COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

George Tipton vs. Axis Fabrication & Machine Co.
E2001-00258-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young

Rouse Construction Co. vs. Interstate Steel Corp.
E2001-00242-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
This is a case wherein the Plaintiff/Appellant, Rouse Construction Company, seeks damages for breach of contract from the Defendant/Appellee, Interstate Steel Corporation. The Chancellor found that there was no meeting of minds between the parties as to essential contract terms and, therefore, ordered that Rouse's claim be denied. The Chancellor further determined that Interstate should be allowed a judgment in the amount of $19,090.00 for materials and plans delivered to Rouse. We concur in the determination of the Chancellor and affirm.

Myron Hubbard vs. Sandi Hubbard
E2001-00110-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young
The Trial Court granted appellee Judgement before the 30 days to answer process provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure had expired. On appeal, we vacate and remand.

Thomas Wynns III vs. Rae Cummings
W2000-02156-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
This case involves a dispute between Thomas Clinton Wynns, III ("Thomas") and Rae Ann Cummings ("Rae Ann"), the son and granddaughter of Mrs. Leola Wynns ("Leola"), concerning Leola's mental capacity and ability to manage her own affairs. Plaintiff, Thomas, holder of a power of attorney from his mother, filed a complaint against the defendant, Rae Ann, seeking to have Rae Ann turn over to him all of Leola's assets in possession of Rae Ann. Rae Ann filed an answer to the complaint and a petition for appointment of a conservator for Leola and for an injunction against Thomas from removing any more of her assets. After a nonjury trial, the trial court found that the court had jurisdiction to appoint a conservator for Leola; that the facts warranted the appointment of a conservator; that the power of attorney held by Thomas and a will executed by Leola in 1998 were void, and that the quit claim deed executed on April 22, 1999, in favor of Thomas, was also void. Thomas appeals. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

Richard Crowe vs. First American
W2001-00800-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
Owner of a pickup truck sued the bank that financed the purchase for conversion after the bank repossessed the truck. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $250,000.00. Bank appeals. We affirm in part reverse in part and remand.

Scarlett/Patrick Spencer vs. James Aydlotte
W2001-00995-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
This is a suit for the termination of parental rights. The Appellants filed a petition in the Chancery Court of Gibson County to terminate the Appellee's parental rights to his child. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the Appellants' petition. The Appellants appeal the trial court's order denying the Appellants' petition to terminate the Appellee's parental rights. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court's decision.

Southwest Williamson County Community Assoc. et al vs. Bruce Saltsman
M2001-00943-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: J. Russ Heldman
Being dissatisfied with the State's concept of, and planning for, the extension of State Route 840 through southwest Williamson County, three residents in the County, two nonprofit corporations, and a partnership that owns property in the County, sued J. Bruce Saltsman, Sr. ("the Commissioner"), in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Transportation ("TDOT"). Following a bench trial, the court below entered a final judgment including (1) a writ of mandamus ordering the Commissioner to perform a number of "duties" in connection with Route 840; and (2) a permanent injunction enjoining him from moving forward with the planning and construction of Route 840 through Williamson County until he complies with the trial court's order. The Commissioner appeals. In addition to other bases for reversal, he asserts that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of this controversy. We agree with the appellant that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below in its entirety and dismiss the petition.

Natalya Mazor vs. Kenneth Isaacman
W2000-01485-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Kay S. Robilio
This is a dental malpractice case. The patient visited the defendant dentist in August 1997 for routine root canal surgery. After the surgery, the patient began experiencing "constant" pain in the tooth in which the root canal was performed. She was told by the defendant dentist that this was pain ordinarily felt after root canal surgery. In February 1999, the patient visited another dentist who discovered that a piece of a drill bit had been left inside patient's tooth during the previous root canal. In December 1999, the patient filed a lawsuit against the defendant dentist for dental malpractice. The defendant dentist filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the patient did not bring the claim within the one year statute of limitations. This motion was granted and the patient now appeals. We reverse, finding that the patient had one year from the time she discovered or should have discovered the foreign object in which to file her lawsuit.

2001-00383-COA-R3-CV
2001-00383-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III

James Laney vs. Evelyn Oldham
E2000-02710-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown, III
Evelyn B. Oldham ("Defendant") sold to James C. R. Laney ("Plaintiff") a house and lot located next to a Chalet owned by Defendant. Defendant granted Plaintiff an easement for use of a driveway. Plaintiff later converted his residence into a business. In 1993, the Trial Court entered an Order interpreting the easement to allow Plaintiff's use of the driveway for a "normal amount of delivery." No appeal was taken from this Order. In 2000, the Trial Court, but a different trial judge, entered another Order interpreting the 1993 Order to allow for a normal amount of business deliveries using the driveway. We conclude that the 1993 Order permits only a normal amount of deliveries consistent with a residential use. We reverse the decision of the Trial Court, and remand for further proceedings.

In Re: Estate of Lois Chandler
E2000-03055-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: John F. Weaver
Buster Chandler, Jr. ("Chandler") was appointed administrator of the estate of his mother, Lois Chandler, who died intestate in 1998. Chandler is incarcerated in Kentucky for a murder he committed in 1990. Chandler requested the Chancery Court arrange for his transportation from prison in Kentucky to Knoxville, Tennessee, so he could be present for the hearing regarding the closing of his mother's estate and so he could meet with the Knox County Attorney General regarding his murder conviction in Kentucky. Chandler argued that the Attorney General wanted to try him for the murder in Knoxville and would assist in obtaining a pardon from the governor of Kentucky. The Chancery Court denied his request, closed his mother's estate, and assessed court costs against Chandler as administrator. Chandler appeals. We affirm the Chancery Court.

Blake Burton, et al vs. Hardwood Pallets, Inc., et al
E2001-00547-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne
This appeal involves a dispute between the sellers of a business and the bank that financed a portion of the purchase price. The plaintiffs, Blake Burton and Michael Burton, entered into an agreement with the defendant, Hardwood Pallets, Inc., to sell the Burtons' pallet manufacturing business. As partial consideration for the sale, Hardwood Pallets executed an unsecured promissory note to the Burtons in the amount of $1,000,000. Additional consideration for the sale was obtained by way of an $800,000 loan from the defendant, AmSouth Bank, to Hardwood Pallets; as a part of the bank transaction, Hardwood Pallets pledged its assets as collateral. As a condition to the making of the loan, AmSouth required the Burtons to execute a subordination agreement. When Hardwood Pallets defaulted on the bank loan, AmSouth sold the collateral at a private sale. Litigation ensued. In addition to suing Hardwood Pallets and its shareholders, the Burtons sued AmSouth, alleging procurement of breach of contract and civil conspiracy to defraud. AmSouth filed a counterclaim, alleging that the Burtons breached the subordination agreement. It also filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that it acted within its rights under the subordination agreement. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of AmSouth pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. We affirm.

Phillip Ledford vs. Bradley Memorial Hospital
E2001-00291-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Lawrence H. Puckett
The plaintiffs, Phillip A. Ledford ("Ledford") and his wife, Elizabeth Ledford, filed suit against the defendants, Daniel V. Johnson, M.D., Bradley Memorial Hospital ("the Hospital"), and Southeast Tennessee Orthopedics, Inc. ("Southeast"), alleging medical malpractice arising out of surgery performed by Dr. Johnson on Ledford's broken arm. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment. We affirm.

Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. vs. SA W. Jeong
E2001-00246-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Lawrence H. Puckett
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company ("Tennessee Farmers") brought a declaratory judgment action against Sa W. Jeong ("the injured party"); her daughter, Hyunlan Lee; and her son-in-law, Jack Sung K. Lee (the defendants Lee are referred to herein collectively as "the Lees"), asking the trial court to "declare whether or not Tennessee Farmers is obligated to afford liability coverage to [the Lees] in connection with the lawsuit filed against them by [the injured party]." At the conclusion of a bench trial, the trial judge ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that the word "reside" and its derivatives "resident" and "residing," particularly as the latter two words are used in the policy language excluding coverage of a claim by a "covered person" or one "residing in the same household," are ambiguous, and that the language of the policy should be construed against Tennessee Farmers as the drafter of the policy. The court ordered Tennessee Farmers to provide liability coverage to the Lees with respect to the subject lawsuit. Tennessee Farmers appeals, raising issues as to whether the trial court correctly ruled that the policy is ambiguous, and whether the trial court was correct in finding that the word "resident" was susceptible to a reasonable meaning that would exclude the injured party from the ambit of the subject exclusionary language in the policy. We find that the subject policy provision is not ambiguous; however, we conclude that the injured party was not "residing in [the Lees'] household" as that language has been construed by applicable case law. Accordingly, we affirm.

Wanda Steinbrunner vs. Tuner Funeral Home, Inc., et al
E2001-00014-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Jacqueline E. Schulten
Six years after her husband died, Wanda J. Steinbrunner sued the Chattanooga funeral home that handled his burial and the medical examiner that performed his autopsy. She made various claims based upon theories of negligence, gross negligence, and outrageous conduct. The trial court granted the funeral home and the medical examiner summary judgment. Steinbrunner appeals, challenging the grant of summary judgment. We affirm.

Roberts vs. Everhart Steel Const. Co. Inc.
E2001-00187-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne
In this action for damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by defendant's negligence, a jury awarded damages. On appeal, we conclusively presume the Judgment is correct, because we cannot review all of the evidence heard by the jury.

Patrick Reinshagen vs. PHP Companies, Inc.
E2001-00025-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown, III
In this action for breach of employment contract and defamation, the Trial Court granted summary judgment to defendants. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

Sherry Lee Lightfoot v. Tommy Edwin Lightfoot
E2001-106-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: L. Marie Williams

Arthur Anderson vs. Edwin Roberson
W2000-01879-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
This appeal presents the sole issue of in personam jurisdiction of a nonresident corporation and the nonresident individual owning a majority interest in the corporation by virtue of their activities, as described in the Tennessee Long Arm statute, or alternatively, as co-conspirators with defendants, subject to the jurisdiction of the court.

Dorothy Owen vs. George Summers
W2001-00727-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Dewey C. Whitenton
This is an action to set aside a warranty deed. Plaintiff-Grantor filed suit on February 11, 1997, to set aside a deed executed July 11, 1989, on the grounds of fraud and mental incompetency. The defendant grantee denied fraud and mental incompetency and affirmatively relied upon the seven-year statute of limitations. Following a jury trial, which ended in a mistrial, the parties stipulated that the case be submitted to the chancellor who conducted the trial for a nonjury determination from the trial transcript and trial exhibits. The chancellor found that the seven-year statute of limitations had been tolled by virtue of the grantor's mental incompetence, the deed was procured by fraud, and that the grantor was mentally incompetent on the date of the execution of the deed. The chancellor rescinded the deed. Defendant-Grantee has appealed. We affirm.

Judy Burroughs vs. Robert Magee
W2001-00238-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
This is a personal injury and wrongful death case. The plaintiff and her husband were involved in an automobile accident. The plaintiff sued the driver of the other vehicle for her husband's wrongful death as well as for injuries she sustained in the accident. The plaintiff named the driver's physician as an additional tortfeasor, alleging that the physician negligently prescribed drugs to a known drug addict, negligently prescribed two contraindicated drugs, and negligently failed to warn his patient of the risks of driving while under the influence of the drugs. The trial court granted the physician's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the physician had no duty to unidentifiable third parties such as the plaintiff. We affirm in part and reverse in part, finding that the physician owed a duty to the plaintiff and the decedent to warn his patient of the risks of driving while under the influence of the prescribed drugs.

Michael Cheslock vs. Bd. of Admin., etc .
W2001-00179-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
On December 14, 1995, Memphis Police Lieutenant Michael Cheslock appeared before the Pension Board of Memphis, Tennessee, to request a line of duty disability pension as provided by the Memphis Code of Ordinances, Section 25-1(27). Mr. Cheslock had been diagnosed by two psychiatrists as disabled by job related Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. The Pension Board refused the line of disability pension, determining that Mr. Cheslock did not meet the requirements as defined by the code. Mr. Cheslock filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Shelby County. The petition was denied and this appeal followed. We affirm.

G. Kline Preston vs. Garrett Realty Service, Inc.
M2000-02350-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
Davidson County -This matter comes to us on appeal from summary judgment granted due to Tennessee's lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Plaintiff attempted to rent a condominium in Florida and sued Defendant in Tennessee for breach of contract after Defendant discovered a mistake in the quoted price and refused to rent the condo to Plaintiff for the quoted price. The circuit court determined that Tennessee had no personal jurisdiction over Defendant and dismissed the case. We affirm.

Tarrance Robinson vs. Neil Clement, et al
M2001-00365-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
This appeal involves a state prisoner housed at the Riverbend Maximum Security Institution who was disciplined for possessing a deadly weapon. After exhausting his internal appeals, the prisoner filed a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, alleging that the disciplinary proceedings had violated his due process rights. The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss the petition. On this pro se appeal, the prisoner asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition. We have determined that the prisoner's petition does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted and, therefore, affirm the trial court.

James Moody vs. William Lea
W2000-02916-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: R. Lee Moore Jr.
This appeal involves a dispute over an oral contract to lease farming equipment. The agreement provided that the defendant could use the plaintiff's farming equipment for an amount to be determined by a formula. The defendant began farming his land, intending to plant cotton, when the Mississippi River rose and the backwater covered his property. Because the backwater remained on the land for such a long period of time, the defendant could no longer grow cotton; he had to grow soybeans instead. Subsequently, the defendant refused to pay the plaintiff the amount the plaintiff claimed under the contract, and the plaintiff sued. The trial court held that the contract was enforceable and that the defendant's performance was not excused by the doctrine of frustration of commercial purpose. The defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court. For the reasons below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case to the trial court to modify the judgment.