safety and that of their families. And in defiance of a protective custody order and an Amber Alert for a child in danger, the lawyer enabled her client to evade law enforcement by supplying her client with a burner phone and hiding the client and her child inside the lawyer’s own home. All of these acts were connected to judicial proceedings in which the lawyer was participating. After lengthy disciplinary proceedings, a Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel recommended disbarment, and on appeal the trial court agreed. The lawyer appeals to this Court. Here, the lawyer’s comprehensive efforts sought to intimidate judges and justice system officials, and to directly poison the well of justice. Her conduct is a grave dishonor as a lawyer and demands the most severe sanction. No judicial response short of disbarment would be acceptable. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Demetrius Adkisson a/k/a Antonio Demetrius Tuner Jr. (Concurring in Part/Dissenting in Part)
The majority concludes that Antonio Demetrius Adkisson’s confession to law enforcement officers was involuntary and vacates his two convictions for second-degree murder. Whether Adkisson’s confession was voluntary under the Tennessee and United States Constitutions is a close question. But applying the same totality-of-the circumstances test as the majority, I conclude that the confession here was the product of Adkisson’s own free will, not police coercion. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s analysis of that issue and from the Court’s judgment vacating Adkisson’s convictions. |
Gibson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Demetrius Adkisson a/k/a Antonio Demetrius Turner Jr.
Seventeen-year-old Antonio Demetrius Adkisson (a.k.a. Antonio Demetrius Turner, Jr.) (“the Defendant”) was charged with two counts of first-degree murder for the fatal shooting of two victims. The Gibson County Juvenile Court (“the juvenile court”) held a transfer hearing and found it appropriate to transfer the Defendant to the Gibson County Circuit Court (“the trial court”) to be prosecuted as an adult. After a jury trial, during which the Defendant’s videotaped statements were admitted into evidence, the Defendant was convicted of two counts of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. See State v. Adkisson, No. W2022-01009-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 1252173 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Aug. 14, 2024). The Defendant requested permission to appeal to this Court, alleging (1) the juvenile court lacked probable cause to believe he committed the charged offenses, as required for transfer by Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-134(a)(4)(A), and (2) the trial court erred in admitting his confession at trial because he did not validly waive his right to remain silent and his confession was involuntary. We hold that the Defendant was properly transferred to the trial court. We further hold that the Defendant validly waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, but his confession was unlawfully coerced in violation of the Due Process Clause and thus inadmissible at trial. Having found reversible error on that basis, we vacate the Defendant’s convictions of second-degree murder and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Gibson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Randall C. Johnson
This appeal addresses sealing judicial records. Three filings were sealed without a written order. The presiding judge later recused herself and the matter was transferred. Then The Nashville Banner intervened to unseal the records. The trial court denied the motion to unseal. The appellate court denied the Rule 10 appeal and then denied the petition for writ of certiorari. We reverse. Rule 10 interlocutory review is available to media intervenors when judicial proceedings are closed or documents are sealed. Sealing judicial records protected by the First Amendment right of access requires entry of a written order after finding that a compelling interest necessitates sealing. Any such order mustbe narrowly tailored and seal only those judicial records, or the portions thereof, necessary to protect the identified interest. After conducting a de novo review, we do not find a compelling interest necessitating sealing. The documents shall be made available to the public. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Randall C. Johnson (Concurring in Part/Dissenting in Part)
I agree with many of the holdings in the majority’s good opinion, but I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s adoption of a new compelling interest standard for sealing documents. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Randall C. Johnson (Concurring in Part/Dissenting in Part)
I join in Justice Kirby’s separate opinion. I briefly write separately to emphasize my specific concern with the majority’s unnecessary adoption of the compelling interest standard in this case. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Tony Carruthers v. State of Tennessee
Tony Von Carruthers, a death-row inmate scheduled for execution on May 21, 2026, filed a motion requesting last-minute DNA testing of fingernail scrapings and bindings from the murder victims.1 Mr. Carruthers sought an expedited ruling on the motion without an evidentiary hearing. After analyzing the request under the mandatory and discretionary provisions of the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (DNA Act), the post-conviction court denied the motion. Mr. Carruthers appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon motion of Mr. Carruthers, this Court assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-3-201(d). Because Mr. Carruthers has failed to establish the statutory criteria for ordering analysis under the DNA Act, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Cinda Haddon v. Ladarius Vanlier et al.
In this case, we determine whether prejudgment interest may be awarded in an action brought against a tortfeasor and defended by an uninsured motorist carrier under Tennessee’s Uninsured Motorist Act. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 56-7-1201–1206 (2016 & Supp. 2025). The trial court determined that Plaintiff Cinda Haddon could not recover prejudgment interest because her claim was for personal injury. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Ms. Haddon brought a contract action. Haddon v. Vanlier, No. M2023-01151-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 4590434, at *2–3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. March 17, 2025). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals remanded this matter to the trial court for a determination of prejudgment interest. Id. at *5. Upon review, we find that this is a personal injury action. Because prejudgment interest is not available in a personal injury action, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court denying Ms. Haddon prejudgment interest. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Elliott J. Schuchardt v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
This is an attorney discipline case. Elliott J. Schuchardt was licensed to practice law in Tennessee in 2008. Beginning in 2019, several individuals reported Mr. Schuchardt to the Board of Professional Responsibility. These complaints detailed conduct that implicated the following rules of professional conduct (“RPC”): RPC 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a)–(b) (Communication), 1.5(b) (Fees), 1.7(a)(1) (Conflict of Interest), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.2 (Expediting Litigation), 3.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 3.4(c) (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel), 4.2 (Communication with a Person Represented by Counsel), 4.4(a)(1) (Respect for the Rights of Third Persons), 8.1(a) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 8.2(a)(2) (Judicial and Legal Officials), 8.4(c) (Misconduct-Dishonesty/Fraud/Deceit/Misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (Misconduct-Administration of Justice). A Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility found that Mr. Schuchardt violated these RPCs on forty-seven occasions and recommended disbarment. The Knox County Chancery Court affirmed. Mr. Schuchardt now asks us to reverse. Because ample evidence supports the decisions below, we affirm Mr. Schuchardt’s disbarment. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Matthew Lacy
Ronald Matthew Lacy was a luxury car middleman. In 2015, through a series of electronic communications sent from Kentucky, Lacy persuaded the owner of a car dealership in Tennessee to wire him funds for a Mercedes. But Lacy never delivered the Mercedes or returned the funds. In this appeal, we consider whether a Tennessee court had statutory territorial jurisdiction to convict Lacy of theft for that conduct. We conclude that it did. We further conclude that Lacy’s theft conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. We therefore uphold Lacy’s conviction and affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
CCD Oldsmith Henry, LLC et al. v. Town of Nolensville
CCD Oldsmith Henry, LLC and Oldsmith Group LLC (collectively, “Oldsmith”) brought this civil action in the Williamson County Circuit Court alleging that the Town of Nolensville wrongfully refused to issue building permits that it promised to provide as part of a development project. The Town answered the complaint and asserted counterclaims alleging that Oldsmith failed to fulfill its promise to help pay for intersection improvements needed to support the project. |
Williamson | Supreme Court |
SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
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