APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child.
Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence established
several grounds of termination and that termination was in the best interest of the child.
We now affirm.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right. The petitioner seeks review of the
trial court’s denial of his motion for recusal. Discerning no error upon our review of the
petition for recusal appeal, we affirm.

The Defendant, Michael B. Hurst, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury
of unlawful possession of a weapon by a violent felon, a Class B felony, and violation of
the seat belt law, a Class C misdemeanor, and received an effective thirty-year sentence.
See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 2021) (subsequently amended) (unlawful
possession of a weapon), 55-9-603 (2024) (seat belt law). He appeals the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop and contends the
evidence is insufficient to support the firearm conviction. We affirm the judgments of the
trial court.

This appeal involves a petition for terminationof parental rights and stepparent adoption. The chancery court found that the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support were proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court also determined that the termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The mother appeals. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a divorce involving one minor child. Appellant claims that the trial
court erred in multiple ways when valuing and distributing the marital estate. He also
challenges his limited and restricted parenting time in the permanent parenting plan entered
by the court. Because the record is insufficient to support the valuation of certain items
within the marital estate, we vacate that portion of the trial court’s judgment. Further, the
trial court’s order lacks sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law related to the
permanent parenting plan. Accordingly, we vacate the permanent parenting plan and
remand for further proceedings. The remainder of the judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant, Kevin Ray Roark, was convicted by a Greene County jury of driving under
the influence, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section
55‑10‑401 and received a suspended sentence of eleven months and twenty‑nine days with
ninety days to serve. On appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the trial court violated his
constitutional right to present a defense and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 by
excluding his proffered expert witness; (2) that the trial court erred under Tennessee Rule
of Evidence 702 and McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 263-65
(Tenn. 1997) by admitting the State’s drug‑impairment expert without conducting the
required reliability analysis; (3) that the trial court improperly denied his Rule 29 motion
for judgment of acquittal; and (4) that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Based upon our review, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Devan Denton, filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that due process required the tolling of the statute of limitations based on alleged attorney abandonment, and that the statute of limitations should be tolled because he pursued federal habeas corpus relief before filing his post-conviction petition. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, concluding that it was untimely and that the Petitioner failed to present a basis for due process tolling. The Petitioner appeals, claiming the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The pro se Defendant, Agness McCurry, has filed an application for extraordinary
appeal, see Tenn. R. App. P. 10, seeking review of the trial court’s October 8, 2026 denial
of a motion for judgment of acquittal. We have determined that a response from the State
is not necessary in this matter. Tenn. R. App. P. 10(d). Upon review of the application,
we conclude that the Defendant has not demonstrated grounds for extraordinary relief
under Rule 10. Accordingly, the application is DENIED.

After years of litigation, the parties reached a settlement agreement in a case. One of the
parties attempted to avoid the settlement agreement, and the other party filed a motion to
enforce. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion, finding that
the parties had entered into an enforceable settlement agreement. The trial court then taxed
the court costs to the non-moving party, despite the parties agreeing that they would equally
divide the court costs between them. We affirm the trial court’s judgment granting the
motion to enforce the settlement agreement. We reverse the trial court’s taxing of court
costs and remand to the trial court on that issue. Because the appellants prevailed on the
issues regarding the assessment of costs, we decline to find that this was a frivolous appeal.

This action involves the adoption of a minor child whose mother was deceased. The child’s father had gained custody of the child after the child’s mother’s death, but the father was later arrested and incarcerated. The child was then placed in the custody of the paternal grandparents. With the father’s consent, the grandparents filed a petition for termination of the father’s parental rights and for adoption. The trial court granted the petition on the same day it was filed. The maternal grandmother, who had been allowed to intervene in custody proceedings involving the minor child and the paternal grandparents pending in a different court, filed a motion seeking to set aside the adoption decree. The trial court denied the motion, and the maternal grandmother has appealed. Determining that the maternal grandmother lacks standing to seek relief in the trial court or on appeal, we conclude that this appeal must be dismissed.

Appellees moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Appellants’ premises liability
complaint failed to state a claim. Appellants argued that their complaint was sufficient but
nevertheless sought leave to file an amended complaint to address the alleged deficiencies.
The trial court granted the motions for judgment on the pleadings. The motion to amend
was denied in the same order, which stated that the motion was not addressed as it was
moot. The trial court then denied Appellants’ motion to alter or amend its judgment, finding
that it had applied the correct standard by reviewing only the original complaint. Because
the motion to amend should have been heard before the motions for judgment on the
pleadings and because we conclude the motion to amend should have been granted under
the circumstances, the trial court’s order is reversed as to the denial of the motion to amend
and vacated as to the grant of judgment on the pleadings.

A stalking victim was granted an order of protection prohibiting the Appellant from having contact with her.  On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to issue the order of protection due to a federal lawsuit the Appellant initiated against a third party.  We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction and affirm its judgment. 

On September 28, 2026, the Fourth Judicial District Public Defender filed an
application for interlocutory appeal on behalf of “Defendants, Nathan Dennis, Stevie
Hurst, and Chadrick Rayfield . . . and similarly situated defendants in all four counties of
the Fourth Judicial District” seeking interlocutory review of the trial court’s September 8,
2026 order denying a motion to disqualify the District Attorney General’s Office from
prosecuting cases in the Fourth Judicial District. Tenn. R. App. P. 9. Counsel asserts
that interlocutory review of the trial court’s order is required to prevent irreparable injury;
to prevent needless, expensive, and protracted litigation; and to develop a uniform body of
law. Tenn. R. App. P. 9(a)(1), (2), and (3). The State has filed an answer in opposition to
the application. Following our review, the application for interlocutory appeal is
DENIED.

Defendant, Michael Howard Wigand, pleaded guilty to two counts each of reckless
aggravated assault; vehicular assault; and felony reckless endangerment and one count each
of driving under the influence (DUI); DUI, per se; possession of a handgun while under
the influence; and speeding. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total
effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days and ordered
Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the
trial court erred in its application of several enhancement factors and by denying alternative
sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry
of amended judgments consistent with this opinion.

This matter is before the Court upon petition of the Defendant, Kyle Scott Wallace, for an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 10B, section 2.  The Defendant seeks review of the trial judge’s order denying his motion to recuse. Upon review, and for the reasons stated below, the petition is denied.

The plaintiff filed a qui tam action on behalf of the State of Tennessee against several defendants who designed and manufactured guardrails that were installed on Tennessee roads. The defendants moved to dismiss the case based on the expiration of the Tennessee False Claims Act’s three-year statute of limitations. The plaintiff responded, inter alia, that the statute of limitations had been tolled while an earlier federal action involving this claim had been pending. The defendants disagreed, arguing that the plaintiff was not entitled to tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) because he had voluntarily dismissed all of his claims in the federal action. But the plaintiff asserted that he was not entitled to voluntarily dismiss his claims in the federal action due to specific requirements of the federal False Claims Act. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss but granted an interlocutory appeal to this Court. We hold that the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all of his claims in the federal action and that he therefore was not entitled to tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). So we reverse.

In this probate case, several potential creditors filed claims against the decedent’s estate in
the Probate Division of the McMinn County Chancery Court (“probate court”), alleging
that lawsuits had been filed against the administrator ad litem of the estate in the McMinn
County Circuit Court (“circuit court”). The administrator ad litem and the decedent’s
surviving spouse filed exceptions to the claims, averring that the alleged creditors had
failed to personally sign or verify the claims as required by statute. The alleged creditors
subsequently amended their claims to personally sign and verify them. However, the
amended claims were filed over one year after the decedent’s death. Following a hearing,
the probate court determined that (1) the alleged creditors’ amended claims related back to
the filing of the original claims and were not time-barred and (2) the circuit court needed
to rule on whether the lawsuits in that court were being properly prosecuted before the
probate court could address the status of the alleged creditors’ claims. The probate court
thereby held the alleged creditors’ claims in abeyance pending a circuit court ruling. The
administrator ad litem and the surviving spouse have appealed. Having determined that
the probate court properly held the alleged creditors’ claims in abeyance, we further
determine that the probate court has not entered a final judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss
this appeal and remand the case to the probate court for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Joseph Davis, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; two counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony; and criminal attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony, and received an effective sentence of forty-nine years. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522(2018) (subsequently amended) (rape of a child), 39-13-504 (2018) (subsequently amended) (aggravated sexual battery), 39-17-1005 (2025) (especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor), 39-12-101(a)(3) (2025) (criminal attempt).On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Because we agree that the evidence is insufficient to support the especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor convictions in Counts 3 and 5, we vacate those convictions and judgments and remand the case. We affirm the Defendant’s remaining convictions.

Plaintiff/Appellant filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B seeking review of the trial court’s order denying her motion to recuse. Finding no evidence of bias requiring recusal, we affirm.