In Re: Joseph G., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Joseph G., Trinity G., and Stephen G. (“the Children”), the minor children of a married couple, J.G. (“Father”) and E.G. (“Mother”). The Children, then ages four, two and one respectively, were placed in the protective custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) following the incarceration of both parents. The Children were subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected by stipulation of the parents. A year after the Children entered foster care, DCS filed suit to terminate the parents’ rights. Following a bench trial, the court granted DCS’s petition. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist as to both parents and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Father and Mother separately appeal. As to both parents, we reverse the trial court’s finding of willful failure to support. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Hancock | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Chill et al v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
Donald Chill and his wife, Martha Chill, brought this action against their homeowner’s insurance carrier, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Insurer”), alleging breach of contract by virtue of its refusal to pay for their loss caused by an earthquake. The insurance policy required suit to be brought within one year of the loss. The Chills filed their complaint almost seven years after the loss and over three and a half years after the Chills refused to accept Insurer’s offer to settle the claim for $88,086.49. The trial court granted Insurer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the lawsuit was not timely filed. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Main Street Market, LLC v. Emily V. Weinberg
This dispute arises from a fire that destroyed six adjoining buildings in 1997. The buildings were located along a single city block, running north to south, in downtown Memphis, Tennessee. Defendant owned the second building, sandwiched between one building to the north, owned by one of the Plaintiffs, and the four remaining buildings to the south, owned by the other Plaintiff. Approximately one month before the fire, a substantial portion of the second and third buildings collapsed, damaging all six buildings, and compromising the structural integrity of each building. Due to safety concerns, the parties were ordered not to enter the buildings and were required to ensure that their buildings were inaccessible to the public. The parties complied with the orders. Shortly thereafter, a trespasser entered the Defendant’s building and started a fire which spread to each of the adjoining buildings resulting in substantial damage. Plaintiffs filed negligence actions against the Defendant and argued that she was liable to them for their property damage caused by the criminal acts of the trespasser. Following a trial, the trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of the Defendant based on its conclusion that the Plaintiffs failed to establish any of the requisite elements of their negligence claims. After throughly reviewing the record, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brandon Williams v. Katie Singler
This appeal involves the modification of a parenting plan. The father filed a petition alleging a material change in circumstances and seeking to be designated primary residential parent for the parties’ minor son. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the mother had violated the parenting plan and held that this constituted a material change in circumstances. It changed the designation of primary residential parent from the mother to the father, held the mother in contempt, and awarded the father attorney fees as punishment for the contempt. The mother now appeals. The trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. After a careful review of the evidence, we affirm the finding of a material change in circumstances, but hold that the trial court erred in holding that it was in the child’s best interest to change the designation of primary residential parent from the mother to the father. We also vacate the holding of contempt against the mother and the award of attorney fees as punishment for the alleged contempt and remand for additional findings. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
The Commissioners of the Powell-Clinch Utility District v. Utility Management Review Board
Respondent utility district commissioners appeal the trial court’s determination that a ground for removal from office added to Tennessee Code Annotated § 7-82-307(b)(2), as amended effective June 2009, may be applied retrospectively to acts occurring prior to the effective date of the amendment to remove them from office. They also appeal the trial court’s determination that the additional ground for removal of commissioners, “failing to fulfill the commissioner’s or commissioners’ fiduciary responsibility in the operation or oversight of the district,” is not unconstitutionally vague. We reverse retrospective application of the additional ground for removal contained in the statute, as amended; hold that the statute is not void for vagueness; and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Beaver v. Ford Motor Company
In this appeal we are asked to construe the scope of the Tennessee Lemon Law and to determine whether it applies to Plaintiff’s vehicle. For the following reasons,we find the law applicable to vehicles with a “gross vehicle weight” of 10,000 pounds or less, and we affirm the trial court’s conclusions that Plaintiff is entitled to protection and relief thereunder. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Proposed Conservatorship of Mary F. Stratton
Mary Fern Smith (“Petitioner”) filed a petition in the trial court seeking the appointment of a conservator for her 90-year-old mother, Mary F. Stratton (“Mother”). Mother filed a motion to dismiss citing the provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). The trial court held that it did not have jurisdiction of the petition because Mother was not a resident of Roane County. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-3-101 (2007). It dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Stephen B. et al
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on the minor children (“the Children”) of Tammy S. (“Mother”). Upon order of the Campbell County Juvenile Court entered September 19, 2011, the Children were taken into emergency protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) due to unsanitary conditions in the family home and concerns regarding inappropriate supervision and medical neglect of one of the Children. DCS filed a petition seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights on July 11, 2012. The petition alleged several statutory grounds for termination, including abandonment based on willful failure to visit the Children, abandonment based on failure to provide a suitable home, persistent conditions, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Following a bench trial conducted October 4, 2012, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights after finding by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children due to her failure to provide a suitable home, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan, and (3) the conditions leading to the Children’s removal persisted. The trial court further found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. We affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Kendall Foster, et al v. Federal National Mortgage Association, et al
The plaintiffs brought this action alleging wrongful foreclosure after a judgment against them became final in an earlier, separate unlawful detainer lawsuit filed by Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”). The trial court dismissed the action as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm the judgment of the trial court because the plaintiffs could and should have raised the issues pertaining to the alleged wrongful foreclosure in the earlier detainer action. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Wilma Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A.
The Circuit Court dismissed this appeal from General Sessions Court based on the Appellant’s failure to file a surety bond. Appellant paid costs in the General Sessions Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i), but did not submit a surety bond under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-5-103. The circuit court held that failure to post the surety bond under Section 27-5-103 resulted in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the circuit court. Based on this Court’s holding in Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, L.L.C., No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Wilma Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A. - Dissenting
Here we have yet another case from Shelby County involving the bond requirements for an appeal from general sessions court to circuit court. This Court squarely addressed this issue in University Partners Development v. Bliss, No. M2008-00020-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 112571 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S. Jan. 14, 2009), a memorandum opinion, and we addressed it again in Jacob v. Partee, 389 S.W.3d 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012). Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103 provides that “the person appealing shall give bond with good security, as hereinafter provided, for the costs of the appeal, or take the oath for poor persons.” In both Jacob and University Partners, we held that the statute is unambiguous, and that an appellant who seeks to appeal from general sessions court to circuit court cannot satisfy the bond requirements of the statute by merely remitting payment of an initial filing fee. Payment of the initial filing fee, we explained, simply does not constitute giving “bond with good security” for “the cost of the cause on appeal.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-103. The Supreme Court denied permission to appeal in both Jacob and University Partners. An opinion from the Office of the Attorney General reached the same result. See Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 12-23 (Feb. 23, 2012). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lafayette Insurance Company v. Jerry S. Roberts, et al.
In this appeal we must determine whether an injured worker was an “employee” or a |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Amanda Leenhouts v. Gert Jan Leenhouts
This appeal involves a motion to set aside a default judgment. The wife filed a complaint for divorce. The husband was served with process. After the husband failed to file an answer, the wife filed a motion for a default judgment. The husband filed no response to the motion. The trial court granted the wife a default judgment and held a hearing on the wife’s divorce complaint. The husband did not appear at the hearing. Based on the evidence wife presented at the hearing, the trial court divided the marital estate. The husband then filed a motion to set aside both the default judgment and the divorce decree. The trial court denied the husband’s motion, and the husband now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sandy Jane Smart v. Brian Wayne Smart
Mother and Father were divorced in 2007 and granted joint custody of their then-six year old child. Mother filed a petition for modification in which she asked to be named the primary residential parent because the joint arrangement was not working for the parties and was not in Child’s best interest. Trial court granted Mother’s petition to be named primary residential parent, but directed that major decisions for Child should be made jointly. Father appealed, arguing that trial court erred in finding material change of circumstances had occurred since the initial parenting plan was entered and that the comparative fitness analysis favored Mother as the primary residential parent. Mother appealed trial court’s judgment regarding major decision making. We affirm trial court’s judgment modifying the parenting plan to name Mother the primary residential parent and amend the plan to have Mother make major decisions for Child rather than both Mother and Father jointly. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Mother’s attorney fees but award her reasonable fees incurred on appeal. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of: Skylar B. D.
The Department of Children’s Services filed two petitions to terminate the parental rights of a mother to each of her two children after they were found to be dependent and neglected. The mother was served with both petitions, but she failed to appear at the proceedings where the court heard evidence about her persistent drug use and the Department’s attempts to help her overcome the problems that prevented her from safely parenting her children. The trial court found that the Department had established two grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence that applied to both petitions: persistence of conditions and substantial failure to comply with parenting plans. The court also found that it was in the best interest of the children that the mother’s parental rights be terminated. Mother appealed. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Waylon R. D.
The Department of Children’s Services filed two petitions to terminate the parental rights of a mother to each of her two children after they were found to be dependent and neglected. The mother was served with both petitions, but she failed to appear at the proceedings where the court heard evidence about her persistent drug use and the Department’s attempts to help her overcome the problems that prevented her from safely parenting her children. The trial court found that the Department had established two grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence that applied to both petitions: persistence of conditions and substantial failure to comply with parenting plans. The court also found that it was in the best interest of the children that the mother’s parental rights be terminated. Mother appealed. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Alexander Owens v. James Emery Owens
Wife was awarded rehabilitative alimony in 2004 that was to terminate in 2012. In 2009 Wife filed a petition to increase the duration and amount of her alimony, or, in the alternative, for an award of alimony in futuro. The trial court found Wife was in need of support, but it denied Wife’s petition, finding Wife had not used all reasonable efforts to rehabilitate herself. On appeal we find Wife’s inability to be rehabilitated as that term has been defined by the legislature warrants a modification of Wife’s alimony award. We reverse the trial court’s judgment denying Wife’s petition for alimony and conclude Wife is entitled to alimony in futuro but in a lesser amount. We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying Wife’s request for attorney’s fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lillie Franchie Huddleston v. Robert Lee Huddleston
In this divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of property, specifically the appreciation in value of farm property he owned in his own name prior to the marriage as marital property and of a life insurance policy owned by Wife as her separate property. Finding that the court erred in its classification of the increase in value of the farm property, we reverse the judgment in part and remand for further proceedings. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
David Kwasniewski v. Scott Donna Lefevers
Lessor and Lessee executed a lease agreement that gave Lessee an option to purchase the rented property during a two-year period. A purchase and sale agreement was executed the same day outlining the terms of the sale if the option were exercised. Lessee did not exercise the option during the period specified, and Lessor sued the Lessee for breaching the purchase and sale agreement. Lessee filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted. Lessor appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint. Because Lessee did not exercise the option to purchase the property, the purchase and sale agreement did not become operative. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Aayden L. B. et al
The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on several grounds and determined that the termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We affirm. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Anne Groves, Individually And As Next Of Kin Of Charles Groves v. Christopher Colburn, M.D.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against a hospital in which she asserted claims for medical malpractice and wrongful death. She later amended her complaint to add a party and did not contemporaneously file a certificate of good faith. The trial court dismissed the second complaint with prejudice based upon the court’s determination that plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Henry J. Nagorny v. Sheriff Scott Layel
This appeal arises from a dispute over the calculation of jail time credits. Henry J. Nagorny (“Nagorny”), an incarcerated individual, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court for Grainger County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to compel Sheriff Scott Layel to award him jail behavior credits that allegedly were due him. The Trial Court dismissed Nagorny’s petition sua sponte, stating that the calculation of credits is an administrative matter. Nagorny filed this appeal. We hold that the Trial Court, stating no compelling substantive basis for its decision, erred in dismissing Nagorny’s petition sua sponte. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for proceedings consistent with our Opinion. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
Andrew Spencer v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company
Andrew Spencer (“Plaintiff”) sued Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Railroad”) for negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. After a jury trial, the Trial Court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict finding and holding, inter alia, that the Railroad was not at fault for Plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff appeals raising an issue regarding jury instructions concerning foreseeability and notice. We find that the jury instruction regarding foreseeability and notice was misleading, and we vacate and remand for a new trial. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Anne McDaniel v. Robb Ashby McDaniel
Mother appeals the designation of Father as the primary residential parent of the parties’ two minor children and the parenting schedule which gave Father substantially more parenting time. We affirm the trial court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision which was primarily based on the importance of continuity in the children’s lives. As for the parenting schedule, which awards Father 245 days and Mother only 120 days a year, we find that the evidence preponderates against such a disparity of parenting time; therefore, we reverse the parenting schedule and remand this issue for the trial court to adopt a revised parenting schedule that permits each parent to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the children’s lives that is consistent with the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a). |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
William H. Worley, et al v. Rarity Communities, Inc., et al
Following a trial where Plaintiffs were awarded compensatory and punitive damages, Defendants filed a motion seeking a new trial based on juror misconduct. Defendants alleged the jurors arrived at the punitive damages amount using a quotient, or gambling, verdict. The trial court denied Defendants’ motion for a new trial and Defendants appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because the jurors’ affidavits indicate that not all jurors agreed in advance to be bound by the mathematical process involved in arriving at a quotient verdict. |
Marion | Court of Appeals |
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